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PREFACE
At the end of October 1956, the world discovered the hidden face of the 
Soviet empire when an entire people in the Communist bloc rose up 
against the single-party system and their country’s occupation by the 
Red Army. That country was Hungary. The Budapest revolution that 
broke out on 23 October revealed the impotence of the ruling Hungarian 
Communist party, which had to turn to Moscow for help. During the 
night, the Soviet divisions stationed in Hungary made their way to the 
capital to put doivn an insurrection of several thousand civilian 
combatants. Those combatants, however, enjoyed the enthusiastic 
support of the population, and most of the army and even the municipal 
police refused to fight them, if they did not actually join them. As a result, 
the “battle of Budapest” lasted nearly a week, followed by a temporally 
lull under the leadership of a new prime minister, Imre Nagy. This 
patriotic, enlightened Communist tried to reach a political wider- 
standing with the leaders of the Kremlin, but ultimately failed. On 
k November a second invasion by the Soviet army crushed the uprising.
The revolution was over. The Soviet intervention left thousands of 
dead and wounded, buildings in ruins, and prisons that, over the weeks, 
filled up with insurgents and intellectuals accused of having taken part 
in the revolt. Around 10,000 of them received heavy prison sentences, and 
more than 300 were executed, including Prime Minister Imre Nagy and 
several of his colleagues, all of them Communists.
Isabelle Vonèche Cardia’s remarkable work focuses on one particular 
aspect of these events, namely the operation earned out by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during and after 
the insurrection. This operation was documented only in official ICRC 
activity reporis, which provided precise accounts of the work earned out 
by the Geneva centre and its delegates and the distribution of aid to the 
victims, but refrained from any analysis or political conclusions. Ms. 
Vonèche Cardia’s research fills that gap, revealing for the first time the 
political impact of the ICRC action. That action was critical for the 
Hungarians saved and protected by the Genevan humanitarian 
organization, but it was also of major imporiance for the ICRC itself, 
being the biggest operation the organization had undertaken since World
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War II - and the most perilous, since the Soviet Union had been hostile 
towards the ICRC since the end of the war. The ICRC was consequently 
forced to embark on its action in Hungary without any assurance of 
cooperation from the authorities of Moscow and Budapest - and, 
needless to say, with no knowledge of the way the Communist bloc 
functioned, or of the nature of the power that held sway after the 
appointment of Imre Nagy.
Isabelle Vonèche Cardia presents a very perspicacious analysis of the 
difficulties arising from this unprecedented situation. The ICRC could, 
of course, invoke the Geneva Conventions, which had been ratified by the 
Soviet Union and Hungary; but it was confronted by an intractable 
armed conflict compounded by an equally intractable, three-sided 
political conflict - on one side, the Hungarian insurgents, on the other, 
the Soviet power, and between them Imre Nagy’s government which, in 
its efforts to find a solution to the crisis, ivas moving closer and closer to 
the national revolutionary cause. Who was who, out in the field? Who 
represented which population and which authority? Was it an internal 
conflict or an international one? Like the elusive combatants themselves, 
the Genevan delegates had to feel their way, bid they never gave up. The 
present study is the first that has ever described the real complexity of this 
situation and the ICRC’s unflagging determination to save victims and 
protect the population in the face of all obstacles. At the same time, the 
author has impariially pointed oid the weaknesses that mawed the 
operational strategy adopted by the organization’s base in Geneva.
At the outset, everything happened very quickly. Less than a week of 
fighting was succeeded by a week of relative stability as the Nagy 
government sought a compromise acceptable to both the revolutionary 
forces and Moscow. All this took only 13 days - and then came, as 
mentioned, the massive invasion and repression. During the initial 
stage, neither the ICRC headquarters in Geneva nor the delegates in the 
field had the time or the means to see clearly what was going on, much 
less enlist the aid of the authorities. A delegate from Geneva, for example, 
could hardly rely on the promises of a Hungarian diplomat who had 
served the Communist government before the revolution but rallied to the 
Nagy government - only to turn his coat again the next day. And how 
could relief supplies be fonvarded and prisoners protected without the 
consent of this Soviet commander or that local revolutionary leader? 
Imre Nagy’s position also seems to have been a major problem for the 
heads of the ICRC. His name appeared very rarely in updated 
documents, and there is no evidence that the organization approached 
his government. The ICRC may have considered him insignificant, or 
thought of his government as a sort of interlude between the main acts, a
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temporally stopgap that would soon collapse. All we can ascertain now is 
that the Geneva organization approached the Soviet authorities — in 
particular Dimitri Chepilov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs - and, 
naturally, the Hungarian Red Cross, but did not tiy to obtain assistance 
from the revolutionary government of Budapest.
The incidents described in this book plunge the reader into the heart of 
a labyrinth that the author has managed to map out with the help of 
ICRC archival material. She has gone still further, however, in her 
efforts to shed light on the decision-making process. The Geneva 
Committee faced tivo major dilemmas, one of them being to determine 
the very nature of the conflict. As noted in several sources cited in this 
book, including a shrewd note by René-Jean Wilhelm, the Hungarian 
affair bore some of the hallmarks of an international conflict, but “the 
hostilities in Hungary called rather for the application of Ariidé 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, an ariicle that is valid for non-international 
conflicts”. In fact, writes Ms. Vonèche Cardia, the ICRC considered that 
the implementation of this ariicle would serve to guarantee that a certain 
minimum of humanitarian principles was respected, making an exact 
legal definition of the conflict unnecessary for the time being but keeping 
such an option open for the future.
This policy - or rather this absence of any decision as to the nature of 
the conflict - ivas probably wise, under the circumstances. There would 
have been no advantage in poisoning the ICRC’s relations with the 
Soviets, who could not veiy well admit to a state of war with socialist 
Hungary, their friend and ally. On the contrary, the ICRC’s attitude 
“reflected its desire to maintain friendly contacts with the USSR”, writes 
Ms. Vonèche Cardia. “The Hungarian action was conducted with 
extreme caution to avoid compromising future operations in the 
Communist camp”.
The ICRC showed the same caution in facing its second major 
dilemma ivhen, after the brief revolution had been crushed, János 
Kádár’s government began to cany out mass arrests, political trials, and 
executions. During those years of repression, the ICRC remained true to 
its mission, making every effort to carry out various operations. In 
particular, it sought authorization to visit prisoners, but never obtained 
it except in the case of one or two essentially uncontroversial visits. 
Notably, there is no sign that any attempt was made to ascertain the fates 
of the most prominent political prisoners, namely Imre Nagy and his 
codefendants, who were initially deported to Romania, and later 
imprisoned, tried, convicted, and executed in Budapest. This book shows 
very clearly that János Kádár’s government was happy to accept the food
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and other material assistance sent in from the West, but kept the doors of 
the prisons locked.
After a year of unavailing efforts that foundered on the duplicity of 
the Hungarian authorities, the I CRC had to admit failure at last, and on 
3 October 1957 it decided to cease its endeavours. Nonetheless, the present 
study cites accusations that the ICRC was not firm enough, a criticism 
that has been made notably by the ICRC’s own collaborators. Isabelle 
Vonèche Cardia attributes the ICRC’s timid approach primarily to its 
fear of a world conflict that would be more dangerous than the 
Hungarian insurrection. Judicious though this reasoning undoubtedly 
was, at the time the jails were filled to bursting with young insurgents, 
including minors, aivaiting trial, sentencing, and execution - not to 
mention the Prime Minister, two other members of the lawful 
government of1956, and two journalists, who would mount the scaffold 
on 16 June 1958.
Nonetheless, the ICRC seems to have been justified in ceasing its 
efforts in the sphere of deportations, since it lacked exact information. 
Concern about the fate of 100 or 200 students forced across the 
Hungarian border onto Soviet territory teas set at rest by their return, 
and to date there has been no report of any insurgent prevented from 
returning home.
The publication of this meticulous, scrupulous work on the merits 
and flaws of the ICRC action must be saluted. With respect to the flaws, 
an episode recounted in the book shows that the errors committed were 
attributable to the ICRC’s inexperience - even ignorance - rather than to 
any failure in its principles and duties. Applying to Moscow for the 
facilities it needed for its action in Hungary, the ICRC received the 
brusque reply: ask Budapest. Even in 1956, there were things that Geneva 
headquarters might have known. Or that someone coidd have made a 
telephone call or two to find out...
Miklós Molnár
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to the International Committee of the Red Cross for 
having made this work possible and being so receptive to my requests. I 
wish to take this opportunity to extend warm thanks to all the members 
of the ICRC who have helped me, in particular Karin Ducret, Sophie 
Coppex, Addolorata Della Tommasa, Dominique Junod, Marie-Béatrice 
Meriboute, Françoise Patry and Françoise Perret, Marie-Claude Perret, 
Aurélie Schaerer, Fabrizio Bensi, Martin Merger, Jozef Palkó vie, 
Charles Pierrat, Alain Stauffer, and Michel Veuthey.
I would also like to thank Professor René Girault for having consented 
to direct and guide my research. Melchior Borsinger, Miklós Molnár, and 
Jiri Toman gave me the benefit of useful conversations, and Mrs. Ibi 
Kukorelly was kind enough to translate a Hungarian document for me. I 
am indebted, as well, to Clara Cardia, Odile de Lastelle, and Florence 
Walker, Benoit Bastard, Victor-Yves Ghébali, Vincent Menendez, Jean 
Perrenoud, Louis de Saussure, Fernando Vidal, and Rafael Wolf for 
them contributions to this work, and to Martha Grenzeback for her 
competent English translation of the original French edition. Finally, 
I would like to express my great appreciation to François Bugnion for 
his assistance and constant support.

FOREWORD
The aim of this book is not only to chronicle the action conducted by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the course of the 
1956 Hungarian revolution, but also to explain why this organization was 
authorized to work in the Eastern bloc. To answer this question, the book 
focuses first on the relations between the ICRC and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) before the events of 1956, and then on the 
relations between the USSR and Hungary. It then goes on to describe the 
ICRC’s action in Hungary in chronological order, distinguishing between 
three different phases of the operation: the ICRC’s operations during the 
insurrection, the establishment of delegations in Vienna and Budapest, 
and the period of the temporary missions that were organized after the 
permanent delegations were closed.
This study covers an entire decade (1952-1962) in order to situate the 
ICRC’s action in its context. The year 1952 revealed a good deal about 
the state of relations between the ICRC and the USSR. That was the 
year of the 18th International Conference of the Red Cross, at which the 
Soviet Union displayed real hostility towards the ICRC. I have pursued 
my analysis up to 1962 so as to cover most of the ICRC operation in 
Hungary-which continued into the 1960s and even longer-as well as the 
Cuban crisis, in which the ICRC mediated between the USSR and the 
United States.
The book is based on an analysis of documents in the ICRC archives. 
The main dossiers to which I had access were those pertaining to the 
missions, which contained the reports submitted by the delegates in 
Budapest and Vienna, documents relating to the ICRC action in the field, 
and minutes of meetings between the various people involved. These 
dossiers provide a sound basis for reconstruction of the ICRC action. 
However, since the ICRC was working under pressure, the documents in 
the archives do not always give a precise account of the decisions made 
and the challenges confronted by the organization; and, moreover, 
certain documents are not accessible to researchers. Consequently, the 
study of the ICRC’s action in Hungary from 1952 to 1962 has yet to be 
completed.

INTRODUCTION
On 23 October 1956, several thousand students assembled in Petőfi 
Square in Budapest, where a crowd quickly joined them. The 
demonstrators all gathered around the parliament building and 
demanded to talk to Imre Nagy, the former Council President who had 
been removed from power in 1955. That evening Imre Nagy finally 
spoke, but his speech did not satisfy the demonstrators’ expectations; he 
merely enjoined caution. Then the First Secretary of the Party, Emö 
Gerö, addressed the Hungarian people over the radio. In his speech, he 
could not praise the USSR enough, and condemned those who wanted “to 
set proletarian internationalism and Hungarian patriotism against each 
other”.1 The transmission of these words unleashed an uproar; 
demonstrators tried to storm the radio broadcasting building, and the 
first shots were fired there. Stalin’s statue was joyfully pulled down as 
gun battles raged around the city. This armed riot was completely 
spontaneous, improvised by young people who met up and formed groups 
in the heat of the action. During the night, the Hungarian leaders finally 
decided to install Imre Nagy as the head of the government, but it was 
too late; the insurrection was under way. To re-establish order, they 
called in Soviet tanks, which sought to control the streets of the capital by 
force.
For one turbulent week, Imre Nagy tried to do the impossible: 
reconcile the demands of the rebelling people with Soviet pressure. In 
the end he decided to go with the Hungarians, and proclaimed Hungary’s 
neutrality and its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. On 4 November 
1956, Moscow answered this unacceptable move with force: Soviet tanks 
invaded the country and broke the armed resistance in one week. Order 
had been re-established.
In his last speech, Imre Nagy pronounced these words: “At daybreak, 
Soviet forces started an attack against our capital, obviously with the 
intention to overthrow the legal Hungarian democratic government. Our 
troops are fighting. The government is in its place. I notify the people of
1 André Fontaine, History of the Cold War, Vol. 2, From the Korean War to the Present, 
trans. Renaud Brace (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1970), p. 215.
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our country and the entire world of this fact”.2 Up to the last minute Imre 
Nagy and his supporters beseeched the outside world to come to their 
aid, but their pleas went unheeded except for a few symbolic gestures 
intended to salve the consciences of Western governments and 
international organizations aware of their own impotence. Eisenhower 
wrote to Bulganin, the Soviet premier, asking him to withdraw his 
troops. The United Nations Security Council, to which Imre Nagy had 
already appealed during the uprising, held an emergency meeting on 
4 November and voted nine to one for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
Since the single vote against it was that of the USSR - which amounted 
to a veto — the Security Council could do no more than issue a moral 
condemnation of the Soviet intervention.
Although the Hungarians’ appeals fell on deaf ears in the political 
world, humanitarian bodies were more responsive. On 27 October 1956, 
only four days after the uprising had begun, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) was already in Hungary. Answering an appeal 
from the Hungarian Red Cross, it had embarked on its biggest relief 
action of the decade.3
The ICRC was the relief organization of choice for a number of 
reasons. First, it was the only such body authorized to enter Hungary. All 
the UN’s attempts to intervene met with failure. The UN special 
commission established to investigate events in Hungary was denied 
entry to the country, and, despite his requests, so was the UN Secretary- 
General, Dag Hammarskjöld. Consequently, the United Nations relied 
on the ICRC to assist the Hungarian people. Dag Hammarskjöld 
declared in July 1957, while visiting the ICRC headquarters: “No public 
tribute on my part [...] could adequately express the debt of gratitude 
which innumerable persons, in particular the victims of the events in 
Hungary and the Middle East, owe to the Red Cross for the services it 
has rendered during the past months with such competence and devotion 
to duty”.4
Second, the ICRC was the sole organization authorized to intervene 
in Hungary because it had always acted in the international sphere and 
addressed only problems engendered by armed conflicts, its main tasks 
being to protect and assist the military and civilian victims of those
2 Ibid., p. 229.
3 The ICRC was created in 1863 at the initiative of Henry Dunant. Its history and modes 
of operating are reviewed in Annex I.
4 “Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld at the ICRC Headquarters”, ICRC Press Release No. 615b, 
10 July 1957.
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conflicts.0 The ICRC’s protective activities were intended to preserve 
those victims from the dangers, sufferings, and abuses of power to which 
they might be exposed in the hands of an adverse authority or enemy 
group or when, as refugees, they were completely dependent on the will 
of a host country not party to the conflict. Assistance consisted in 
convoying and distributing all material aid intended for conflict victims. 
These activities were fundamentally tied to the role of neutral 
intermediary conferred on the ICRC by the Geneva Conventions, the 
Statutes of the International Red Cross, and the resolutions of 
International Red Cross Conferences.5 6 Although the ICRC was the 
neutral intermediary between belligerents, it did not act alone. As part of 
the International Red Cross, it was obliged not only to respect all the 
decisions made by the authority superior to it (the International 
Conference), but also to cooperate with the other components of the 
movement, namely the League of Red Cross Societies (today’s 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) and the National 
Societies themselves.7
Finally, the ICRC was able to intervene in Hungary by virtue of the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, ratified by the USSR on 10 May 1954 
and by Hungary on 3 August of the same year. Its action was restricted, 
however, by the fact that the Conventions are generally applicable only 
to international armed conflicts, whereas at the time in question the 
events of 1956 were classified as internal affairs of the Eastern bloc.8
5 Paragraphs 4 to 6 of Article VI of the Statutes of the International Red Cross provided 
a precise description of the role of the ICRC:
“4. It undertakes the tasks incumbent on it under the Geneva Conventions, works for 
the faithful application of these Conventions and takes cognizance of complaints 
regarding alleged breaches of the humanitarian Conventions.
5. As a neutral institution whose humanitarian work is carried out particularly in time 
of war, civil war, or internal strife, it endeavours at all times to ensure the 
protection of and assistance to military and civilian victims of such conflicts and of 
their direct results. It contributes to the preparation and development of medical 
personnel and medical equipment, in co-operation with the Red Cross organizations, 
the medical services of the armed forces, and other competent authorities.
6. It takes any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a specifically 
neutral and independent institution and intermediary and considers any question 
requiring examination by such an institution”. ICRC/League of Red Cross 
Societies, Handbook of the International Red Cross, 11th ed. (Geneva, 1971), p. 276.
h Jacques Moréikon, “Red Cross Assistance and Protection”, International Review of the 
Red Cross 224 (Sept.-Oct. 1981): 264-268.
1 On the relations between the different components of the International Red Cross, see 
Annex II. On the National Red Cross Societies and the League of Red Cross Societies, 
see Annexes IV and V.
8 The problem of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Hungarian conflict is 
discussed in Annex III.
4 HUNGARIAN OCTOBER
Even where the ICRC is entitled to intervene, the country involved 
can always refuse to accept its assistance. In this case, however, the 
Hungarian Red Cross in fact applied to the ICRC, with the tacit consent 
of the Soviet invader. The interesting question here is why Moscow 
authorized the ICRC to enter its sphere of influence, when it had shown 
considerable hostility towards the organization since 1945. To answer 
this, we will have to review the relations between the ICRC and the 
USSR since 1917, examine the relations between Hungary and Moscow, 
and, finally, analyse the impact of the ICRC action in 1956.
CHAPTER I
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ICRC 
AND THE USSR 
1918-1956
1. THE ICRC AND THE USSR, 1918-1945
Relations between the ICRC and the USSR were established soon 
after the October Revolution. In May 1918, the ICRC appointed Edouard 
Frick as its delegate in Russia. A few weeks later, on the basis of a 
proposal drafted by this delegate,9 a decree of the Council of People’s 
Commissars was adopted and signed by Lenin. In this decree, dated 
30 May 1918,10 the Soviet government “informs the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva and all the governments which 
have acceded to the Geneva Convention that this Convention, in all its 
initial and later versions, as well as all the other international 
conventions and agreements relating to the Red Cross and recognized 
by Russia before October 1917, are recognized and will be respected by 
the Russian Soviet Government which retains all the rights and 
prerogatives ensuing from these conventions and agreements”.11
On 7 August 1918, the Council of People’s Commissars also announced 
“the uninterrupted continuation of the activity of the Russian Red Cross 
Society”.12
9 For more information about relations between the ICRC and the USSR during this 
period, see François Bugnion, Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et la 
protection des victimes de la guerre (Geneva: ICRC, 1994), pp. 286-295. English 
translation in preparation.
10 Sources differ as to the date of this decree. The date of 2 June 1918 is cited in André 
Durand, History of the International Committee of the Red Cross: From Sarajevo to 
Hiroshima (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1984), p. 100. However, we find 30 May 
1918 in I. P. Blishchenko and V.A. Grin, International Humanitarian Law and the Red 
Cross (Moscow: Executive Committee of the Order of Lenin Alliance of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies of the USSR, 1983), p. 25.
11 Blishchenko and Grin, p. 25.
12 Durand, p. 102.
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For its part, in 1921 the ICRC recognized the existence and operation 
of the Soviet Red Cross, but insisted that genuinely active ties be 
established. In October of that year, the ICRC established a delegation in 
Moscow and sent Voldemar Wehrlin there as a delegate. He remained in 
the Soviet Union until 1938. During those years, relations between the 
ICRC and the USSR were fairly good. Voldemar Wehrlin seemed 
satisfied with the work his delegation was doing: “Thanks to the prestige 
of the International Committee, such a mission has been able to work for 
17 years in the USSR without deviating in the slightest from the guiding- 
principles of the Committee’s existence, namely, the total independence 
and impartiality of humanitarian activities”.13
The Soviets, however, did not share Wehrlin’s optimism. Although they 
tolerated the presence and activities of an ICRC delegate on then- 
territory, they remained mistrustful of him. As one official remarked, 
“Here we consider Europe’s humanitarian organizations as institutions of a 
single class — the bourgeoisie - that want to worm their way in everywhere 
to find out what is not going well for the Communists”.14 This having been 
the case from the beginning, the Soviet attitude towards humanitarian 
organizations does not appear to have been the reason for the ICRC’s 
departure in 1938. Although during his last year in the Soviet Union 
Voldemar Wehrlin received only temporary residence permits good for 10 
to 15 days from the Soviet authorities, it was neither that sort of annoyance 
nor the Soviets’ perception of the ICRC that compelled the organization to 
leave. The ICRC recalled its delegate on its own initiative,15 to the great 
regret of Wehrlin himself: “The USSR is a huge world in itself, and never in 
history has a country been so cut off. This situation, I feel, makes it highly 
desirable for a Red Cross delegation to be there, so that the outside world is 
represented within the Soviet Union, not only by the diplomatic missions 
pursuing national aims, but also by those of international humanitarian 
work so ably represented by your Committee”.16
According to André Durand, the ICRC closed its delegation in 1938 
because it had found itself called upon to perform, as a major part of its 
activities in the USSR, duties normally assumed by a consular office, while
13 Ibid., p. 236.
14 Jacques Moreillon, Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et la protection des 
détenus politiques (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute and Lausanne: Editions L’Age 
d’Homme, 1973), p. 71.
lo On this point, opinions differ: “It is with regret that the International Committee 
terminates this mission, the Soviet authorities having refused to renew its delegate’s 
visa”. Bugnion, p. 1158.
16 Durand, p. 236.
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at the same time it was forbidden to carry out its own traditional tasks.1 ' 
Moreover, at the time the ICRC did not think of maintaining any permanent 
delegations except in conflict zones or areas suffering from particularly 
severe circumstances, so the fact that the ICRC had maintained a 
delegation for so long in the USSR was already unusual. Nonetheless, in 
November 1938, as war threatened, the ICRC again requested a visa for its 
delegate; but war broke out before it received a response.17 8
The main problem the ICRC faced in its relations with the USSR 
during World War II was the issue of prisoners of war. Since the USSR had 
not ratified the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War,19 the ICRC could not legally intervene on behalf of 
either Soviet prisoners in enemy hands or prisoners detained by the 
Soviets. Thus, in terms of legal obligations, the ICRC had a perfect right to 
wash its hands of this category of persons. Instead, however, it decided to 
offer its services to all the belligerents regardless of whether or not they 
had ratified the Conventions. In order to perform its functions 
satisfactorily, in 1941 the ICRC requested permission to set up a mission 
in Moscow, but the Soviet government took no action. Instead, it informed 
the ICRC, through the intermediary of the People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, that “The Soviet Government is 
ready to accept the proposal of the ICRC concerning the despatch of 
particulars about prisoners of war, if such indications are forwarded by the 
countries at war with the USSR”.20 Even if the lack of a delegation in the 
USSR prevented it from making direct arrangements for assisting 
prisoners of war, the ICRC continued to hope that the belligerents might 
be brought to some sort of agreement. Yet despite numerous applications 
to the powers concerned, the ICRC did not manage to find any common 
ground. From 1944 on, hope was well and truly lost, since the Soviet 
government no longer allowed the representatives of the Alliance of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR to maintain official 
relations with the ICRC. Only informal contacts were possible.21
17 Certain consular duties fell to the lot of the ICRC mission in Moscow because 
Switzerland had not maintained political and commercial ties with the USSR since 1923. 
For more information on the reasons for that diplomatic rupture, see ibid., p. 258.
18 Ibid., p. 236.
19 The USSR had, in fact, ratified only the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field.
20 Telegram from Moscow, 27 June 1941, in Report of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross on Its Activities during the Second World War (September 1,1939-June 30, 
19Jf7), 4 vol. (Geneva: ICRC, May, 1948), Vol. I: General Activities, p. 409.
21 For a detailed account of the ICRC’s actions in the conflicts of Eastern Europe, see 
Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities during the 
Second World War, Vol. I, pp. 404-436.
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In addition, the USSR and the ICRC were at odds more than once 
during the war. In 1942, the ICRC called on the belligerents not to 
prosecute prisoners of war for things they had done before being 
captured. The Soviets sharply criticized this request, since it was 
contrary to the policy they intended to follow. When the Katyn mass 
grave was found in April 1943,22 the USSR completely disapproved of the 
ICRC’s willingness in principle, as long as all the interested parties 
requested it, to lend its good offices to appoint a commission of enquiry 
that would be present during the disinterment of the bodies.23 The 
ICRC’s attitude was openly criticized in the Soviet press. Finally, when 
Soviet troops arrived in Berlin, they arrested and deported the ICRC 
delegates stationed there. A few months later Moscow released them 
without explanation.
These incidents show that during the world conflict relations between 
the ICRC and the USSR were acrimonious and occasionally explosive, 
foretokening a difficult future.
2. THE CONFERENCES OF 1948 AND 1949
It was not until 1948, at the 17th International Conference of the Red 
Cross in Stockholm, that the different organs of the Red Cross world 
assembled again. This would also have been the first opportunity since 
the war for the ICRC and the USSR to meet, except that the USSR and 
its satellites declined the invitation. The reasons given by the Soviet 
government and the Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of 
the USSR were aimed directly at the ICRC.24
22 On 13 April 1943, the German authorities announced that they had discovered, in the 
Forest of Katyn (near Smolensk, on territory then occupied by the Germans), a mass 
grave containing the remains of some 10,000 Polish officers murdered by the Soviets in 
1940. Moscow immediately retorted that the bodies were of prisoners executed by the 
Germans during their attack on the USSR. Both the German and Polish governments 
asked the ICRC to participate in the exhumation operations.
2,i Report of the Intel-national Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities during the 
Second World War, Vol. I, pp. 428-429.
24 Letter from Dr. Chodlokoff, Chairman of the Working Committee of the Soviet Union 
Red Cross and Red Crescent, Moscow, to Count Folke Bernadotte, Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the International Red Cross Conference, 15 Aug. 1948 
(FOLForeign Office] 369/3969. K. 9831). See also letter from S. Basarov, Acting Chargé 
d’Affaires of USSR in Sweden, to Count Folke Bernadotte, Chairman of the Central 
Committee of the Swedish Red Cross, 17 Aug. 1948 (FO 369/3969. K. 9831), cited in 
Dominique-D. Junod, The Impeiiled Red Cross and the Palestine-Eretz-Yisrael 
Conflict 19Í5-1952: The Influence of Institutional Concerns on a Humanitarian 
Operation (London: Kegan Paul, 1996), p. 249.
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One of the Alliance’s complaints about the ICRC was that it “did not 
protest against the fascist crimes and against the gravest violations of 
the International Conventions concerning the sick, wounded and 
prisoners of war committed by Hitler Germany”.20 Such a protest, 
however, would not have accorded with the rules the ICRC had laid 
down for itself, namely its “refusal to make any pronouncements on 
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions, and [its] equally 
categorical refusal to undertake itself enquiries concerning deeds 
contravening these conventions or the law of war”.2<> The Alliance also 
resented the ICRC on the grounds that it had done nothing since the 
end of World War II for the people still detained in formel- Fascist 
camps and that it had not protested against the “banditry of the Fascist 
Greek Monarchy” or against the “bloodbaths in Indonesia and 
Vietnam”.2' The Soviet government, for its part, blamed the ICRC 
for failing to denounce Fascist crimes publicly and for adopting a hostile 
attitude to the USSR; and since the ICRC was one of the organizers of 
the International Conference, the Soviets preferred not to attend.
The President of the ICRC, Paul Ruegger, seized the opportunity of 
the first session of the Conference to respond to these accusations. He 
asserted that the ICRC was not at all hostile to the Soviets, as evidenced 
by the efforts it had made since 1946 to establish a dialogue with the 
Alliance. As for the allegations concerning the ICRC’s conduct during 
World War II, President Ruegger invited those interested to refer to the 
Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities 
during the Second World War.* * * * 27 28
The accusations made against the ICRC, together with the Soviet 
refusal to attend the International Conference, showed clearly that 
relations between the ICRC and the USSR were very tense, and the 
Soviet Union was accordingly expected to stay away from the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949 as well. Yet it did attend that conference, and signed 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Although initially this may seem 
surprising, two factors help account for Soviet participation in the 1949 
conference. For one thing, signing the Geneva Conventions was a logical 
corollary of upholding the humanitarian law from which the USSR
2:> Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference, Stockholm, August 1948, Report
(Stockholm: Swedish Red Cross, 1948), p. 31.
2,1 Leopold Boissier, “Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et ses interventions dans
les conflits politiques”, Annuaire suisse de science politique 5 (1965): 12.
27 Junod, p. 248.
28 Ruegger’s speech, first plenary meeting, 20 Aug. 1848, in Seventeenth International 
Red Cross Conference, Stockholm, August 1948, Report, pp. 25-27.
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wanted to benefit. The Soviet Union had in fact signed all the conventions 
and other agreements of international law previous to 1949, except for 
the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War.29 30Moreover, at the time the Soviets were certain that the “world 
revolution” was on the right track, and that under the circumstances civil 
war must inevitably break out in the capitalist world in the form of a 
proletarian revolution that might bring other States into the USSR’s 
sphere of influence.311 During the conference discussions about Article 3 
common to the four Conventions, the only article applicable to internal 
conflicts, the Soviets insisted very strongly on giving it the broadest 
interpretation possible.31 Thus, signing the 1949 Conventions was in the 
USSR’s national interest, and had nothing to do with the ICRC.
Nonetheless, during the Diplomatic Conference the Soviet Union 
made certain reservations to the Geneva Conventions. The first one 
concerned Article 10/10/10/11, common to all four Conventions, which 
provided for the designation of an impartial humanitarian body to 
assume, in the absence of a Protecting Power, the functions normally 
performed by the latter. In its reservation, the Soviet government 
declared that it would not “recognize the validity of requests by the 
Detaining Power to a neutral State or to a humanitarian organization, to 
undertake the functions performed by a Protecting Power, unless the 
consent of the Government of the country of which the prisoners of war 
are nationals has been obtained”.32
The second reservation was in respect of Article 85 of the Third 
Convention (which reads: “Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of 
the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, 
even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention”33). The USSR 
declared that it reserved the right to withhold unilaterally the protection 
of the Geneva Convention from prisoners of war whom it classified as war 
criminals.34 Through these two reservations, the Soviet Union restricted
29 The USSR also failed to sign the 1927 International Relief Union Convention (the 
principal aim of which was to provide material assistance to disaster-stricken 
populations in the signatory countries). See ICRC/LRCS, Handbook of the Interna­
tional Red Cross, 10th ed. (Geneva: ICRC/LRCS, 1953), p. 302.
30 Jiri Toman, “La conception soviétique du conflit armé non international”, inVölkerrecht 
im Dienste des Menschen (Verlag Paul Haupt, 1986), p. 315.
31 Ibid., pp. 309-335.
32 Claude Pilloud, “Reservations to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”, International 
Review of the Red Cross 180 (March 1976): 117.
33 The Geneva Conventions of August 12,19Í9 (Geneva: ICRC, n.d.), p. 111.
34 For a more detailed discussion of the Soviet reservation concerning Article 85, see 
Bugnion, pp. 716-724.
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the ICRC’s freedom of action, particularly with regard to the protection 
of prisoners of war or civilian internees.
Finally, the Soviet government pointed out that according to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions “the ICRC may undertake measures relative to the 
assistance to the wounded and sick and the protection of members of the 
medical personnel in armed conflict. This activity is, however, performed 
with the consent of the Parties to the conflict. While mentioning the 
ICRC, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not prefer it to other 
humanitarian bodies regarding aid to the wounded and sick. As a matter 
of fact, they only confer on it the right to offer its services to the Parties to 
the conflict”.35
Thus, Soviet participation in the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 in no 
way improved relations between the USSR and the ICRC. As the 
historian David Forsythe has remarked, “it is a historical fact that Red 
Cross protection and assistance in conflict situations has not been widely 
accepted in the socialist world since 1949”.36
3. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ICRC 
AND THE USSR DURING THE 1950s
During the 1950s, the ICRC and the USSR had two opportunities for 
contact with each other. In 1950, the President of the ICRC, Paul 
Ruegger, went to Moscow to visit the President of the Alliance of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR. During his stay, he 
managed to meet with the Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko.3'
The second encounter took place in 1952, in Toronto, at the 
International Conference of the Red Cross. During the conference, the 
Soviet delegation launched numerous attacks against the ICRC on the 
subject of revising the Statutes of the International Red Cross, 
particularly Article VI.38 The head of the Soviet delegation, General 
Nikolai Vassilievitch Slavin, declared that his delegation recognized 
“neither the Statutes nor the Rules of Procedure incorporating articles 
which grant the so-called I.C.R.C. the functions and rights of an
35 Blishenko and Grin, p. 22.
3(1 David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 36.
37 The activities report for that year does not record the results of this meeting. See 
International Committee of the Red Cross: Report on General Activities (January 1 to 
December 31,1950) (Geneva: ICRC, 1951), p. 26.
33 For the most important clauses of Article VI, see note 5.
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international organization. That Committee is not an impartial interna­
tional organization because it has definitely taken sides. It has become 
the political instrument of one party and consequently neither has, nor is 
entitled to have, the legal right to fulfill the provisions of Article VI of the 
Statutes.[...] These Statutes undermine all possibilities of international 
co-operation at the organizational level of the Red Cross. They 
undermine all confidence in the impartiality of the international 
organization of the Red Cross, which is turned into the tool of one 
political party”.39 40
The Soviet delegation also accused the ICRC of perpetrating crimes 
against humanity and of violating the international conventions. 1 These 
accusations were unfounded and had no other purpose but to attack the 
ICRC, since, as Jacques Freymond has noted, a comparative reading of 
the relevant articles (Articles VII of 1928 and VI of 1952) showed that 
“the definition of the ICRC and its responsibilities ha[d] hardly 
changed”, though those responsibilities might have been expanded.41 
The draft revision of the Statutes was ultimately adopted by a majority of 
70 to 17 (the USSR and its allies constituting the minority).
After the USSR’s violent criticisms of the ICRC during the Toronto 
Conference, relations between the two were apparently broken off, at 
least to judge from public documents (the ICRC records on this subject 
are not available). In 1954, the USSR ratified the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, but this did not reflect any improvement in its relations with the 
ICRC. The ICRC and the USSR did not re-establish contact until 1956, in 
the wake of the events in Hungary.
39 XVIIIth International Red Cross Conference, Toronto, July-August 1952, Proceedings 
(Toronto: Canadian Red Cross Society, 1952), p. 35.
40 Ibid., p. 101.
41 Jacques Freymond, Georges Willemin, and Roger Heacock, The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), pp. 137-138.
CHAPTER II
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR 
AND HUNGARY 
1953-1956
An ally of Nazi Germany during World War II, Hungary was 
liberated by the Red Army in January 1945. From that time on, the 
presence of Soviet troops linked the country’s fate to that of the USSR, 
and in 1949 it became a People’s Democracy. When Stalin died on 5 March 
1953, the Soviet leaders sought to keep the communist bloc intact, but 
they realized that Stalin’s policy towards the People’s Democracies had 
been disastrous and that many changes would be necessary. The changes 
made in Hungary during that period, however, did not alter the country’s 
relationship with the USSR at all. Under cover of a relative degree of 
liberalization, the USSR continued to exercise complete control over 
Hungary. This was reflected in the Kremlin. infighting over the 
leadership of the USSR, in the political, economic, and military measures 
that the Soviet government took with respect to Hungary, and, finally, in 
the endorsement of these measures and their consequences at the 
20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
Following Stalin’s death, the leadership of the USSR was assumed by 
a triumvirate: Georgi Malenkov, the dictator’s designated successor, who 
held the post of Prime Minister; Lavrenti Beria, who retained the 
position of Chief of Security; and Vyacheslav Molotov, who had been 
Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1939. Khrushchev replaced Malenkov 
as Party Secretary, although he had not as yet been officially appointed 
as such.
This new collective government encompassed various trends. The 
first, represented by Molotov, was supported by Lazar Kaganovich, and 
sought to maintain the Stalin model in return for a few concessions. The 
second group was led by Malenkov and Beria, who favoured a policy of 
radical economic reforms and a certain liberalization of political life. The 
third group, headed by Khrushchev, had centrist tendencies, meaning
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that it was agreeable to some modification of Stalinist policy, but clearly 
upheld the primacy of party control.42
Beria was removed from the collective leadership in July 1953 and 
executed in December of the same year. For two years (1953-1954), 
Malenkov took the lead in the collective government, embarking on a 
new policy with respect to the People’s Democracies known as “the new 
course”. As a result of internal rivalries focusing on economic policy, 
Malenkov was forced to resign the premiership in February 1955, but he 
was not executed. From that time on, Khrushchev, “who at the time of 
Stalin’s death had seemed, like Stalin at the time of Lenin’s death, the 
least impressive of the party leaders, was now clearly the first among 
them, though by no means yet undisputed autocrat”.43 His position 
weakened temporarily in 1956, following the 20th Congress, but he 
regained the trust of his peers in the course of 1957.
1. THE VARIOUS MEASURES TAKEN 
BY THE USSR WITH RESPECT TO HUNGARY
The “new course” applied in all the People’s Democracies took the 
form of various measures: proclaiming amnesties, halting forced 
collectivization, reducing prices for essential consumer goods, softening 
repressive policies by curbing the secret police’s arbitrary power,44 and, 
finally, compelling governments to institute collective leadership.
The Soviet leaders realized that the economic and social situation in 
Hungary was particularly difficult. Accordingly, they decided to summon 
the Hungarian leader, Mátyás Rákosi, to Moscow in May 1953. The 
Soviet rulers asked him to give the Hungarian Communist Party a 
collective leadership like the one in Moscow, because they considered 
that the policy implemented in Hungary in recent years was making him 
too unpopular. Once back in his own country, however, Rákosi ignored 
Moscow’s instructions. He did not resolve the problem of sharing power; 
in the economic sphere, he opted for a five-year plan that was inspired by 
the Stalinist model, disregarding the Kremlin’s new policy. At this 
“disobedience”, the leaders of the USSR called Rákosi back to Moscow,
42 From 1955 on, Khrushchev turned “Malenkovism” to his own advantage. For details, 
see François Fejtő, A History of the People’s Democracies: Eastern Europe since Stalin 
(Harmondsworth and Ringwood: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), p. 30.
43 Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Krushev. The History of World Communism (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 358.
44 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II: Imperial and Global 
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1981), pp. 73-74.
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together with his colleagues and his most dogged adversary, Imre Nagy. 
Moscow ordered Rákosi to adopt “the new course” in both the economic 
and political spheres, and Rákosi obeyed. First he castigated himself 
before the Central Committee, on 28 June. Then he resigned the 
premiership in Imre Nagy’s favour, while retaining the post of First 
Secretary of the Party.
At the beginning of July, Nagy announced new governmental 
measures, notably a revision of the five-year plan, a halt to excessive 
industrialization and, instead, a focus on the development of light 
industry and food production, with increased investments in agriculture. 
Collectivization was to be moderated and permission would be given for 
the dissolution of kolkhozes (collective farms) at the end of the year if the 
majority of the members desired it. The new government program also 
envisioned a certain improvement in the population’s standard of living, 
greater intellectual freedom, and a reduction in police powers.
However, the new Hungarian policy soon proved a failure, for, as the 
historian François Fejtő has written, “the change-over was too abrupt. 
Not only were the people psychologically unprepared for reform; the 
party organization as well was taken by surprise and alarmed. 
Accustomed to ruling over a terrorized population, the organization 
was afraid to let go of the reins, fearing the masses might take the 
concessions as a sign of weakness, and sweep it away”.45 46 *
The failure of the new policy, however, was in fact due more to the 
forced cooperation between the conservative Mátyás Rákosi and the 
reformist Imre Nagy. Every new measure adopted by Nagy was 
invariably repudiated by Rákosi, and as a result never effectively 
implemented. Malenkov’s replacement by Khrushchev in 1955 allowed 
Rákosi to oust Nagy, but it prevented him from simply re-establishing 
the previous regime, since the Kremlin wanted him to follow all but a few 
precepts of Nagy’s policy.45 The Hungarian leader, still opposed to the 
Kremlin’s new policy, made just enough concessions to avoid calling 
down the wrath of Moscow. That the “new course” was even partially 
applied in Hungary was due to Soviet pressure. In relations between the 
USSR and Hungary, everything was decided in Moscow. In this respect, 
Stalin’s successors continued his policy of total domination of the People’s 
Democracies; the methods were different, but the relationship between 
the two countries remained the same.
45 Fejtő, p. 40.
46 François Fejtő, Budapest, l’insurrection. La première révolution anti-totalitaire,
2nd ed. (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1990), p. 65.
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The relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia showed that the 
USSR also controlled Hungarian foreign policy. June 1953 saw the re­
establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, 
but it was not really until 1955 that these two countries made friends and 
“the Yugoslav way” ceased to be considered heretical. This reconciliation 
was awkward for Rákosi, since he was obliged to abandon the 
propaganda against Tito that had greased his way to power a few years 
earlier.
The Kremlin did not, in any case, leave Rákosi a choice; it expected 
Hungary, together with the other People’s Democracies, to espouse its 
new policy towards Yugoslavia. In a speech delivered in Sofia in 1955, 
Khrushchev declared that the road lay open to the development of 
friendly relations between the USSR and the People’s Democracies, on 
one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other.47 Rákosi followed Moscow’s 
policy reluctantly, limiting himself to a recommendation to re-establish 
normal relations with Yugoslavia. This was one more instance of the 
persistence of the Stalinist hegemonic policy towards Hungary.
Yet another example of Soviet domination of Hungarian affairs was 
the international organizations in which the USSR included Hungary, 
namely the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), known in the West as COMECON. In short, the 
Soviet Union had simply replaced its former tools of regional domination 
with institutional ties, thereby establishing a framework for continued, if 
less blatant, control.48
Signed on 14 May 1955 between the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Democracies, the Warsaw Pact served a dual political function for the 
USSR.49 It was both a response to the remilitarization of West Germany 
and its admission to NATO in 1954, and a way of maintaining cohesion in 
the Eastern bloc. In fact, it served above all to legalize a de facto situation, 
namely the subordination of the armies of the People’s Democracies to 
the Soviet command. Thus, while pretending to establish an equal 
alliance between the USSR and the People’s Democracies, the Warsaw 
Pact actually subordinated those countries to Moscow. Although it 
provided for joint command of the armies, a closer look at the structure of 
the Pact shows that Moscow always played the leading role. Soviet
4‘ Zbigniev K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1961), p. 192.
4's André Liebich, “Six States in Search of an Identity”, International Journal 43 (Winter, 
1987-1988): 5-6.
49 The other members of the Pact were Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Albania, and the German Democratic Republic.
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officers held the most important posts, and the entire military- 
organization was located in the Soviet Ministry of Defence. Moreover, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Pact, Marshal I.S. 
Konev, was the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defence, and the few 
Eastern European staff officers had very little influence on military 
planning.50
Besides subordinating the armies of the People’s Democracies to the 
Soviet command, the Pact also provided a legal basis for the stationing of 
Soviet troops in those countries. With respect to Hungary, the peace 
treaty signed in Paris on 15 September 1947 (proclaiming the end of war 
between Hungary and the “Allied and Associated Powers”) stipulated 
that all the Allied armed forces had to withdraw from Hungarian 
territory except for those of the USSR, which reserved the right to keep 
on Hungarian soil any troops that might be needed to maintain 
communication lines with the Soviet occupation zone in Austria.1’1 
Logically, then, the Soviet troops ought to have withdrawn from 
Hungarian territory after the signature of the Austrian State Treaty on 
15 May 1955.1’2 Instead, however, they remained — by virtue of the lawful 
authorization conferred by the Warsaw Pact, signed one day before the 
State Treaty with Austria. Thus, the USSR cleverly managed to 
“transfer” its right to remain on Hungarian territory from one treaty to 
another.
The presence of Soviet troops was a formidable means of maintaining 
control over the country. As François Fejtő has noted, “The Soviet 
leaders, on the whole, showed foresight. Having agreed to relax their 
relations with the People’s Democracies by restoring certain formal 
attributes of independence and sovereignty, they wrote into the pact a 
pledge of ‘mutual fraternal aid’ ”.53 The USSR would use this pledge in 
1956 to justify its armed intervention during the Hungarian revolution. 
The Warsaw Pact was thus an instrument designed to preserve Soviet 
interests in the region more than it was a true military alliance.
The second multilateral undertaking to which Hungary adhered was 
the CME A. Created in 1949 by Stalin, it did not play any major economic 
role at the time, being nothing more than a political response to the * 03
',0 David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition? 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 44.
61 UN, “Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary”, General Assembly 
Official Records, Eleventh session, Supplement 18 (A/3592), New York, 1957, p. 49. 
The State Treaty re-established Austria as an independent State within its 1938 
borders.
03 François Fejtő, A History of the People’s Democracies, pp. 62-63.
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Marshall Plan.54 *At the time the USSR was busy rebuilding its own 
economy, and its economic relations with the People’s Democracies were 
limited to exploiting their resources.35 In 1954, however, the Soviet 
leaders decided to revive the CMEA. Between 1954 and 1957, the 
association enjoyed a new vitality, but it was not until 1959 that its 
statutes were adopted. The economic ties that the USSR established 
with these countries in fact represented a means of maintaining the 
existing system of military security and political subordination more 
than they did any real search for common economic interests.56
The CMEA and the Warsaw Pact served to keep Hungary and the 
other People’s Democracies dependent on the USSR. They were the 
pillars on which a new regional identity could be built. They also 
permitted the creation of “an association of sovereign Soviet allies tied by 
common defence interests, by common economic concerns, and by a 
common ideology”.5 '
2. THE 20TH CONGRESS OF 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR
The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU), which met in Moscow for the week of 17-24 February 1956, 
affirmed the new policy followed by the USSR since the death of Stalin. 
In the Central Committee’s official report, the USSR ratified several 
points of the “new course”, but only those concerning Hungary will be 
discussed here. The report also endorsed the principle of socialist 
pluralism — that is, the right of each Communist country to chart its own 
course towards socialism in accordance with its own historical, economic, 
and social conditions. In quoting a passage from Lenin’s Works, “All 
nations will arrive at socialism - this is inevitable, but not all will do so in 
exactly the same way”,58 the Soviet leaders legitimized the national path 
of Yugoslav Communism. Surprisingly enough, however, the example 
the report cited was not Yugoslavia, but rather the People’s Democ­
racies: “In Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and the other 
European People’s Democracies, this form sprang up and is being utilized
04 Sarah M. Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1984), p. 15.
05 Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Le grand frère. L’Union soviétique et l’Europe soviétisée 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1983), p. 302.
56 Terry, p. 14.
°7 Liebich, p. 6.
58 Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 
20th Party Congress (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 43.
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in conformity with the concrete historical, social and economic conditions, 
and peculiarities of each of these countries”.09
This new outlook must be understood as an expression of the Soviet 
leaders’ desire to legitimize the hybrid situation prevailing within the 
Communist bloc. On one hand, Moscow had to show some tact in 
its handling of Yugoslavia, by offering official recognition in the 
20th Congress of the possibility of alternative roads to socialism. On the 
other hand, it had to prevent the People’s Democracies from following 
the Yugoslav example - that is, it had to keep them under Soviet control. 
This dichotomy did not escape the leaders of the People’s Democracies. 
“Referring to the ‘ideas of the Twentieth Congress’, Gomulkists and 
Nagyists in particular accused their governments of submitting to the 
Kremlin and automatically adopting the Soviet model”.60
The “secret speech” Khrushchev made at this Congress put Stalin on 
trial for the first time. In it, Khrushchev denounced the atrocities Stalin 
had perpetrated. He denounced the fabricated trials, the liquidation of 
the leadership of the Polish Communist Party in 1938, the massacres and 
mass deportations of certain nationalities (among others, the Kalmyks 
and the Chechnians), the murder of innocent Communists and most of the 
senior officers of the Red Army, and other crimes. In particular, 
however, he condemned Stalin’s “personality cult”, and stigmatized the 
Short Biography of Stalin: “This book is an expression of the most 
dissolute flattery, an example of making a man into a godhead, of 
transforming him into an infallible sage, ‘the greatest leader’, ‘sublime 
strategist of all times and nations’. Finally no other words could be found 
with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens”.61 This speech attributed all 
the acts it denounced to Stalin, not to the Party. Pravda, the Party organ, 
remarked that: “The personality cult is a superficial abscess on a 
perfectly healthy organism”, indicating that it was indeed Stalin, not 
Stalinism, that was on trial.62
3. THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
Reactions to the 20th Congress were very diverse in the various 
People’s Democracies. In Poland the response was quite violent, 
culminating in the Poznan riots in June 1956, but in October of the same
<>ri Fejtő, A History of the People’s Democracies, p. 68.
61 Branko Lazitch, Le rapport Krouchtchev et son histoire (Paris: Seuil, 1976), pp. 132-133.
62 Pierre Berstein and Serge Milza, Histoire du vingtième siècle. De 1953 à nos jours. La 
croissance et la crise (Paris: Hatier, 1987), p. 240.
20 HUNGARIAN OCTOBER
year the Poles obtained what they had been demanding. The Hungarians 
watched events in Poland with great interest, and their goal that October 
was to achieve the same things that the Poles had-namely, the definitive 
rejection of Stalinism, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, a greater 
democratization of political life, a promise to put the economy back in 
order, and some degree of independence/’'' All these new measures, of 
course, were to be applied within the framework of the socialist order.64 
This, then, was what the Hungarian intellectuals of the Petőfi circle had 
in mind for their country.
During this period, however, a certain unrest developed among the 
students, who drew up a much more radical 16-point programme that 
included the organization of general competitive elections with universal 
suffrage by secret ballot. On 23 October 1956, the students marched in 
the capital, where crowds of citizens soon flocked to join them. The 
demonstration degenerated into violence and the panic-stricken Hun­
garian government asked the Soviet army to reimpose order.
Once calm had been restored, the government announced conces­
sions. Imre Nagy, who had been removed from power in 1955, was 
reinstated in the Party and appointed Prime Minister. It was too late, 
though; the Hungarian government had lost the trust of the people, who 
could not forgive it for calling in the Soviets. The party apparatus fell to 
pieces, leaving Nagy without the administrative structures necessary to 
implement his decisions, and he was gradually drawn to accept the 
revolutionary positions adopted by the people. From the national, 
limited communism of the Petőfi circle, he moved to a revolutionary 
opposition that made demands unacceptable to Moscow. Hungary had 
gone too far in the de-Stalinization process, calling for the re­
establishment of political pluralism, a declaration of neutral status — 
implying a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact — and other measures.
Moscow’s first reaction to these developments was to play for time by 
acknowledging past errors and offering a few concessions. On 30 October, 
the Kremlin published a statement expressing its willingness to “review 
its economic relations with the People’s Democracies, to negotiate the 
presence of Soviet troops and advisers in various spheres”.65 But these 
measures came too late; Hungarian demands far exceeded Soviet 
concessions. The impossibility of consensus and the unacceptability, in
The best works on the Hungarian Revolution are listed in the bibliography of this book. 
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Soviet eyes, of Hungarian demands decided Moscow to put down the 
revolutionary movement by force.
On 4 November 1956, the Red Army intervened and crashed the 
insurrection, leaving 2,700 dead and more than 20,000 wounded.61' The 
Soviets could legally justify this second military intervention on the basis 
of the Warsaw Pact, which, as the Soviet delegate to the UN Security 
Council explained, authorized the USSR “to protect Hungary against 
subversion”.6' Thus, the Soviet interpretation of events in Hungary was 
that the whole affair was a counter-revolution that had been quelled with 
the help of certain members of the Warsaw Pact.
The Hungarian experience showed clearly the limits that the People’s 
Democracies could not cross without precipitating an incursion of Soviet 
tanks. The USSR was ready to offer the People’s Democracies a longer 
leash, but under no circumstances to take it off altogether. Consequently, 
the new regime installed in Hungary after the events of 1956 remained 
very strongly tied to Moscow. Under the protection of the Soviet army, 
the Hungarian leader János Kádár gradually rebuilt the base of the 
system: the Communist Party. The demands of 1956 were buried.
The text of the joint statement issued by all the Communist parties in 
power — except for the Yugoslav party — during the international 
conference of Communist parties in November 1957 showed clearly the 
new line the Communist bloc intended to adopt. This statement 
proclaimed the USSR’s leading role in the socialist camp and condemned 
revisionism. Under pressure from the Chinese Communists and leaders 
of some of the People’s Democracies (such as Czechoslovakia), Moscow 
“consented” to backtrack; the new openness glimpsed at the 20th 
Congress was abolished. The joint statement revealed the limits of the 
changes that the USSR was willing to accept. It was retreating in order 
to ensure its control of the bloc.
It is unlikely, however, that the Hungarian Revolution and the fear it 
aroused in sister parties were the reasons for the USSR’s about-face at 
the 1957 conference. The Soviet policy from 1953 to 1956 had not, in fact, 
produced the results anticipated. The Soviet leaders simply wanted to 
calm the tensions in the bloc in order to maintain unity. Their main 
concern was to determine what degree of decentralization would allow
l,c ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungary, October 1956-June 1957 (Geneva: 
ICRC, 1957), p. 15.
1,7 Fejtő, A History of the People’s Democracies, p. 121.
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them to maintain effective control while keeping order within the bloc.08 
It did not occur to them that their new policy might be misunderstood by 
certain People’s Democracies. Consequently, when matters came to a 
head in Hungary, the USSR intervened to make the “readjustments” 
that it thought necessary for the pursuit of its goals.
Although Moscow managed to make these “readjustments”, the 
historian Miklós Molnár insists that the Hungarian revolution must not 
be regarded as a defeat:
“The Hungarian revolution is, despite its failure, worth far more 
than would have been a victory without a revolution. It became an 
event not because of the concrete facts gained by revolution, but by 
the very fact of the revolution itself, the very fact that for the first 
time since 1917 a people had rebelled. For Hungary, at any rate, that 
is what counts, and will still be of greater importance than its 
ephemeral revolutionary institutions and 150 hours of independence. 
In 1956 she came back into history....”69
U8 Charles Gati, The Bloc that Failed. Soviet-East European Relations in Transition 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), p. 35.
h!l Miklós Molnár, Budapest 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution (London: 
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CHAPTER III
THE ICRC’S FIRST STEPS IN HUNGARY 
(27 OCTOBER-11 NOVEMBER 1956)
On 27 October 1956, four days after the revolution began, the large 
number of casualties engendered by the fighting prompted the 
Hungarian Red Cross to send the ICRC an appeal for blood plasma, 
blood transfusion equipment, and bandages. On the same day the ICRC 
sent the supplies requested and a delegate, Herbert-Georges Beckh, to 
Vienna.70 Thus began the first phase of the ICRC relief action in 
Hungary, which extended from 27 October to 11 November 1956 and 
encompassed three kinds of activity. The first consisted in aiding the 
victims of the conflict and providing them with food and medical supplies; 
the second aimed at protecting the victims by issuing appeals and trying 
to visit detainees; and the third involved responding to requests for 
information concerning refugees.
1. ASSISTANCE
On 28 October, the ICRC learned from the Hungarian Red Cross that 
a Swiss plane could be landed at the Ferihegyi civilian airfield in 
Budapest. It immediately launched an emergency appeal to 26 National 
Societies for blood plasma, medicine, and food supplies, and then made 
the necessary arrangements with the Swiss federal authorities and the 
Swiss Red Cross to charter an airplane.
The following day, the ICRC plane, escorted by two Hungarian 
planes also loaded with relief supplies, landed at Ferihegyi airport. '1 It 
was the first Western plane to arrive in Budapest.72 The two delegates on 
board handed over the relief supplies to members of the Hungarian Red 
Cross and drew up a preliminary list of the Budapest population’s needs,
70 ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungary, p. 5.
11 ICRC, Annual RepoH 1956 (Geneva: ICRC, 1957), p. 6.
72 “Rapports présentés en séance plénière par M. Gallopin le 1er novembre 1956”, 
Archives of the ICRC (hereafter AICRC), dossier 251(65), 1.2.
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using information collected on the spot. The Swiss and Hungarian planes 
then left to pick up more supplies in Vienna, which they transported back 
to Budapest. This airlift functioned satisfactorily, and by 30 October 
Budapest’s requirements for medical supplies and blood plasma seemed 
to have been covered. Still needed, however, were the means to satisfy 
the great demand for food, medical supplies, and hospital equipment 
throughout the country.
In the meantime, relief supplies flowed uninterruptedly into Vienna. 
The National Societies of 21 countries, responding to the ICRC appeal, 
announced that they were dispatching food supplies and medicine. The 
value of the aid received came to approximately 1.2 million Swiss francs, and 
additional shipments worth SFR 1.5 million had already been pledged.73 74 75In 
the face of this constant influx into Vienna of donations that had to be 
rerouted to Hungary, the ICRC was no longer capable of managing the 
distribution operation. Since one of the delegates in Hungary had left 
Budapest for the Győr region in order to expand the ICRC action to the 
province, the organization now had only one delegate in the capital, and he 
could not possibly manage the distribution of aid by himself. Under these 
circumstances, the Executive Director, who was directing operations from 
Geneva, decided to establish permanent delegations in Vienna and 
Budapest. To begin with, he sent three new delegates to Vienna: Jean de 
Preux, Charles Amman, and Ernest Meyer. Thus, the ICRC began to 
mobilize increasing numbers of people so that it could carry out its activities 
in Hungary more effectively, but the nature of the events there made it 
difficult to foresee the magnitude of the action that would be required.
On the evening of 31 October, the ICRC plane had to turn back 
because the Budapest airport was surrounded by Russian tanks and 
authorization to land was refused. According to delegate Charles 
Amman, “the purpose of the occupation of the Budapest airfield was 
apparently to permit the evacuation of certain important figures of the 
regime”. '4 Another possibility, however, was that it was due to the fact 
that the rebels had attacked the airfield the night before'0 in an effort to 
lay hold of relief supplies.
73 The donor countries were: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, East 
Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, and West Germany. See “Red Cross Action in Hungary”, ICRC Press 
Release No. 524b, 29 Oct. 1956.
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75 “Procès-verbal de téléphone entre M. Amman et M. Gallopin du 30 octobre 1956”, 
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The ICRC was not deterred by this initial stumbling block. It 
continued to distribute aid at the Austro-Hungarian border, and 
beginning on 1 November relief convoys from various National Red 
Cross Societies, furnished with a safe-conduct from the ICRC, arrived in 
Budapest. A food convoy sent by the Austrian Red Cross and 
accompanied by an ICRC delegate also crossed the border and managed 
to return to Vienna the same night. To ensure its delegates’ safety, the 
ICRC sent a memorandum to the Soviet authorities as well as to all the 
civil and military authorities in Hungary, asking them to facilitate its 
humanitarian action and to guarantee the safety of the persons and 
property engaged in that enterprise. The work of organizing the dispatch 
of aid by land began. The ICRC, working together with the League of 
Red Cross Societies, decided an agreement was needed to demarcate 
their respective responsibilities. On 2 November the two organizations 
signed an accord stipulating that the League would be responsible for the 
reception and coordination in Vienna of the supplies sent by the National 
Societies, while the ICRC would forward them to Hungary and 
distribute them with the assistance of the Hungarian Red Cross.'6 
Bonabès de Rougé of the League was in charge of distributing the gift 
supplies among the refugees and civilian population of Hungary. The 
donations from the National Societies were not immediately distributed, 
but apportioned as needed.'7
From 4 November, when Soviet tanks intervened for the second time, 
the borders were closed. As a result, the ICRC convoys were no longer 
authorized to pass, and the ICRC had no news of its delegates. The 
delegates themselves, although unable to receive instructions from 
Geneva, continued their mission as best they could, but the situation was 
very confused. Jean de Preux and Melchior Borsinger (who was 
coordinating the action from Geneva) did not know who was in power 
in Hungary, and consequently did not know with whom to negotiate. 
Acknowledging themselves to be powerless, they went so far as to 
suggest a mission by the ICRC President to Moscow. ',s All the same, they 
did manage to establish contact with an officer of the Russian command 76 77 78
76 For the text of this agreement, see Annex VI.
77 “Procès-verbal de téléphone entre MM. Gallopin, Michel et Siordet du 20 novem­
bre 1956”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, Questions générales.
78 “No one knows who and where command is stop consequently no party to negotiate. In 
this situation Geneva delegates powerless stop Preux’s opinion: presidential mission to 
Moscow” [translation: MG]. “Telegramme de MM de Preux et Bovey pour le CICR à 
Genève du 7 novembre 1956”, AICRC, 200(65) Hongrie 1951-1960.
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post, from whom they requested a temporary cease-fire and authoriza­
tion for the ICRC convoys stranded at the border to enter the country 
and then return to Vienna afterwards. '9 Meanwhile, ICRC headquarters 
in Geneva contacted the Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies of the USSR requesting news of its delegates and reiterating its 
plea that the Alliance facilitate their mission.* 80
When the organized resistance ceased throughout Hungarian 
territory between 10 and 11 November,81 82the ICRC convoys were once 
again permitted to enter the country. After long negotiations at the 
border post of Sopron, the first convoy arrived in Budapest on 
11 November. From then on, the ICRC’s white tracks travelled the 
Vienna-Budapest road regularly.
The course of the relief action was thus closely linked to the political 
events that were rocking the country. The Hungarian and Soviet 
authorities accepted the ICRC’s presence except at crucial moments of 
the uprising and the repression that followed it.
2. PROTECTION
During the revolution, both the ICRC headquarters and the 
delegates in the field took steps to protect the victims of the conflict. 
Beginning on 30 October, senior officials in Geneva wondered if the ICRC 
ought to issue a formal appeal to the belligerent forces to respect the 
rules of humanity embodied in the Geneva Conventions. The Executive 
Director, Roger Gallopin, consulted the delegates in Hungary. René 
Bovey, in Budapest, felt it was not worth the trouble in the current 
situation. Herbert-Georges Beckh, who was in the provinces at the time, 
believed, on the contrary, that an appeal was necessary, for the fate of 
prisoners gave cause for concern; apparently, on 29 October the 
Communist troops had shot 120 people, while everyone the insurgents 
captured was immediately hanged. Finally, on 31 October, the ICRC 
broadcast this appeal:
“At a time when the International Committee of the Red Cross, in
conjunction with the principal National Red Cross Societies, is
19 “Rapport de M. de Preux à Vienne et Budapest”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
80 “Procès-verbal de téléphone entre D.P.F. et M. Borsinger du 5 novembre 1956”, 
AICRC, 251(65), 1.1.
81 “Les événements de Hongrie et l’application des Conventions de Genève”, AICRC, 
200(65) Hongrie 1951-1960.
82 “Procès-verbal de téléphone entre M. Amman et M. Gallopin du 30 octobre 1956”, 
AICRC, 200(65) Hongrie 1951-1960.
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endeavouring to give Hungary, so sorely tried, the charitable aid the 
country requires, it wishes to recall several fundamental principles 
contained in the Geneva Conventions by which all peoples are bound.
(1) All those who take no part in the fighting must be respected. The 
taking of hostages, in particular, is forbidden.
(2) It is prohibited to kill or to wound an enemy who gives himself up. 
Prisoners must be treated humanely. In no case can any sentence 
be passed on them without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court.
(3) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for without 
discrimination.
The ICRC appeals to all concerned for the principles of these 
Conventions, which Hungary ratified in 1954, to be strictly 
respected”.
This appeal was heavily influenced by Article 3 common to the four 
Geneva Conventions,83 the only article applicable to non-international 
conflicts. Given the situation in Hungary when this appeal was broadcast, 
it is clear why the ICRC chose to focus on an article governing non­
international conflicts. The appeal was issued on the day Radio Moscow 
confirmed that the Soviet government was willing to negotiate the 
withdrawal of its troops, indirectly implying that the resolution of the 
Hungarian issue would henceforth be Hungary’s business. Yet on 
4 November at dawn, Soviet tanks attacked Budapest, setting off heavy 
fighting around the city. On the same day, the ICRC issued another 
appeal, “to commanders and combatants in Hungary”,84 calling on them 
to arrange a trace in compliance with Article 15 of the First Geneva 
Convention governing the search for and evacuation of wounded. It also 
sent two telegrams, one to Moscow and one to Budapest, to ask those 
governments to implement the four Geneva Conventions in the field.85 
Since the fighting showed no signs of abating, on 7 November the ICRC 
repeated its appeal to commanders and combatants in Hungary.
Aside from these appeals and telegrams, the ICRC headquarters did 
not undertake any other measures focusing on protection, leaving that 
area of activity to its delegates. “The International Committee is, 
moreover, concerned for the fate of the victims of the conflict, and our
83 For the text of the article, see Annex III.
84 ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungai-y, p. 8.
8" For the text of the two telegrams, see Annex VIII.
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delegates have been instructed, in addition, to carry out all the ICRC’s 
traditional tasks”, noted Roger Gallopin.86
On 31 October 1956, the ICRC delegate Herbert-Georges Beckh, 
then in western Hungary, managed to establish contact with the 
insurgents. In Győr he met with Attila Szigethy, President of the rebel 
National Committee which controlled an area of Hungarian territory 
populated by some 400,000 people. After some discussion, Beckh 
obtained from Szigethy a pledge to respect the Geneva Conventions: 
“President Szigethy formally declares his consent to the application of 
the Conventions in this civil war”.8 ‘ In Sopron, Beckh also managed to 
protect 200-300 prisoners who had fallen into the insurgents’ hands from 
being shot. Moreover, he obtained permission to visit 29 civilian 
prisoners being held in Győr. Back in Vienna, he met with a 
representative of the Hungarian Embassy who thanked him, on behalf 
of the government, for the efforts he had made to ensure that the 
insurgents respected the Geneva Conventions. Beckh extracted a 
promise that when he returned to Hungary he would be allowed to visit 
detained insurgents; but the representative of the Hungarian Embassy, 
afraid of compromising himself, refused to provide written confirmation 
of this promise.88 89The ICRC delegate who had remained in Budapest also 
tried to obtain permission to visit detainees and internees, but in vain.
3. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT REFUGEES
The ICRC’s function with respect to refugees was (and still is) to 
collect and convey news between refugees and them relatives, and to 
reunite families that have been separated; the provision of material aid 
was primarily the responsibility of the National Societies and the League 
of Red Cross Societies. The various ICRC services included the Central 
Information Agency, whose function was precisely to re-establish 
contact among the different members of a family that had been split 
up. Its activities were based on the 1949 Conventions, 36 articles of which 
govern the tasks it must perform.80
From the beginning of the events of 1956, many Hungarians fled then- 
country and requested asylum — mainly in Austria and Yugoslavia, but 
also in other States. Often the members of one family crossed the border
86 “Rapport présenté par M. Gallopin en séance plénière du Comité le 1er novembre 1956”, 
AICRC, 225(65), 11.4.
81 “Procès-verbal du Conseil de Présidence du 15 novembre 1956”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
88 Ibid.
89 CICR, Agence Centrale de Recherches (Geneva: CICR, n.d.), p. 1.
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at different times and as a result were not taken in by the same country. 
Moreover, in most cases they did not have time to make enquiries about 
other family members and to find out where they were.90 To help such 
refugees re-establish contact with then- relatives, the ICRC took various 
measures. First of all, it began to broadcast over Radio-Intercroixrouge 
the names of people seeking news of their families. At the same time, it 
made family message forms available to those concerned, which it 
forwarded or used as a basis for enquiries.91 It then set up a central card- 
index for Hungary, organizing within its Central Agency an information 
bureau that registered as much information as possible about the 
Hungarian refugees. The ICRC was assisted in this endeavour by the 
National Societies of the host countries, which cooperated efficaciously in 
setting up and operating the Hungarian central card-index, whether by 
filling out the refugee personal-history cards distributed by the ICRC or 
by providing lists of names and leaving the ICRC to fill out the individual 
cards itself.
The Hungarian card-index was not operational until the beginning of 
1957, when it became possible to link up the different requests for 
information and thus provide answers for those requiring them. All the 
information collected in this way remained strictly confidential, however, 
divulged only by the express consent of the person involved, in accordance 
with the ICRC’s normal practice in such cases. Although the Hungarian 
government asked the ICRC to provide it with the names of the refugees 
registered in the Hungarian central card-index, the ICRC refused, 
explaining that only relatives were authorized to request information,92 
and that it was not at liberty to give out such information to anyone else.
Thus, tracing activities were instituted as soon as the conflict began, 
and they were continued for as long as the ICRC continued to receive 
requests.
This chapter shows that during the first days of its action the ICRC 
intervened almost simultaneously in several spheres. It organized the 
dispatch of aid, worked to protect victims of the conflict, and dealt with 
requests for information concerning the refugees, all at the same time. The 
ICRC fulfilled its mandate, even though neither the Hungarian nor the 
Soviet authorities facilitated its task, and the Hungarian Red Cross, then 
in the process of reorganizing, was unable to provide the support needed.
90 ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungary, pp. 29-30.
91 Ibid., p. 30.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INSTALLATION OF THE ICRC 
IN VIENNA AND BUDAPEST 
(NOVEMBER 1956-JUNE 1957)
In the first days of November 1956, the fighting in Hungary stopped; 
the revolt had been largely brought under control. Peace was restored and 
the ICRC was able to go to the assistance of the civilian population, for the 
general strike continued and the country’s economic situation was 
disquieting. In order to carry out its assistance and protection functions 
more efficiently, the ICRC decided to open offices in Vienna and Budapest. 
This chapter will examine first the organization of the operation and then 
the ICRC’s activities on behalf of the Hungarian population and refugees.
1. ORGANIZATION OF ICRC ACTION
A. The Various Agreements
The ICRC set up two delegations, one in Vienna and the other in 
Budapest, on the basis of a formal agreement between the governments. 
Then it reorganized the relief operation in Vienna, amending its original 
agreement with the League of Red Cross Societies. From now on the 
ICRC would “undertake not only the forwarding, allocation and 
distribution of relief in Hungary (as provided for in the Agreement of 
2 November), but also the handling in Vienna of gifts earmarked for the 
relief operation in Hungarian territory”.93 The League was thus no 
longer the sole agent receiving and coordinating the consignments sent 
by the National Societies.
From the end of organized resistance on 11 November, relief 
operations progressed without any major problems. Nonetheless, the 
ICRC decided to draw up an agreement that would provide the basis for 
the continuation of its relief action, and the President of the ICRC
!l,i For the text of this amendment, see Annex VI.
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entrusted this task to the Executive Director, Roger Gallopin. The latter 
accordingly left for Vienna to meet with the representatives of the 
Hungarian Red Cross. The ICRC’s choice of the Hungarian Red Cross as 
its partner was completely consistent with the role a National Society 
was expected to play if a conflict broke out on its territory and the ICRC 
was asked to intervene. Nonetheless, Roger Gallopin wanted first to be 
sure that these representatives were indeed authorized to act on behalf 
of the Hungarian Red Cross.
As noted earlier, during the first phase of the ICRC action 
collaboration with the Hungarian Red Cross had not been very active, 
since the latter had been in the midst of reorganizing. On 1 November, 
the Nagy government had appointed a new director, Zoltán Zsebök, who 
had no time to set anything in order before the Red Army attacked three 
days later.94 After calm had been restored, the Hungarian Red Cross was 
put under the direction of a group of five doctors who rotated the 
presidency between them and enjoyed the recognition of the Kádár 
government.95 The doctors were Boldizsár Horváth, Tibor Nónay, 
Ferenc Czeyda-Pommersheim, Ferenc Földvári, and Dezső Klimkó. The 
Executive Director was Dr. György Killner, who also exercised the 
functions of Government Commissar.
The Executive Director of the ICRC, Roger Gallopin, reported that in 
meetings with Professors Horváth and Nónay, Dr. Killner, and Mihály 
Gedenyi, Head of the Foreign Relations Department, he had ascertained 
that these men were indeed authorized representatives of the Hungarian 
Red Cross and did not have any political connections. He was well aware, 
however, of the current situation of the Hungarian Red Cross: “certainly, 
for the Hungarian Red Cross, they represent a facade behind which there 
is now almost no edifice, since the pro-Communist elements in this Red 
Cross, notably the former Secretary-General, left when the Nagy 
Government came to power”.96 Under these circumstances, it was vital 
that the ICRC help the new representatives to reconstitute their Red 
Cross, so that it would have the necessary infrastructure and range to 
implement the action. The negotiations themselves were conducted 
completely openly, and the few members of the government who were 
present did not take part in the discussions. On 16 November 1956, the 
ICRC and the Hungarian Red Cross finally signed an agreement which
1,4 Dr. Zoltán Csillag, Data about the Activity of the International Committee of the Red 
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was ratified on the same day by the Hungarian Minister in Vienna, in the 
name of the Hungarian Government.9 '
Roger Gallopin was well aware of Hungary’s motives for signing the 
agreement: “Clearly the need to accept the donations is great, and the 
real donations will come from the West. But the only way to ensure 
acceptance of relief from that quarter is to provide guarantees that the 
action undertaken will not lose its humanitarian character”.98 Hungary 
was not receiving the aid it needed from the other People’s Democracies. 
The agreement signed with the ICRC allow-ed it to accept the gifts of the 
West, since the fact that they came through the ICRC eliminated their 
potential propagandists value.99
The agreement stated that the ICRC would be responsible for the 
distribution of the gift supplies entrusted to it by the National Red Cross 
Societies, the League, the United Nations, and certain governments and 
private bodies. The UN had decided to set up a relief programme to 
benefit both Hungarians in the country and refugees, and in an 
agreement it signed with the ICRC on 4 December 1956, the latter 
was designated as “the sole agency to carry out the relief programme on 
behalf of the United Nations”.100
Thus, Westerners agreed to give relief to the Hungarians on the 
understanding that the donations would be distributed “in accordance 
with the fundamental principles governing [the ICRC’s] work, i.e. with 
strict impartiality and without any discrimination whatsoever other than 
that based on the urgency of the needs of the persons to be assisted”.101 
In this way, the ICRC served as a link between Hungary and the West.
The 16 November agreement allowed the ICRC to plan and organize 
its action. A delegation was set up in Budapest, but the warehouses and 
technical apparatus remained in Vienna, since it was impossible to 
forward everything to Budapest and store great quantities of supplies 
there.102 Moreover, the ICRC preferred to proceed moderately, 
forwarding donations gradually to avoid giving rise to disturbances or 
even political interference in Hungary. Thus, the decision to keep a
9‘ For the text of the agreement, see Annex IX.
1,8 “Procès-verbal de téléphone entre MM. Gallopin, Siordet et Michel du 20 novem­
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delegation in Vienna was not entirely due to technical problems. In 
addition, the ICRC was very firm about the way its action was to be 
carried out; if the 16 November agreement was not respected, the ICRC 
was prepared to cease its activities.
B. The Delegations
The ICRC operation actually got under way at the beginning of 
December 1956 with the appointment of Swiss National Councillor Georg 
Rutishauser as General Delegate. Rutishauser was asked to take charge of 
all the necessary technical services. With the help of the Swiss Red Cross, 
Rutishauser quickly recruited several technicians to work on transport 
and organization. He then set up the services required for the Vienna and 
Budapest delegations. Finally, he chose four assistants to help him with 
the general management of the relief operations. Delegate Marius Redli, 
responsible for supplies and finance, planned the major relief programmes 
together with the Budapest delegation. He also arranged, in cooperation 
with the ICRC Relief Section in Geneva, for the dispatch of the supplies 
needed to implement the programmes. Finally, he was in charge of the 
financial administration of the Vienna and Budapest delegations. Melchior 
Borsinger, who was responsible for foreign relations, acted as liaison 
officer between the League of Red Cross Societies, the National Red Cross 
Societies, and all the other relief organizations represented in Austria. He 
also maintained contact with the foreign embassies and legations in Vienna 
that contributed to the ICRC action, and was responsible for all the 
traditional tasks of the ICRC as well. The two other assistants were 
replaced several times. One of them was the head of the Information 
Service, who kept the press and the donor National Red Cross Societies 
informed of the progress of the relief operation. The other was the head of 
the Medical-Pharmaceutical Section, in charge of all the medical branches 
of the relief action and all the applications for medical relief. Together, this 
team constituted the general delegation that supervised the Vienna and 
Budapest delegations.103
The Vienna delegation, which received and forwarded donations, had 
several departments. One of them was responsible for the warehouses 
where the supplies were stored and sorted. This department checked 
inventories, recorded donations, identified donors, and notified the 
donors of the arrival of their gifts. The second department contained the 
divisions of road and rail transport services. The road division was
103 For a better understanding of the way the general delegation and the Vienna and 
Budapest delegations functioned, see the diagram in Annex XI.
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responsible not only for maintaining and operating the automobile fleet 
(126 vehicles), but also for handling all the customs formalities involved in 
entering Hungary. It should be noted that since the closure of the airport 
on 31 October 1956, road transport was the only means of sending 
supplies to Hungary. Beginning in December 1956, however, rail and 
river connections resumed, and a new division was set up to organize 
train shipments to Hungary. The third department of the Vienna 
delegation, the Administration Department, dealt with all staff matters 
(accommodation and maintenance), accounts, equipment, and mail.
The Budapest delegation was also subdivided into different sections. 
One of them, in cooperation with the Hungarian Red Cross, planned the 
major relief programmes and drew up the distribution schedules. The 
latter were determined on the basis of the donations pledged or already 
delivered, or else in response to special requests submitted to the general 
delegation. The second section was in charge of the distribution of gift 
supplies, which it monitored by means of receipts issued by the 
Hungarian Red Cross and signed by the beneficiaries, as well as by 
visits to the distribution centres established throughout the country.
The Budapest delegation had to create a transport service, because 
the Hungarian Red Cross had lost all its vehicles during the fighting. This 
service was accordingly put at the Hungarian Red Cross’s disposal for 
delivering relief supplies to the distribution centres. In addition, a 
storage facility was set up to house the relief supplies and to put together 
the parcels distributed to the Hungarian population.
2. THE RELIEF OPERATION
After the initial emergency measures, when the need for swift action 
took precedence over other considerations, the ICRC was able to address 
the situation in a more orderly manner. Its first task was to make a 
thorough study of the needs of the Hungarian population affected by the 
recent events. Eight thousand dwellings had been completely destroyed 
and 35,000 had suffered damage. Some hospitals, too, had been badly 
damaged in the fighting. Casualties were estimated at 2,700 dead and 
20,000 wounded. In addition, the supply of coal, textiles, and shoes was very 
precarious, and certain foodstuffs (such as milk, eggs, salt, sugar, coffee, 
and tea) were unobtainable. There was a shortage of medical supplies and 
certain medicines, such as antibiotics and insulin. Investigation revealed 
that in Budapest alone, at least 250,000 people required assistance.104
104 ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungary, pp. 15-16.
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To assist this sector of the population, the ICRC established a number 
of programmes. At the outset it decided against distributing relief 
indiscriminately to the entire population of Budapest, because such a 
course could have political implications. Ralph Eckert was designated as 
“Programme Officer” and charged with designing specific aid pro­
grammes.10'1 Between December 1956 and June 1957, the ICRC set up 
167 programmes, three of which will be described here by way of 
illustration. One programme was designed to distribute 100 grams of 
powdered or condensed milk daily to pregnant women and children under 
the age of six. Another programme provided a hot meal daily for every 
child under six. A third programme, much appreciated by the population, 
distributed parcels containing four kilos of various foodstuffs providing a 
caloric value of 14,000 calories. Other programmes provided various other 
items: blankets, clothing, shoes, coal, window-glass, and medicines.
The ICRC supervised the distribution of supplies by the various 
programmes. It did this by monitoring receipts signed by the 
beneficiaries and specifying the nature and quantity of the goods 
delivered. In general, this system of supervision proved satisfactory. 
Relative to the magnitude of the action as a whole, only a fraction of the 
relief supplies appeared on the black market, and relatively little was 
stolen from the warehouses or in transit.
The ICRC also sold some of the donations to local economic agents and 
used the money to open a blocked account for the Hungarian Red Cross 
at the Hungarian National Bank. These funds were earmarked to assist 
people in need, to cover the operating expenses of the Hungarian Red 
Cross, and to re-equip hospitals and social institutions. The Hungarian 
Red Cross could not, however, withdraw money from this account 
without the prior consent of the ICRC.
Once it had set up these programmes, the ICRC had a better idea of 
what it needed; it was able to plan the flow of supplies and to request 
specific commodities. Consequently, it issued additional appeals to 
different donors and bought goods with the cash contributions it 
received. Supplies were forwarded from Vienna to Budapest by road 
transport until March 1957, when the Hungarian government requested 
that relief supplies no longer be sent by road. It forbade the last convoy to 
leave Vienna, because it believed that certain drivers were increasingly 
undertaking actions that did not conform to their mission.11"’ The 
delegation tried to persuade the Hungarian authorities to reconsider
i°i> “pr0ces-vei'bal de Plénière du 6 décembre 1956”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
10,1 “Aktennotiz entre M. Rutishauser et le CICR du 9 janvier 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1.
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their position, which was becoming increasingly restrictive, even in the 
granting of visas;10' but the ICRC did not let itself be intimidated by 
these restrictions and decided to dispatch its aid by riverboat. Ice in the 
Danube, however, soon put an end to this operation. The only means of 
transport left was the railroad. The Hungarian government offered to 
provide armed guards for the train cars, but the ICRC declined, 
considering this to be contrary to its principle of neutrality.
To carry out its work between December 1956 and June 1957, the 
ICRC sent 150 Swiss personnel to Austria and Hungary.107 08 The monthly 
cost of these two delegations was half a million Swiss francs. The relief 
action in Hungary “clearly exceeds all those of recent years; there has 
been no operation of comparable scale since the relief organized during 
the Second World War for the Greek population or for Belgium”.109 The 
relief action in Hungary was thus considered one of the ICRC’s major 
post-war operations.110
The ICRC was supposed to close down its delegation and leave 
Budapest in June 1957. This date had been selected “in consideration of the 
fact that as soon as the new harvest was ready to be gathered - thus 
bringing to an end the difficult food situation caused by the events of 
October 1956 — the relief action undertaken by the ICRC would no longer 
be absolutely necessary”.111 Nonetheless, the ICRC wanted to stay in 
Hungary, for it was still waiting for a number of promised donations, 
including one from UNICEF. It insisted on being present to oversee their 
reception and distribution, and rejected any suggestion of “entrusting 
responsibilities of that nature to the Hungarian Red Cross, which is 
inclined to return to what it was before the events of October 1956”.112 The 
Hungarian Red Cross did, in fact, undergo a reorganization; on 31 May 1957 
the five professors of medicine and the Executive Director, Dr. Killner, 
ceased to exercise their functions and Professor Pal Gégesi Kiss took over 
as President, with Ambassador Joseph Kárpáti as Secretary-General.
With the concurrence of the government and the Hungarian Red 
Cross, a small delegation was left in place. On 27 June 1957, the 
Hungarian Red Cross and the ICRC signed a new agreement defining
107 “A Relief Convoy of the ICRC for Budapest”, ICRC Press Release No. 586b, 
8 March 1957.
108 “Service de presse”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1.
1011 “Procès-verbal de Plénière du 6 décembre 1956”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
110 See Annex XII.
111 ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungary, p. 28.
112 “Note pour l’Assemblée plénière du 28 mai 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
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the duties of the five ICRC workers remaining in Budapest. Their 
mission was essentially to administer the donations of textiles and 
hospital equipment. To that end the ICRC sent a circular out to the 
various National Red Cross Societies and other potential donors, telling 
them that from 15 September 1957 contributions would have to be 
addressed directly to the Hungarian Red Cross.113 From June to October 
1957, the small delegation worked in close cooperation with the 
Hungarian Red Cross and the Hungarian Ministry of Health.
Since the food situation in the country had improved, the ICRC decided 
to concentrate its efforts on a medical and social programme. For the most 
part, it provided university clinics and major hospitals with medical 
supplies, as well as distributing large quantities of bedding and kitchen 
towels to old-age homes, pediatric clinics, and smaller hospitals. These 
distributions were made through 37 new programmes. The ICRC was not 
prevented from verifying that the beneficiaries had indeed received the 
gifts they were supposed to have received, and that the programmes were 
operating in a satisfactory manner.114
A second relief action involved building a new prosthesis factory to make 
artificial limbs for the war-disabled. In April 1957, the ICRC sent a special 
mission to visit the prosthesis factory already operating and to determine 
what innovations would be required. The mission, judging the Hungarian 
prosthesis models to be outdated, advised the Hungarian Red Cross and the 
Minister of Health to select a model manufactured abroad. These bodies 
selected the East German model, and the ICRC hired two East German 
technicians to draw up a plan of action. This plan provided, first of all, for a 
study exchange between East German and Hungarian technicians. Next, a 
special workshop would be set up for the purpose of fitting and adapting 
artificial limbs to those who needed them. Ultimately, the plan called for 
renovating or even replacing the spare-parts production line.
This plan stipulated that not only would the ICRC be responsible for 
training the workers, but it would provide the machinery necessary to 
set up the prosthesis-fitting workshop. It would also supply a certain 
number of spare parts for artificial limbs. The Ministry of Health, for its 
part, would provide the necessary premises and pay for water, gas, and 
electricity.115 In October 1957 this project was still far from completed,
113 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre M. Fischer et M. Maunoir et en présence de 
Mme Mathez et MM. Siordet, Chenevière, Gallopin, Pilloud”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
1I'1 “Bericht über die IKRK-Aktion in Ungarn ab 1. Juli 19576is, 19. Október 1957”, 
AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
115 “Rapport de mission de Mlle Pfirter (action médico-sociale) du 5 avril-9 avril 1957”, 
AICRC, 251(65), 1.3.
THE INSTALLATION OF THE ICRC IN VIENNA AND BUDAPEST 39
and the Hungarian Red Cross pushed back the deadline for constructing 
the new factory from 1958 to 1959.
The ICRC closed its rudimentary delegation at the end of October 
1957 as planned. This, however, did not mean an end to its activities in 
Hungary, as one of the Committee members clearly indicated: 
“Mr. Chenevière insists, however, that the ICRC has an interest in 
conserving the option of undertaking new missions in Hungary as the 
occasion arises — an opinion shared by the other members of the 
Committee. Mr. Fischer should try to prepare the ground for this before 
his departure or at the reception he will hold to mark his departure”.* 11'1
Overall, the second phase of the relief action went well. Aside from 
certain difficulties from March 1957 onward relating to the transport of 
gift supplies, the Hungarian authorities did not hinder ICRC activities. 
They even allowed the organization to maintain a delegation in Budapest 
for longer than originally agreed. That is not to say, however, that there 
was no friction at all. For example, the Hungarian press announced that 
the chocolate sent by Swiss schoolchildren to their Hungarian counter­
parts was meant to overthrow the regime. The chocolate bars distributed 
in the schools were allegedly accompanied by bullets intended to kill 
Russian and Hungarian soldiers.11' Other accusations of this kind made 
at the time were indicative of the atmosphere of distrust in which the 
ICRC worked. The stress suffered by the ICRC in Hungary in 
connection with its assistance to the population thus derived primarily 
from propagandists and psychological factors.
3. PROTECTION
Simultaneously with its relief action, the ICRC resumed, in this 
second phase of intervention, its protective functions. First it sought to 
render assistance to political detainees, then to deportees, and finally, 
beginning in September 1957, to medical personnel prosecuted or 
arrested by the Hungarian authorities.
A. Political Detainees
In its actions on behalf of political detainees, the ICRC did not adopt 
any specific strategy, but in each case decided “the concrete modalities of 
the action, considering all the circumstances apt to make the action as
116 “Plénière du 3 octobre 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
11 ' “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre MM. Kapcsos et Maunoir du 15 février 1957”, AICRC, 
251(65), 1.1.
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quick and efficacious as possible. Each individual case calls for an 
arrangement of its own; there is, as a rule, no set procedure”.118 
Consequently, it is difficult to compare the way the ICRC addressed the 
problem of political detainees in Hungary with its approach in other 
situations. We will therefore follow the usual practice of the ICRC itself, 
which does not formally define the term “political detainees”.119
It should be recalled that there is no universally applicable and 
enforceable provision in international public law that imposes any kind of 
obligation on the State towards those of its own nationals that it detains 
for political reasons.120 Since the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 
concerns only prisoners of war, the ICRC’s activity in this domain has no 
actual basis in law.121 Yet it was precisely the issue of political detainees 
that revealed the limits the Hungarian government sought to impose on 
the ICRC’s activity. As long as the organization occupied itself with 
providing material assistance the Hungarian authorities raised no 
objection; but as soon as it tried to exercise its protective function, it 
was sternly rebuffed.
On 15 November 1956, the Geneva headquarters took up the question 
of political detainees. It had the Division of General Affairs prepare a 
document containing instructions for the Budapest delegation. First of 
all, information had to be obtained concerning the status and treatment of 
persons detained as a result of the events of October, the identity of the 
detaining authority, and whether anyone had been deported. In addition, 
the delegation was to request authorization to make visits and, where 
warranted, to provide aid, invoking the precedents the ICRC had 
established during its interventions in Greece, Morocco, Algeria, and 
Cyprus. It was also supposed to request that such persons be tried in 
regularly constituted courts, in conformity with Article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions. Where possible, it was to try to prevent the 
conviction of those who had simply participated in the struggle, or obtain 
clemency for them, by stressing the general confusion that had prevailed 
at the time. Finally, under the circumstances, the ICRC informed its 
delegation that although an overly legalistic position was best avoided, it
118 Léopold Boissier, “La Croix-Rouge et l’assistance aux détenus politiques”, Politique 
étrangère 23, no. 1 (1958): 22.
119 Jacques Moréidon, Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et la protection des 
détenus politiques, p. 14.
120 Ibid., p. 123.
121 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of victims of war provide the basis 
for ICRC activity. For more information, see Annex III.
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should take Article 3 and the general principles and spirit of the Geneva 
Conventions as a minimal starting point.122 All these measures were to 
be undertaken gradually but purposefully.
The next day, the ICRC began to lay the groundwork for its protection 
policy. In the agreement of 16 November 1956 that it signed with the 
Hungarian Red Cross, it introduced a sentence referring to its traditional 
tasks: “The sole object of this agreement being the distribution of relief 
supplies to the Hungarian population, it cannot be interpreted as 
restricting the other- humanitarian activities which the International 
Committee of the Red Cross may be called upon to exercise in Hungary in 
conformity with the statutes of the International Red Cross or the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions”.123 Thus the delegation began its 
applications to the authorities for information about political detainees.
Obtaining such information proved difficult, however. The Hungarian 
Red Cross claimed that the Kádár government had not itself made any 
arrests; the Soviet authorities were solely responsible for the arrests and 
deportations. The Hungarian Ambassador to Vienna did not deny this, 
but said merely that reports had been greatly exaggerated.124 At ICRC 
headquarters, there was debate over the best strategy to adopt and what 
aspects of the Conventions should be invoked to give ICRC delegates the 
best chance of being able to assist political detainees. One of the 
Committee members considered that the ICRC should settle for 
invoking Article 3. He also thought that the ICRC might undertake 
certain steps vis-à-vis the Hungarian authorities: “I still think that the 
Committee should consider, at the right moment, an informal, personal 
approach to the Hungarian government to discuss this subject”.125
The General Affairs Division also examined the possibility of 
intervening. It recognized without question that in some respects the 
events in Hungary presented the characteristics of an international 
conflict between Hungary and the USSR. However, as Jean-René 
Wilhelm noted, “in numerous other aspects [...] - among which the 
interpretation of the events given by the Governments involved cannot 
be completely disregarded — the hostilities in Hungary called instead for 
the application of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, an article that is
122 See Annex XIV.
128 See Annex IX.
124 “Annexe du procès-verbal de Présidence du 22 novembre 1956”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
125 “Note de M. Siordet à MM. Boissier, Gallopin et Pictet du 5 décembre 1956”, AICRC, 
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valid for non-international conflicts”.121’ Because of these aspects, the 
General Affairs Division considered that basing the ICRC’s measures on 
Article 3 would give them the best chance of success. In its view, citing 
that article would guarantee a modicum of respect for human rights while 
leaving the door open to a possible amplification of the ICRC’s powers 
later. Moreover, the application of this article would not affect the exact 
legal classification of the conflict, a classification considered as “not 
currently necessary for humanitarian action”.* 127
At the beginning of 1957, the ICRC again asked for news of political 
detainees. It wanted to know their names and where they were being held 
so it could pass this information on to their families. It also noted that under 
the terms of the Geneva Conventions, particularly the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
these detainees were entitled to convey news of themselves, write to their 
friends and relatives, receive material aid from the ICRC or their families, 
and receive visits from the ICRC.128 The Hungarian Red Cross, however, 
when informed of the ICRC’s intentions, begged the delegates not to take 
any steps in the matter of the detainees, for fear of compromising all the 
operations already in progress.
During a meeting of the Presidency Council on 17 January 1957, the 
President of the ICRC expressed his disappointment over the handling 
of the issue of political detainees, and insisted that the problem was 
serious.129 *Prevented from carrying out its traditional functions, the 
ICRC was in a difficult position. As Committee member Jacques 
Chenevière remarked, “we risk drawing reproaches such as those 
incurred at the end of World War II, and the dangers are the same with 
respect to continuing the actions in progress. The problem must remain 
on the agenda”.1"0 The ICRC did not want to be accused of not having 
tried to do anything for political detainees. Thus, the potential impact of 
this problem went beyond Hungarian borders.
At the end of January 1957 the ICRC was informed by its delegate in 
Budapest that the political detainees’ situation was becoming increas­
ingly grave, and that all applications to the Ministry of the Interior and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been in vain. According to ICRC
12,1 See Annex XV.
127 Ibid.
128 “Projet de note établi par M. Bovey pour M. Gallopin du 16 janvier 1957”, AICRC, 
225(65), II.4.
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delegate Bovey, “the solution is probably in Moscow..”.131 Since the relief 
action was moving into high gear at the time, Roger Gallopin and the 
President of the ICRC started out by asking permission to distribute 
relief parcels in the prisons,132 but received no response during the 
following months. The ICRC did not give up hope, and continued to 
believe that it should overlook no possible avenue in its efforts to perform 
its traditional functions. “Although it may be difficult to make an official, 
general request to visit prisoners as in other countries, beginning with 
individual cases may be a way of achieving the same result”.133 According 
to Roger Gallopin, however, such a proceeding would not lead to 
anything, since if the ICRC had not achieved anything during the 
conflict, it was unlikely to do so now that the situation had been stabilized.
During the summer of 1957, many arrests were made — 3,000 were 
counted between 5 and 20 July — and they showed every sign of 
continuing; in fact, a prison that had been closed down was reopened. 
Under these circumstances, the ICRC wondered what chance it had of 
accomplishing anything without provoking the antagonism of the 
Hungarian Red Cross and the political authorities. In previous years, 
the ICRC’s policy had been to intervene only in situations where the 
presence of its delegates could be expected to bring about an 
improvement in the physical conditions of detention. By working within 
the limits of what was possible, the ICRC sought to maintain the trust 
that was its stock-in-trade for any humanitarian action.134 By this token, 
it considered that in the current atmosphere it had no prospect of 
intervening.
At the end of 1957, shortly before the ICRC closed its delegation in 
Budapest, efforts were still being made to assist political detainees. 
Ernst Fischer asked the Hungarian Red Cross if it would be possible to 
distribute gift supplies in the prisons. That organization refused to take 
up the matter, asserting that it was an exclusively internal Hungarian 
concern.135 *In meetings with the ICRC delegates, the Hungarian Red 
Cross always showed itself very unforthcoming, but eventually it agreed 
to convey the ICRC’s request to distribute parcels in the prisons to the
131 “Rapport de M. Bovey présenté au Conseil de Présidence du 31 janvier 1957”, AICRC, 
251(65), 1.2.
132 Ibid.
133 “Procès-verbal de Présidence du 18 juillet 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
134 “Procès-verbal entre Mme Mathez et MM. Boissier, Fischer, Siordet, Chenevière,
Gallopin, Pilloud, Maunoir du 7 août 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
5 “Procès-verbal d’entretien avec M. Fischer et plusieurs membres du CICR du 
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government. The President of the ICRC even sent a letter to Kárpáti, 
the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Red Cross, requesting a definite 
answer concerning the relief that the ICRC could provide to political 
detainees.136 In the meantime, the ICRC settled for offering support to 
the families of the detainees.
This was the situation when the ICRC left Budapest at the end of 
October 1957. It should not be concluded, however, that the ICRC 
members attached little importance to the organization’s lack of success 
in this domain. Some considered that the steps the ICRC took after 
completing its relief action were unsatisfactory.
“Although at the time [the beginning of 1957] the ICRC might 
conceivably have wanted to avoid jeopardizing its newly commenced relief 
action by asking for permission to visit the prisons, it is surprising that once 
that action had ended the ICRC - which had made almost no efforts in the 
interim - should show itself so shy in a domain where ample precedent 
[with respect to relief in prisons] had been established in other countries 
and under circumstances much less proximate to armed conflict”.137
But this reasoning was theoretical and unrealistic. The ICRC had 
adopted a circumspect approach because it had as yet no tradition on 
which to rely in this sphere; it was thus compelled to proceed cautiously 
on a trial-and-error basis.138
Moreover, this was apparently not the only reason that the ICRC was 
so moderate in its demands on behalf of political detainees. The action in 
Hungary represented the ICRC’s first intervention in a conflict in a 
People’s Democracy. At the time the world was divided into two 
opposing camps, ready to take up the cudgels from one moment to the 
next. Fully aware of this danger, the ICRC was concerned that overly 
insistent demands might compromise future action in the Communist 
sphere. One of the Committee members expressed this clearly enough: 
“It is best to maintain good relations with the Hungarian authorities, as 
an open door to this world”.139 The ICRC Assembly, moreover, stated 
categorically at its plenary meeting of October 1957: “the ICRC will not 
undertake, for the time being, any special efforts vis-à-vis the Hungarian 
authorities on behalf of detained persons”.140
13,1 “Lettre de M. Boissier à M. Kárpáti du 17 décembre 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
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B. Deportees
Besides political detainees, the ICRC sought to protect people who 
had been deported as a result of the events in Hungary. It began by 
approaching János Kádár’s government, but to no avail, since apparently 
the Soviets were responsible for the deportations. The two delegates in 
Budapest advised the ICRC to take up the matter with Moscow,141 but 
no move seems to have been made in this direction. The only document 
sent by the USSR to the ICRC was a letter concerning another aspect of 
the action. The contents of that letter, however, reflected the Soviet 
position:
“in regard to your telegram N A-577 concerning facilities for 
implementing various Red Cross measures on Hungarian territory 
by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and the National Red Cross Societies, as well as the security of the 
persons participating in the implementation of these measures, allow 
me to inform you that to resolve all these questions you must apply to 
the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic”.142
The fact that the USSR was pretending to be uninvolved in 
Hungarian affairs implied that all applications to Moscow were doomed 
to failure.
According to delegate Beckh, an enquiry into the fate of the deportees 
was essential no matter what its result, since it would permit the ICRC to 
act. His reasoning was as follows: If the reports of deportations were 
erroneous, the East would welcome the ICRC’s intervention because it 
would prove those reports were wrong. By rendering this service to the 
USSR, the ICRC would be in a better position to request access to 
persons who had been deprived of their liberty. If the reports were not 
completely wrong but simply exaggerated, the ICRC’s intervention 
would be doubly advantageous: It would curb the deportations and it 
would allow the ICRC delegates to visit camps, since such visits could be 
expected to appease public opinion. On the other hand, if the reports 
were accurate and the Soviets were determined to continue in the same 
line, they might conceivably be all the more interested in offering a sop to 
humanitarian sensibilities by allowing visits to be made to persons 
imprisoned in Hungary itself.
141 “Annexe du procès-verbal de Présidence du 22 novembre 1956”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 
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At the beginning of December 1956, János Kádár confirmed that the 
reports of deportations were accurate; but he also announced that all 
deportees had already been repatriated, hence the matter was closed. 
The ICRC, however, continued to worry about the problem, and tried to 
identify cases in which it could invoke the Geneva Conventions. If the 
deportees were defined as civilians, or could be considered as such, the 
ICRC could cite Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Part of that 
article stipulates: “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as 
deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the 
territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive”.143
If, on the other hand, the deportees had been armed at the time they 
were seized — which was probably the case for many of them — and they 
were considered prisoners of war according to the definition provided in 
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, the ICRC could then request 
the application of all the articles concerning that category of persons- 
although it could not then oppose the removal of such persons from 
Hungarian territory, since the Detaining Power was entitled to move 
prisoners of war onto its own territory. Nonetheless, as prisoners of war 
these deportees would be able to enjoy visits from the ICRC.144 
Moreover, if the USSR were indeed to recognize them as such and 
authorize visits from the ICRC, this would establish a favourable 
precedent that the ICRC could use in future.
Except for discussion of the ICRC’s methods of intervention, to the 
best of my knowledge there is no documentation of any concrete 
measures undertaken on behalf of deportees. Consequently, we do not 
know what was done for them. All that can be ascertained is that 
although the ICRC was concerned about protecting this category of 
people, no action was actually carried out.
C. Medical Personnel and Former Members 
of the Hungarian Red Cross
Since both medical personnel and former members of the Hungarian 
Red Cross were, in some cases, interrogated by the Hungarian 
government, the ICRC was concerned about protecting them. Certain 
members of the Hungarian Red Cross, including the five professors of 
medicine who shared the presidency, were dismissed from their positions
143 The Geneva Conventions of August 12,1949, p. 172.
144 “Note de M. Siordet à MM. Boissier, Gallopin et Pictet du 5 décembre 1956”, AICRC, 
225(65), II.4.
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in May 1957. The Hungarian government fired the five professors for 
many reasons. They were accused of having provided substantial 
assistance to the “counter-revolutionaries”, of maintaining close ties 
with the West and, by that token, of being in the pay of the “imperialists”. 
They were also charged with having isolated and dismissed the 
Communists on the Red Cross staff and of having hired counter­
revolutionaries in their place. In addition, they were guilty of having- 
encouraged the strikers by providing them with Western aid so they 
could hold out longer, and of having accepted substantial gifts from the 
ICRC, of doing business with it, and, consequently, of being at its mercy. 
Finally, they were accused of not defending the interests of Hungar­
ians.145 146In addition to losing their jobs with the Hungarian Red Cross, 
some of them were arrested and others were placed under surveillance. 
During the summer of 1957, however, it was reported that the five 
professors had resumed their professional activities without suffering 
harassment.
The former head of foreign relations at the Hungarian Red Cross, 
Mihály Gedenyi, was also arrested, but that was on account of his 
journalistic activities. Delegate Ernst Fischer met with Gedenyi’s wife 
and lawyer to find out what the ICRC could do to help, but the lawyer 
strongly advised against any initiative from Geneva. Mrs. Gedenyi, 
however, expressed a wish that the lawyer’s fee might be paid, and the 
ICRC obliged. The ICRC also learned that Mr. Sergenyi, the former 
head of transport at the Hungarian Red Cross, had been arrested. It 
therefore decided to assist his wife, a doctor who apparently desired 
additional training, by offering her the opportunity to attend the 
University of Basle.
In addition, the ICRC intervened on behalf of five Hungarian Red 
Cross auxiliaries accused of appropriating relief supplies not intended for 
them. It proved to the Hungarian authorities that they were in troth the 
designated recipients of the supplies. On the other hand, it did not 
intervene on behalf of members of the Hungarian Red Cross who had 
been arrested for assisting Hungarian nationals to escape and for 
diverting relief supplies, because they had been working at the 
Hungarian Red Cross before the advent of the five professors.145
The ICRC was also informed that Dr. Csillag of the Hungarian Red 
Cross had been dismissed from both the Red Cross and the army medical
140 Csillag, pp. 14-15.
146 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre Mme Mathez et MM. Boissier, Siordet, Chenevière, 
Gallopin, Pilloud et Maunoir du 7 août 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
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service. He was thus left without resources and requested assistance 
from one of the ICRC delegates. For various reasons delegate Fischer 
was inclined to refuse this request, and the members of the ICRC in 
Geneva concurred. However, Fischer informed headquarters that he had 
managed to transmit some relief supplies to those former members of the 
Hungarian Red Cross who had been arrested.
It should be emphasized that the members of the ICRC began dealing 
with this issue before the arrests and other intimidating measures 
actually began. One delegate, Melchior Borsinger, explained this very 
clearly to the Austrian Minister, Oskar Helmer: “I explained to Minister 
Helmer that this is a problem that also worries the ICRC, and that I had 
been asked, a few months ago, to convey a note from Geneva to our 
Budapest delegation concerning precisely this question, and that we 
were concerned not only for the five members of the Presidency of that 
society, but also for all the other members who might in future find 
themselves in a delicate position”.147
The medical personnel arrested for providing care to insurgents were 
in a more desperate situation. The ICRC heard from various sources that 
these individuals had suffered cruel treatment, sometimes with fatal 
results. A Committee member at Geneva headquarters urged the ICRC 
to adopt a very firm policy in the matter. “The situation is such”, declared 
Mr. Chenevière, “that the ICRC might be compelled to withdraw from 
Hungary, if it can do nothing in the traditional sphere”.148
In August 1957, the ICRC accordingly decided to instruct its delegate 
to gather evidence on the arrest of medical personnel and to inform the 
former members of the Hungarian Red Cross that the ICRC intended to 
intervene on their behalf, the idea being to find out if they thought such 
intervention might improve them situation.149 However, Fischer, the 
delegate, was unable to collect any specific documentary evidence 
concerning the circumstances of doctors and nurses accused of having 
provided medical care to insurgents. Nor did he succeed in making 
contact with the former members of the Red Cross.
One of the members of the Committee, Rodolfo Olgiati, wondered “if 
the ICRC cannot try to do more for these people, even at the risk of 
annoying the Hungarian authorities. Otherwise, it seems to be covering
147 “Lettre de M. Borsinger à M. Boissier du 8 juin 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
148 “Procès-verbal de Plénière du 8 août 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.2.
149 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre Mme Mathez et MM. Boissier, Siordet, Chenevière, 
Gallopin, Pilloud et Maunoir du 7 août 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
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up a situation that is fundamentally opposed to the principles of the Red 
Cross, and it may be reproached for this some day, when these people will 
perhaps be free”.150 The ICRC President reminded him that “the 
Committee’s action is based on what is possible”,151 and in this case it 
seemed difficult to do anything. According to Melchior Borsinger and 
Jean Pictet, it was almost impossible to act, for even “Article 18 of the 
First Convention (‘no one may ever be molested or convicted for having 
nursed the wounded or sick’) [was] scarcely applicable: for the USSR and 
Hungary, there [had] been no international war nor even a civil war, and 
the armed hostilities [were] long over”.152
Consequently, the Committee decided not to make any special 
applications to the Hungarian authorities on behalf of detainees and, in 
particular, medical personnel, unless its delegate in Budapest speedily 
came up with sufficient evidence to justify intervention. However, it 
would pay particular attention to the general issue of the free practice of 
medicine in internal conflicts and the application of Article 18 of the First 
Geneva Convention.153 Moreover, the ICRC questioned the First 
Secretary of the Hungarian delegation to the European Office of the 
United Nations concerning medical personnel. The First Secretary 
asserted that it was “difficult for him to believe that medical personnel 
could be harassed as such”.154
Thus, in the second phase of its action in Hungary, the representations 
the ICRC made with a view to protecting prisoners went unanswered. 
The organization achieved virtually nothing. The limitations of its action 
were clear. Hungary, and by extension the USSR, accepted the material 
relief that the ICRC could give them, because they needed it; but they 
obstinately rejected all protection efforts, which they did not consider 
were properly the business of the ICRC. Here we see very clearly that 
the relations between the ICRC and the Eastern bloc, meaning Moscow, 
had not improved. In fact, the ICRC managed to penetrate the Iron 
Curtain only because it had supplies to distribute. The ICRC’s action in 
Hungary could not be considered a step forward in the organization’s 
relations with the USSR; indeed, in my view these relations are a good 
illustration of the tensions of the Cold War.
The ICRC’s attitude towards the Eastern bloc reflected its desire to 
maintain friendly contacts with the USSR. The Hungarian action was
160 “Plénière du 3 octobre 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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conducted with extreme caution to avoid compromising future opera­
tions in the Communist camp. Recognizing the fragility of the ties it was 
creating with the Eastern bloc, the ICRC did its best not to provoke 
Moscow. Austria was aware of this attitude, and reproached the ICRC 
for it — or at least that was the impression Minister Helmer gave the 
delegate Melchior Borsinger: “I also thought I sensed in Minister 
Helmer’s speech that feeling that I have already reported — that the 
Committee’s attitude towards the People’s Democracies is perhaps not 
firm enough”.155
4. REUNIFICATION OF DISPERSED PERSONS
As an exodus of200,000 Hungarians fled abroad, many children left the 
country without their parents, or their parents, having crossed the border 
at a different time, were given asylum by different authorities. In addition 
to providing news of these individuals, the ICRC had to find some basis of 
agreement with the different governments so that those persons who 
desired it could be reunited with their relatives as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. This section will skip over the various agreements established in 
this respect between different countries of asylum in order to focus on the 
problems of repatriation between Hungary and other countries, that being 
the ICRC’s direct area of concern.
The ICRC did not become involved in the problem of family 
reunification on its own initiative, but at the request of the governments 
involved, primarily the Hungarian government. In November 1956, the 
Hungarian government asked the ICRC to take steps to promote the 
repatriation of all minor children (up to the age of 18 under Hungarian 
law) who had taken refuge abroad, alleging that they were sought by 
them parents and that their place was with their families.156 The 
countries of asylum, however, did not consider these grounds sufficient 
and, feeling that the matter of repatriation was not quite so simple, they 
requested help from the ICRC.
The two main countries of asylum — Austria and Yugoslavia — had 
different views concerning the best way to solve the repatriation 
problem. On 7 and 16 January, the Austrian government sent the ICRC 
lists of unaccompanied Hungarian children, asking it to verify that the 
children’s parents were in fact in Hungary. Austria did not want to
155 “Lettre de M. Borsinger à M. Boissier du 8 juin 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
156 “Akie_mémoire sur le problème du regroupement des familles entre la Hongrie et 
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repatriate the young Hungarians without first finding out what awaited 
them in them homeland.
Yugoslavia, in contrast, after having announced that it wanted to 
work with the ICRC on the problem, ultimately adopted a different 
solution. The Yugoslav Red Cross gave the Hungarian Red Cross a list of 
34 children whom it would be willing to repatriate on condition that it 
first received declarations from the parents requesting their children’s 
return. Both the ICRC and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees were surprised by this new move, which they considered 
“absolutely contrary to the undertakings of the Yugoslav government in 
this respect”.157
Other countries, equally concerned by the repatriation problem, 
asked for the ICRC’s assistance in 1957. France wished to use the ICRC 
as an intermediary in repatriating Hungarian children, as a guarantee 
that it would receive valid declarations from parents in Hungary.158 The 
United Kingdom refused to repatriate a single child until the ICRC could 
confirm the parents’ freely expressed wish to have their children 
returned to them. In short, except for Yugoslavia the various host 
countries all wanted the ICRC to make enquiries about the parents of 
children on the lists that they furnished or planned to furnish, in order to 
find out whether the families were still in Hungary and were in fact freely 
requesting the return of their children.
Conversely, several National Red Cross Societies asked the ICRC to 
help them resolve the situation of children left behind in Hungary and 
claimed by them refugee parents. In February 1957, the Norwegian Red 
Cross asked the ICRC to arrange for the transfer of such children to 
Norway. This request echoed a similar one from the Italian Red Cross, 
received some time previously, as well as many individual requests from 
the parents themselves, addressed directly to the ICRC.159 According to 
statements issued at the beginning of 1957 by the Hungarian Embassy in 
Vienna, the Hungarian authorities were in principle willing to allow 
children to leave Hungary in order to be reunited with their parents 
abroad.160
In light of this situation, in April 1957 the ICRC decided to send a 
special delegate, Arthur Guillermet, to Budapest, Vienna, and Belgrade
157
158
159 
KiO
Ibid.
Ibid. For the French government, dealing directly with the Hungarian diplomatic 
representative in France was out of the question.
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to find out exactly how these governments stood on the issue, those being 
the three countries most directly concerned by the problem. It is 
noteworthy that the ICRC sent a special delegate for the purpose even 
though it already had numerous delegates in Vienna and Budapest; 
obviously it wanted to separate this issue from the rest of its operation.
In his meetings in Budapest, Arthur Guillermet came up against the 
intransigence of the Hungarian authorities, who continued to demand 
the repatriation of all minors under 18 and wanted the ICRC to persuade 
the countries of asylum to accept this principle. As for possible legal 
prosecution of these children following their return, the government 
considered that children under the age of 14 could scarcely be assumed to 
have left the country for political reasons. In the case of children between 
the ages of 14 and 18, on the other hand, it considered that “legislation 
and the wishes of the parents should be taken into account”.161 The 
Hungarian government had already adopted a decree-law granting- 
amnesty until 31 March 1957 to all minors under the age of 18 who had 
illegally crossed the border between 23 October and 1 November 1956. 
Now, however, it decided to extend this amnesty indefinitely. None­
theless, as Arthur Guillermet remarked, only the offence of crossing the 
border illegally was mentioned; other offences, such as participating in 
the events of 1956, were probably not covered by the amnesty.162 
Consequently, as soon as they returned to Hungary minors between the 
ages of 14 and 18 were vulnerable to legal prosecution.
The Hungarian government was also very firm on the matter of the 
lists of children’s names, maintaining that they should be sent to the 
Hungarian Red Cross rather than to the ICRC. The special delegate 
thought that this was an allusion to the direct arrangements made 
between Yugoslavia and Hungary, as well as to the recent dispatch of a 
list by the Austrian authorities. As for enquiries to determine whether 
the children’s parents were still in Hungary and had freely expressed 
their wish to take their children back, the Hungarian government 
referred the ICRC to the Hungarian Red Cross.
With respect to the emigration of wives or children who had remained 
behind in Hungary and who wished to rejoin their refugee husbands or 
parents abroad, the Hungarian authorities took a minimalist line. Deputy 
Minister Szarka declared that such persons could obtain visas through 
the usual emigration procedure; but very few visas were in fact received 
in this way. Although the Deputy Minister did recognize that emigration
1Ü1 Ibid.
](i2 Ibid.
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was a humanitarian issue just as repatriation was, he did not conceal the 
fact that the Hungarian authorities attached much more importance to 
the latter.163
In Vienna, Arthur Guillermet found the Austrian government’s 
position on repatriation to be less categorical than in the past. The 
conditions it now posed were that the parents had to be in Hungary and 
had to have freely expressed their desire for the return of their children. 
Moreover, Austria no longer set 14 as the age of majority, an age limit 
recognized by no other country. Nonetheless, it always took into account 
the wishes of the children themselves before deciding to repatriate 
minors between the ages of 14 and 18. Ultimately, as suggested by the 
general delegate of the League of Red Cross Societies, the most urgent 
problem was to obtain authorization for the repatriation or emigration of 
children six years old and under.164
Yugoslavia approached the repatriation problem differently. ICRC 
assistance was immediately requested for children under the age of 14. 
For each of these children a personal file was to be established 
containing, among other documents, a written request from the parents 
expressing their wish for their child’s return.165 Fearing that pressure 
could be brought to bear in order to obtain this document, the Yugoslav 
Red Cross wanted the ICRC to ascertain that the request had been 
freely made. It did not consider itself competent or able to carry out this 
sort of verification on its own.166 *
For children between the ages of 14 and 18, however, the Yugoslav 
Red Cross did not require the cooperation of the ICRC, because the 
repatriation process was different. Each request initiated an adminis­
trative procedure before a tutelary authority, even if the child declared 
that he did not want to rejoin his parents. It was up to the guardian and 
the tutelary authority to evaluate each individual case, placing the best 
interests of the child first.16'
163 Ibid.
1M Ibid.
165 Ibid. The complete procedure was as follows. The Yugoslav Red Cross sent lists of 
children to the Hungarian Red Cross and copies thereof to the ICRC. In return, it 
asked the latter to send it a copy of the birth certificate of each child on the list as proof 
of the child’s parentage; a written request from the parents asking for the return of 
their child; and an attestation from the competent Hungarian authority certifying that 
the parents had not been deprived of their right of parental authority.
166 Ibid.
11,1 Ibid. If the child wished to emigrate, the Yugoslav Red Cross notified the parents, 
stating the child’s reasons and the name of his or her guardian. The parents had a right 
of appeal, but if they did not respond, the child’s wishes were respected and the 
tutelary authority ruled on the case.
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Arthur Guillermet noted that the Yugoslav attitude towards the 
ICRC had changed. Contrary to what the dispatch of lists to the 
Hungarian Red Cross had seemed to portend — namely, a direct 
understanding between the Hungarian and Yugoslav authorities with­
out the participation of the ICRC — the Yugoslav Red Cross wanted very 
much to collaborate with the ICRC.
The special delegate came to a number of conclusions regarding his 
mission to Budapest, Vienna, and Belgrade. First of all, it did not seem 
possible that the ICRC could make the enquiries about the children’s 
parents requested by the countries of asylum without exposing those 
parents to certain risks. The ICRC’s main source of information was the 
Hungarian Red Cross, which seemed to be completely subordinate to the 
political authority. Moreover, the repatriation issue was becoming very 
urgent: tension was mounting in the refugee camps, and there were 
frequent instances of undisciplined behaviour among young people.168 169 * 171
By April 1957 the ICRC possessed all the information it needed to 
decide what to do about these people. It sent Arthur Guillermet to 
Hungary again, this time with instructions to submit to the government a 
draft agreement on the reunification of families. Since the ICRC was 
rather sceptical that the agreement would be approved as it was, it also 
told its delegate what changes he could accept. In order to save time, the 
ICRC authorized him to sign the agreement “as long as any amendments 
requested by the Hungarian Government did not affect in any way the 
fundamental principles on which it was based”.11’11 The ICRC attached 
particular importance to the first article of the draft, which defined the 
principle of family reunification as the essential basis of this humanitar­
ian action; as such, that principle had to be applied in Hungary as well as 
abroad. The criterion for deciding whether a family should be reunited in 
Hungary or abroad was, as a rule, the home or place of residence 
designated by the head of the family. If the family was to be reunited 
abroad, the Hungarian authorities would issue exit visas for the 
individuals in question in an accelerated procedure distinct from that 
normally used for emigrants.1'11 If Article 1 could not be respected, the 
delegate was to “inform the Hungarian Government that since the ICRC 
has not obtained the necessary facilities, it must refuse to lend itself to 
such an action, and so inform those who have applied to it”.1 a
168 Ibid.
169 “Instructions for Monsieur A. Guillermet du Président du CICR datant du 
25 avril 1957", AICRC, 251(65), 1.3.
1111 For the text of the draft agreement, see Annex XVI.
171 For the exact instructions given to Arthur Guillermet, see Annex XVI.
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Further on in the draft, the ICRC defined three different age groups: 
minors aged 6 and under, minors between the ages of 6 and 14, and minors 
between 14 and 18. Different considerations operated for each group. 
Children in the first group were to be restored to their families as soon as 
the person with parental authority over them determined the family’s 
place of residence. Minors in the second group could be consulted as to 
whether they wished to return to or leave Hungary. Minors in the last 
category were to be consulted in all cases. In making this age distinction, 
the ICRC sought to accommodate the wishes of both the Hungarian 
authorities and the countries of asylum. The Hungarian government 
wanted the unconditional repatriation of all children under the age of 18, 
whereas the Austrian authorities wanted to take account of the wishes of 
children between the ages of 14 and 18 (whom they considered to be of 
age).
In the end, the Hungarian authorities rejected the entire proposal. 
They did not see how the issue of repatriating children could possibly be 
linked with the issue of emigration: “the Hungarian parents who pester 
the Hungarian Red Cross and other organizations with their requests for 
the repatriation of children who escaped abroad cannot, naturally, accept 
a linkage between their just demands, which are urgent from the moral 
and humanitarian point of view, and the affairs of persons who, by going 
abroad and abandoning their children, demonstrated at the time 
something other than attachment to their children”.1'2 The Hungarian 
government emphasized, however, that it did not categorically oppose 
emigration, and it noted the existing possibilities offered by the 
legislation governing emigration.
According to delegate Guillermet, the Hungarian government 
rejected the principle of reciprocity for reasons of prestige. If the 
government signed an agreement favourable to the refugees, who were 
considered traitors, it would lose face with the Hungarian population. 
Conversely, a mass return of refugees would be synonymous with 
success for the government.1'3 Consequently, the latter proposed an 
agreement comprising the following provisions: The Hungarian Red 
Cross would give the ICRC the names of children whose parents wanted 
them repatriated; the ICRC would then pass these names along to the 
Red Cross Societies of the countries of asylum so that they could look for 
the children and facilitate their repatriation. The Hungarian Red Cross 
would then send the relevant National Societies a statement from the * 8
1,2 “Lettre de M. Szarka, Ministre-Adjoint des Affaires étrangères, à M. Guillermet du
8 mai 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.3.
m “Deuxième rapport de M. Guillermet du 13 mai 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.3.
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parents requesting the repatriation of their children. Finally, the ICRC 
would make sure that the National Red Cross Societies in the countries of 
asylum were indeed taking steps to repatriate children whose parents 
had requested it.174 175 *As for the costs of this repatriation, the ICRC would 
make arrangements with the National Societies or other organizations to 
cover expenses up to the Hungarian border; from there onward the 
Hungarian authorities would assume financial responsibility.1 '5
The arrangement proposed by the Hungarian authorities was 
completely different from that envisioned by the ICRC, and given these 
great divergencies, any solution to the repatriation problem seemed 
impossible. Moreover, the ICRC’s family reunification initiative came a 
little too late, since some countries of asylum had already established 
agreements with the Hungarian government. The United Kingdom, for 
example, had set up an “intermediary arrangement” under which the 
British consul in Budapest was instructed to send for parents who had 
remained in Hungary to find out whether they wanted their children 
back.
In August 1957 the question of family reunification was still in limbo. 
The direct contacts between the Hungarian Red Cross and the National 
Red Cross Societies of the countries of asylum did not seem to have 
produced any satisfactory results. Given these circumstances, the 
Hungarian authorities finally realized that if they wanted to find an 
overall solution to the repatriation problem, they could not separate it 
from the issue of emigration. Nonetheless, they rejected the idea of one- 
on-one exchanges. The ICRC accordingly decided that the best course 
would be to convene the Hungarian Red Cross and all interested 
National Red Cross Societies of the countries of asylum to a conference in 
Geneva. The ICRC’s view was that such a conference required neither 
the presence of all National Societies concerned nor unanimous decisions. 
It was clear, however, that the principle of two-way family reunification 
(emigration and repatriation) would have to be adopted as “a pre­
condition for these negotiations”.1'1’ The Hungarian Red Cross pro­
nounced itself favourable to the idea of a conference, but proposed
174 The return of children over the age of 16 who, contrary to the wishes of their parents, 
expressed the desire to remain in the country of asylum would be decided by the 
Hungarian tutelary authority. If the decision called for the repatriation of the child 
against his will, the ICRC would ensure that it was carried out. “Lettre de M. Szarka, 
Ministre-Adjoint des Affaires étrangères, à M. Guillermet du 8 mai 1957”, AICRC, 
251(65), 1.3.
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170 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre Mme Mathez et MM. Boissier, Siordet, Chenevière, 
Gallopin, Pilloud et Maunoir”, AICRC, 225(65).
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Budapest as the venue. It also asked “if it might not be possible for 
participants to have decision-making powers, for example through the 
presence of governmental delegates or councillors”.17 ' The ICRC did not 
object to this, since the goal of the conference was precisely to seek a 
basis for compromise. The National Societies invited were consequently 
at liberty to bring governmental experts along.
In October 1957, the idea of a conference for the parties involved was 
still in the planning stage. It was not until the International Conference 
of the Red Cross in New Delhi that the problem of family reunification 
was broached once more: “The XIXth International Red Cross 
Conference...urges all National Societies and Governments to intensify 
their efforts in these matters and, in particular, to facilitate by every 
means the reunion of persons, both adults and children, with their 
families in accordance with the wishes of such persons, and in the case of 
minor children in accordance with the wishes of the recognized head of 
the family no matter where domiciled”.177 78
At the time when the ICRC closed its delegations, the problem of 
family reunification was far from resolved. In fact, since the unfruitful 
negotiations concerning the agreement proposed by the ICRC, no 
progress had been made on the issue overall.1'9 Enormous differences 
remained between the Hungarian government and the countries of 
asylum. As the First Secretary of the Hungarian delegation to the 
European Office of the United Nations remarked during a talk with a 
member of the ICRC, the planned conference was unlikely to engender 
any progress towards solving the problem, since all matters of visas and 
emigration were the province of the government. Moreover, the 
Hungarian Red Cross might fear the prospect of standing isolated 
against all the National Societies of the countries of asylum, who were 
united by their common position. The First Secretary of the Hungarian 
delegation ended by adding that it would be better not to link the two 
questions. To which the ICRC responded that it linked them because the 
refugees themselves were asking their children to emigrate.180
Actually, the issue of family repatriation was so difficult to resolve 
because it had been very much politicized. The Hungarian government
177 “Procès-verbal d’entretien avec M. Fischer et plusieurs membres du CICR du 
16 septembre 1957”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
178 ICRC/LRCS, International Red Cross Handbook, 11th ed. (Geneva: International 
Committee of the Red Cross and League of Red Cross Societies, 1971), p. 467.
179 “Plénière du 3 octobre 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
180 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre MM. Kapcsos et Maunoir du 4 octobre 1957”, AICRC, 
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did not want its nationals to leave the country under any circumstances, 
because that would suggest that living in the West was preferable. The 
Western countries, for their part, did not want to let the Hungarian 
children leave, being well aware of the fate that awaited them. It was 
very possible that if they returned they would be punished for having left 
the country.
The ICRC’s position was difficult to judge, since it had not become 
involved on its own initiative; it was in a way an intermediary between 
the two sides rather than one of the parties involved. This position, 
however, allowed it to be much more demanding with the Hungarian 
authorities, because its mediation would have no direct impact on its 
current and future actions in the Eastern bloc. If the Hungarian 
authorities criticized its position, the ICRC could always take refuge in 
the fact that its intervention had been requested by the governments. 
Thus, if its demands were not respected, or did not suit the parties 
involved, it could withdraw from the negotiations without fearing 
negative consequences for other aspects of its action.
During the second phase of that action, then, the ICRC acted in 
several different spheres. First of all, it managed to organize and 
implement its relief operations without any major problems. In the 
sphere of protection, it ran up against the Hungarian veto on any action 
for the benefit of political detainees, and it did not intervene on behalf of 
deportees and medical personnel. Nonetheless, it succeeded in rendering 
some assistance to former members of the Hungarian Red Cross. As for 
the problem of family reunification, it did not manage to achieve anything 
concrete. The limitations imposed on the accomplishment of its tasks are 
evident — anything other than material aid was problematic. The ICRC’s 
intervention during this second phase was accepted only because it 
allowed Hungary to receive Western donations; it did not reflect any 
improvement in relations between the ICRC and the Eastern bloc.
CHAPTER V
DELEGATES’ TEMPORARY MISSIONS 
IN HUNGARY
Despite the closure of its Budapest delegation, the ICRC wanted to 
continue its activities in aid of Hungary. Accordingly, in early 1958 it 
began to send delegates to that country on temporary missions.
1. ASSISTANCE
The ICRC prolonged its relief activities not only for the purpose of 
assisting the victims of the conflict, but also — and especially — to 
maintain a presence in Hungary, in the hope that it might thus gain the 
opportunity to perform its traditional function. Its action on behalf of the 
war-disabled is proof of this, since the beneficiaries of this action were 
actually not victims of the events of 1956. The ICRC hoped that if it 
maintained contact with the Hungarian authorities it might manage to 
persuade them to authorize visits to political detainees. To keep this 
foothold in Hungary, then, it continued its relief activities in three 
spheres: the winding-up of the relief action, the construction of a 
prosthesis factory, and new material relief programmes.
On the whole, the original relief action was phased out without any 
major problems, but a few matters required further arrangements. The 
first involved the last gift supplies provided in the framework of the 
medical-social programme, which apparently had not been distributed in 
conformity with the plan established between the Hungarian Red Cross 
and the ICRC. In 1958, the ICRC had not yet received certain receipts 
for supplies distributed at the end of 1957 - the receipts that allowed it to 
verify that the distribution had been carried out properly and that the 
beneficiaries had received the supplies due them. These receipts were 
also vital in order to inform donors that their gifts had been distributed, 
so the ICRC exerted “pressure on the Hungarian Red Cross to obtain 
them without delay”.181 Finally, the ICRC delegate, then in Budapest on
181 u‘Procès-verbal de Présidence du 19 juin 1958”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
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a mission, presented a list of the missing receipts to a representative of 
the Hungarian Red Cross. The latter gave him a new batch of receipts, 
but declared that the Hungarian Red Cross had sent a bundle of receipts 
to the Relief Service in Geneva, which apparently had not acknowledged 
receiving them.182 Thus, the receipt problem took time to resolve.
Another issue concerned the use of the money deposited in a blocked 
account in the Hungarian National Bank.183 Some of these funds had 
already been unblocked to help buy a convalescent home for the staff of 
the Hungarian Red Cross and to pay labour costs for the manufacture of 
hospital mattresses. The rest of the money, however, had not yet been 
spent, and the ICRC and the National Society disagreed on the best use 
to make of it. The Hungarian Red Cross wanted to use part of it to set up a 
village for orphaned and abandoned children. The members of the 
Committee took a dim view of this idea, because they believed it difficult, 
“in the current climate of Hungary, to envision Pestalozzi villages that 
would not be centres of political propaganda; information received 
already shows that children who have returned home have been sent to 
re-education camps”.184 Although delegate Fischer visited one such 
village and was very favourably impressed by it, the ICRC adhered to its 
position.185 In August 1958, the blocked account still contained a certain 
amount of money, and the ICRC awaited suggestions from the 
Hungarian Red Cross as to what to do with it.
The programme of assistance to the disabled, initiated wdien the 
ICRC still had its small delegation in Budapest, continued to operate 
during this third phase of the action. At the beginning of January 1958, 
the ICRC decided not to await the construction of new premises before 
sending certain machinery, which then had to be installed in the old 
factory. This would contribute to a clear improvement in the conditions of 
prosthesis manufacture.186 The machinery arrived in Hungary in the 
summer of 1958. During the same period, the plans for building the new 
factory were completed and submitted for approval to the relevant 
ministry. The ICRC urged the Hungarian Red Cross to take any steps it
182 “Rapport sur la mission de MM. Fischer et Maunoir en Hongrie (31 juillet-9 août 1958)”, 
AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
188 See p. 36.
184 “Plénière du 3 octobre 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
iss “procès-verbal de téléphone entre MM. Fischer et Amman du 7 février 1958”, AICRC, 
251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
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could with the authorities to expedite the start of construction. The work 
was not well under way until 1961, and its completion was forecast for 
1962. According to the ICRC, the delay in this programme was in no way 
due to unwillingness on the part of the Hungarian authorities, but to the 
difficulty of finding land and constructing new housing for the people who 
had been — and in some cases still were — residing on the land chosen for 
the new factory.18'
In addition, the Hungarian Red Cross requested more machines, 
which were to be delivered by the ICRC in the autumn of 1961, and a 
fitter had to be sent as well to provide the necessary technical expertise. 
Machinery was still being delivered in 1962. Certain models requested by 
the East German technicians proved to be very difficult to find in 
Western Europe, and the ICRC planned, if necessary, to order them 
from East Germany, which it thought would be an additional proof of its 
neutrality.* 188 It also decided to help finance the construction of the 
prosthesis factory with money drawn directly from the blocked account, 
a move that definitively closed out the account.
On balance, the action on behalf of the disabled progressed 
satisfactorily, if slowly. During his mission in 1965, delegate Jean-Pierre 
Maunoir visited the new factory, which was finally functioning. The joint 
project had succeeded, but it had taken more than five years. The delay 
was unintentional; in fact, it had always been in the Hungarian 
government’s interest to get the ICRC off Hungarian soil as quickly as 
possible. In this respect, it is interesting to note the ICRC’s determina­
tion to implement this action despite the difficulties and the fact that such 
a project had no direct connection to the events of 1956. Its beneficiaries 
were not actually victims of 1956: “about a third of the beneficiaries of the 
prostheses now being manufactured are war victims. The others were 
injured in work or road accidents, or suffer from post-operative 
handicaps”.189 Nevertheless, the project was doubly advantageous: not 
only did it provide assistance to this category of victims, but it also gave 
the ICRC the opportunity to maintain contact with the Hungarian 
authorities and the local Red Cross so that it could attempt to carry out 
its traditional tasks.
18‘ “Rapport sur la mission de MM. Fischer, Ziist et Maunoir à Vienne et Budapest 
effectuée du 13 au 25 mars 1961”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
188 “Procès-verbal de téléphone entre MM. Maunoir et Fischer du 7 mars 1962”, AICRC, 
251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
189 “Rapport sur la mission de MM. Fischer, Züst et Maunoir à Vienne et Budapest 
effectuée du 13 au 25 mars 1961”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
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The ICRC’s new relief programme involved the dispatch of medicines 
to the Hungarian population. At the time local pharmaceutical produc­
tion was insufficient and all imports had been halted, resulting in a 
scarcity of medicaments. In fact, during October and December of 1957, 
the ICRC received 600 individual requests for medicines. After much 
discussion within the organization,190 the Committee allocated credit 
totalling 15,000 Swiss francs, which could be drawn on at a rate of 
SFR 2,500 a month for six months, thus permitting the Hungarian Red 
Cross to satisfy individual requests for essential medicines not 
manufactured in Hungary.191 Thanks to the funds provided by the 
ICRC and the British and Swiss National Societies, shipments of 
individual medicines continued past 1963, for as long as the Committee 
had the means to maintain the operation.192
At the beginning of 1958 the ICRC received a plea for medicines 
worth close to half a million Swiss francs. It wondered whether this 
massive request could still really be considered part of the emergency 
action begun in 1956, and whether conditions of supply in Hungary were 
not adequate to meet this need.19" The Hungarian Red Cross tried to 
justify the magnitude of the request by citing the scarcity of medicines 
stemming from the events of 1956, an epidemic of poliomyelitis in 1957, 
and the impossibility of purchasing pharmaceutical products abroad. Still 
sceptical, the ICRC decided to ascertain the truth of these claims. During 
their mission in July 1958, the delegates learned that the supply of 
pharmaceutical products to hospitals was normal, although certain items 
continued to be unavailable in Hungary.194 Very probably the matter 
was dropped, since there is no further reference to it anywhere in the 
ICRC archives.
Obviously, the ICRC continued its assistance programme for the 
disabled and initiated the dispatch of medicines because it was still 
hoping that such relief operations would allow it to carry out its
190 For details of these discussions, see “Procès-verbaux du 6 janvier 1958 et du 
7 février 1958”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
191 This system was proposed by delegate Fischer. The ICRC now referred all requests 
for medicines to the Hungarian Red Cross. The latter sorted these requests exclusively 
on the basis of the product’s availability in the country and criteria of medical urgency, 
and forwarded the resulting list to the ICRC, which then made bulk shipments. If 
requests exceeded the fixed monthly sum, the ICRC carried the deficit over to the next 
month.
192 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre Mme Koltai et M. Maunoir du 20 février 1963”, 
AICRC, 225(65), III.4, 1961-1970.
19,1 “Rapport sur la mission de MM. Fischer et Maunoir en Hongrie (31 juillet-9 août 1958)”, 
AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
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protective function. One of the Committee members suggested this very 
clearly; Jacques Chenevière proposed that under cover of distributing 
medicaments, delegate Fischer might go to Budapest from time to time 
to continue the ICRC’s protective measures.195 Nonetheless, the ICRC 
realized that the Hungarian Red Cross was beginning to abuse Western 
generosity, and decided not to respond to all of its requests.
2. PROTECTION
The ICRC remained active in the sphere of protection. It attended 
first to political detainees, for whom it made every effort, then to medical 
personnel, and finally to persons who had been convicted and faced 
execution.
A. Political Detainees
We saw that the ICRC’s final effort to assist political detainees was an 
attempt to send them relief parcels, and that the failure of this action led 
the Committee to resolve not to undertake any special measures on 
behalf of this group. At the end of 1957, however, the President of the 
ICRC sent a letter to the Hungarian Red Cross reiterating the proposal 
to distribute parcels in the prisons, but received no answer. The ICRC 
repeated its request, specifying that it would like the Hungarian Red 
Cross to send it a plan for a programme to distribute 200-300 individual 
parcels.195 The Hungarian Red Cross did not react until February 1958, 
when it finally announced its willingness to distribute 500 parcels to 
detainees.
During June 1958, the ICRC learned that the 500 parcels delivered at 
the beginning of the year had indeed been distributed. It entertained no 
illusions, however, as to the significance of that distribution. This first 
successful action on behalf of political detainees could be credited in large 
part to the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Red Cross, Joseph 
Kárpáti; it did not mean that the Hungarian government was any more 
inclined to accept protection activities.
The situation with respect to visits to political detainees also changed. 
The Hungarian Red Cross had offered relief for Greek political detainees, * 10
195 “Procès-verbal de Présidence entre MM. Fischer, Boissier, Olgiati et Chenevière du
10 octobre 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.1, 1957-1964.
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thereby providing ammunition for the ICRC in its efforts to obtain 
permission to visit detainees in Hungary. It reminded the Hungarian 
Red Cross that action on behalf of the Greek political detainees came 
under the heading of a general action for the needy population. Since the 
Hungarian population had already benefited from that part of the 
programme, the ICRC would be happy if its action in Hungary could now 
be extended to detainees and internees.19' Despite this new turn of 
events, the chances of a delegate’s receiving permission to visit political 
detainees remained very slim. The Hungarian government refused, in 
fact, to equate Greek political detainees with Hungarian ones. It seemed 
clear that the government would never accept “the idea of a foreign 
organization inspecting places of detention”.19
Yet the ICRC persevered in its efforts. The issue resurfaced during 
the mission that delegates Maunoir and Fischer carried out in July- 
August 1958. One of the delegates reminded the Hungarian Red Cross 
that the ICRC had already made visits of this kind in other countries and 
that they did not have the character of inspections, their sole purpose 
being to enquire into the material conditions of detention.
With respect to Hungary’s particular circumstances, the existence of 
an internment camp had been confirmed by a communiqué in April 1958 
from the Hungarian Embassy in Bern. Accordingly, delegates Maunoir 
and Fischer sought authorization to visit this camp and, while they were 
about it, to distribute relief supplies there.197 198 99 The Hungarian Red Cross 
refused, asserting that detention conditions in Hungary were out­
standing. The Secretary-General of the Hungarian Red Cross, Joseph 
Kárpáti, announced that the next time the ICRC delegates were in 
Budapest, he would have information on the Hungarian detention 
system ready for them. He added that they would “be amazed to see how 
favourable those conditions are compared with those of Western 
penitentiary facilities”.200 Nonetheless, the delegate insisted on the 
importance the ICRC attached to this issue, and stressed that “if 
Hungary really wants to stop the currently uncontrollable rumours 
circulating in the West, the Hungarian Red Cross should realize that the 
ICRC’s offer to visit is the best way to do it”.201
197 Ibid.
198 “Conseil de Présidence du 19 juin 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
199 “Rapport sur la mission de MM. Fischer et Maunoir en Hongrie (31 juillet-9 août 1958)”,
AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
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While visiting Geneva in September 1958, Joseph Kárpáti announced 
that he had not yet received the report on detention conditions that he 
had promised the ICRC. As for the ICRC’s offer of relief supplies for 
prison infirmaries and hospitals, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian 
Red Cross asserted that it was under consideration. During Karpati’s 
visit, the ICRC did not ask again to visit the prisons.202 Two months 
passed before the ICRC President sent off another letter on the subject.
Seven months later, in June 1959, Joseph Kárpáti informed the ICRC 
that he had asked the Ministry of the Interior if a delegation could visit 
the detainees. Although he had not obtained permission for an official 
visit, he could provide some news of them: they were regularly fed and 
supplies were adequate.
Although according to the latest news “the prison and camp 
populations have reportedly been cut down considerably”,203 Kárpáti 
continued to request, on behalf of the ICRC, permission to visit 
detainees, and hoped to obtain it in time for Ernst Fischer’s next 
mission. In light of the slow progress of this process, in September 1959 
the ICRC President wrote another letter. The ICRC wondered at the 
Hungarian attitude towards political detainees: “It is rather shocking to 
consider how little has been achieved in this sphere in Hungary and the 
interest shown by the Hungarian Red Cross in the issue of political 
detainees in Greece”.204
At the beginning of 1960, the ICRC President wrote to the Hungarian 
Red Cross for the third time, on this occasion to request a resumption of 
the modest parcel-distribution programme in the prisons.205 206 *The 
President’s determination to attend personally to protection tasks 
showed clearly here. He had been chagrined, moreover, to see how 
quickly the authorities and the Hungarian Red Cross acted in the sphere 
of material relief, compared with their lack of urgency in responding to 
requests concerning protection.200
Finally undertaking to speak to the Minister of the Interior about 
political detainees, Joseph Kárpáti requested exact documentation on 
what the ICRC had already done elsewhere in this domain. He also 
promised complete support for the plan to send parcels, even drawing up
202 “Note de Mme Mathez à M. Maunoir du 29 septembre 1958”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
203 “Bericht liber die IKRK-Mission (ler-14 juin 1959)”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
204 “Procès-verbal de Présidence du 25 février 1960”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
205 Ibid.
206 “Rapport de mission de Mme Pfirter et M. Fischer fait au Conseil de Présidence du
2 mai 1960", AICRC, 251(65), 1.2.
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a list to aid in their composition, which he gave to the ICRC. He warned, 
however, that if the ICRC continued to link the issue of Greek political 
detainees to that of Hungarian internees, he would cut off all contact. 
According to him, these two situations could not be compared; the Greek 
camps were completely destitute, which was not the case in the 
Hungarian camps.207
During his 1961 mission, Ernst Fischer received a response from the 
Hungarian government concerning the distribution of parcels. The 
Hungarian government did not object to such a distribution, and even 
proposed to send political detainees a shipment of 500 parcels containing 
underclothes and multivitamin tablets. The authorities imposed the 
condition, however, that the parcels be put together by the Hungarian 
Red Cross and their contents be purchased in Hungary.
The question of visits, in contrast, remained thorny. Joseph Kárpáti 
explained that the Minister of the Interior was reluctant to approve them 
because he did not grasp their humanitarian purpose. Like his 
government, Kárpáti was surprised “that the ICRC is so concerned 
about people considered in Hungary as ‘war criminals’, whereas in so 
many other countries its intervention seems much better justified”.208 
But the ICRC stood firm. Seeing that it could not visit political detainees 
itself, it asked the Hungarian Red Cross to do so and to send it a report 
afterwards. Kárpáti objected to this idea, since he did not see how, in his 
capacity as Secretary-General, he could report to the ICRC on matters 
pertaining exclusively to Hungary’s internal affairs.209
Nonetheless, a few months later the Hungarian Red Cross announced 
to the ICRC that two of its representatives had visited detainees and 
that they would report their impressions to Geneva headquarters.210 
One member of the ICRC argued that although these visits represented 
a step forward, the ICRC must not stop there. In fact, he was of the 
opinion that Kárpáti had taken these steps because of the ICRC’s 
insistence, which meant that the ICRC could demand more.211
The Hungarian Red Cross had visited the Vac and Kalocsa prisons, 
and reported that the treatment of female detainees in the Kalocsa prison 
was perfectly satisfactory. They were kept busy with sewing work, and
208 “Rapport sur la mission du CICR à Vienne et Budapest effectuée du 13 au 
25 mars 1961”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2, 1957-1964.
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enjoyed the use of a constantly replenished library. In addition, they 
were entitled to family visits once a month.212 The Hungarian Red Cross 
announced, however, that after these two prison visits it did not intend to 
make a regular habit of this kind of intervention. Its activities on behalf of 
detainees were limited to providing them with clothing preparatory to 
their release.21'1
Carrying out the planned parcel distribution posed problems. The 
price the Hungarian Red Cross charged for making up the parcels was 
exorbitant. The ICRC received the impression that the authorities, if not 
the Hungarian Red Cross itself, meant not only to obtain the maximum 
financial benefit from the operation, but also to discourage its 
repetition.214 An arrangement was made so that the distribution could 
take place, but it was to be the last. The ICRC repeated its request in 
1963 in vain.215 *
As for visits, it was not until 1964 that the ICRC finally received 
permission to visit a prison. As Maunoir, the delegate entrusted with this 
mission, remarked,
“the visit of 12 October — which did not take place earlier because I 
was not free last summer — constituted the first visit to a place of 
detention in Hungary since 1945. Although it gave us an idea of the 
Hungarian penitentiary system, it did not afford the ICRC any 
opportunity to gain access to those prisoners — numbering 460, 
according to the estimate of the association of former Hungarian 
political detainees in exile — who, despite the two amnesties (the 
second in 1963), are still being held as a result of the 1956 
Revolution”.215
The two prisoners questioned by the ICRC during this visit had been 
arrested in 1964 and 1965, respectively. Their arrest therefore had no 
connection with the events of 1956.
Thus, the ICRC never managed to see a single person who had been 
arrested for his or her participation in the events of 1956 — a real failure 
from the ICRC point of view. As the Executive Director, Roger Gallopin,
212 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre Mmes Koltai et Pfirter ainsi que M. Maunoir du 
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noted, “although we have managed, during the past years, to contribute 
largely to the Hungarian Red Cross’s actions on behalf of the civilian 
population affected by the events of 1956, it was not possible to 
implement the terms of Article 3 with respect to persons detained as a 
result of participating in the events in question”.217 218
F or their part, the Hungarian authorities felt they had done all that 
was necessary to meet the requirements of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions: “authorization granted to the Hungarian Red Cross to 
visit, in 1961, two places of detention and to send relief parcels, and, 
finally, the authorization granted to Mr. Maunoir to visit the Penitentiary 
Centre of Thöko on 12 October 1965”.2LS Once again the divergence 
between the ICRC and Hungary with respect to political detainees was 
strongly in evidence.
B. Medical Personnel
The ICRC also continued its action on behalf of medical personnel. 
Unfortunately, it had not made much progress. In 1958, lacking evidence 
of ill treatment, it did not plan any intervention on behalf of these 
persons.219 In 1959 the ICRC was told several times, though always 
orally, that doctors and nurses had been imprisoned, ill-treated, or even 
executed for providing medical aid to insurgents. However, it was not 
able to obtain any concrete details of these cases — as though the 
potential witnesses were anxious to keep silent. Having no tangible 
evidence, the ICRC refrained from intervening.
Similarly, it did not take any steps to assist former members of the 
Hungarian Red Cross. In the meantime, too, the former Head of the 
Foreign Relations Department, Mihály Gedenyi, had been released from 
prison.
C. Persons Convicted and Threatened with Execution
During this third phase of its activities, however, the ICRC was 
confronted by a new problem. At the end of 1959, Hungary carried out 
mass executions of mostly young people who had just reached majority, 
the Hungarian government having awaited that moment in order to 
implement the death sentence. This news aroused strong feelings in the
217 “Lettre de M. Gallopin à M. Rostás du 12 janvier 1966”, AICRC, 225(65), III.4.
218 For the full report, see Annex XVII.
219 “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre MM. Fischer, Gallopin, Amman et Maunoir du 
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DELEGATES’ TEMPORARY MISSIONS IN HUNGARY 69
West, and many National Societies, associations, and individuals 
contacted the ICRC asking for more information and urging it to 
intervene. Since the Hungarian government completely denied the 
reports, the ICRC responded to all petitions by repeating the official 
statements. János Kádár in fact formally denied these executions in the 
Hungarian paper Népszabadság on 1 November 1959.
“Mr. Kádár notes how far the spiritual arsenal of the architects of 
the Cold War has declined of late. That is why they strive to come up 
with a point or two and then try to bicker over them. [...] In the last 
few days they have invented a report that a whole series of young- 
people were in prison in Hungary, and that the government was 
waiting for them to reach the age of 16 in order to hang them. It goes 
without saying that here everyone knows full well that such 
assertions are nothing but base lies and vile provocations.”220
From testimony gathered by one of its delegates, the ICRC learned in 
1960 that the executions of Hungarian minors who had participated in the 
insurrection had indeed taken place. At that point the ICRC took a clear 
position. If it received any more requests for information on the matter, it 
would no longer comment on whether the executions had taken place. 
However, it would continue to ask applicants to provide names, which it 
needed in order to request information from the Hungarian authorities. 
Otherwise, the ICRC resolved to await its delegates’ next mission to 
decide if and how it would intervene. During their 1961 mission, 
delegates Ernst Fischer, Félix Züst, and Jean-Pierre Maunoir raised the 
question of the execution of minors with the members of the Hungarian 
Red Cross, who denied everything. Under these circumstances, no 
intervention seemed possible, and the ICRC apparently did not alter its 
position thereafter. It thought that the young Hungarians had probably 
been executed long before.221
Despite the ICRC’s many efforts during this last phase of its action, 
its protection activities remained limited. It did manage to visit one 
prison, but this seems a derisory accomplishment compared with the 
approximately 50,000 tonnes of relief supplies, worth close to 88 million 
Swiss francs, distributed in Hungary between October 1956 and 
December 1957.222 The gap between the relief action and the protection
22(1 “Traduction de l’article paru en hongrois dans le Népszabadság, organe officiel du Parti 
communiste de Hongrie, XVIIe année, no. 257 du 1er novembre 1959”, AICRC, 225(65),
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action persisted; Hungary accepted any ICRC intervention that gave it 
material aid, but rejected any intervention relating to measures of 
repression.
3. FAMILY REUNIFICATION
During this last phase of its action, the ICRC was still working on the 
problem of reuniting families, but without much success. The Hungarian 
Red Cross disregarded the problem of emigration and gave priority to 
repatriation. The ICRC explained the Hungarian position to the 
National Societies of the countries of asylum, but refrained from 
comment. The National Societies expressed their disappointment. The 
various parties concerned apparently did not reach any satisfactory 
agreement. The conference planned in 1957 that was supposed to bring 
all the sides together was cancelled.223
In addition, the Hungarian Red Cross wanted the ICRC to finance the 
repatriations. The ICRC was willing to bear the costs only if family 
reunification was achieved in both directions, through repatriation and 
emigration.224 The Hungarian Red Cross also wanted to obtain the lists 
of minors drawn up by the ICRC, but the latter refused to cooperate in 
any way with the Hungarian Red Cross, since it had declined to ratify the 
agreement proposed in April 1957.
Solving the problem was increasingly urgent, however, since moral 
standards were declining among young people in the refugee camps, to a 
disturbing degree. Teenage pregnancies were not unusual. According to 
the mission delegate, no time was to be lost if the situation was not to turn 
against the West.225 In May 1958, the ICRC sent the Hungarian Red 
Cross a letter explaining its position:
“The ICRC, having examined the question, does not feel able to 
abandon the position it has held until now. [...] The problem of 
repatriating Hungarian children is the responsibility of the author­
ities of the countries of asylum and of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. [...] Please note that the ICRC, for its 
part, is ready to accord a favourable examination to any proposal the * 21
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Hungarian Red Cross may make concerning the reunification of
dispersed Hungarian families”.221’
During their mission in July 1958, Maunoir and Fischer raised the 
issue again. They reminded the Hungarians that the ICRC had given up 
trying to find a global solution to the problem of family reunification, and 
that it had left the National Societies of the Red Cross to arrange the 
matter directly among themselves. The ICRC had not altered its 
position. It still refused to be party to a one-way reunification operation. 
Moreover, it was tired of having to seek solutions. If the Hungarian 
authorities wanted the ICRC’s assistance, “it is now their responsibility 
to come up with a general idea or to suggest a specific plan”.* * 227
The Hungarian authorities, for their part, continued to give 
repatriation priority over emigration. They contended that the children 
had emigrated not out of fear of the regime, but in a spirit of adventure, 
and that was why their parents were rightly calling for their return. The 
problem was that the countries of asylum were concealing the truth 
about Hungary from the children and preventing them from correspond­
ing freely with their families. The Hungarian authorities therefore asked 
the ICRC to use its influence with the countries of asylum to facilitate the 
children’s return.
The fate of repatriated children no longer depended on the general 
amnesty declared in 1957; that amnesty had been replaced by individual 
measures allowing the Hungarian authorities to decide each case when 
entry visas were granted. In addition, the Hungarian Red Cross offered 
the ICRC access to its tracing service files in order to examine the cases 
of some 30 repatriated children and find out whether they had in fact been 
restored to their families and were leading normal lives. The ICRC did 
not consider this offer very significant, since no useful survey conclusions 
could be reached thereby. Accordingly, it relinquished the idea of 
monitoring the fate of repatriated refugees in any way.
At a meeting in September 1958, the members of the Hungarian Red 
Cross gave the ICRC delegates a list of 18 people authorized to leave 
Hungary as well as a list of 475 requests for repatriation. It also handed 
over a list of Hungarian refugees who were said to have committed 
suicide in countries of asylum, a list of those hospitalized abroad for 
mental disturbances, and a list of children imprisoned in various 
countries. The ICRC merely accepted the lists and assured the
~ü “Procès-verbal d’entretien entre MM. Fischer et Gallopin et Mme Mathez du
22 mai 1958”, AICRC, 251(05), 1.2, 1957-1964.
227 Ibid.
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Hungarian Red Cross that it would hand them on to the National 
Societies concerned, as it had in the past.228
During 1959, no global solution was found to the problem of family 
reunification. Some countries, such as Yugoslavia, arranged matters in 
their own way. In June 1959, Belgrade organized a fourth transfer of 
Hungarian children back to their country of origin. The Hungarian Red 
Cross claimed that these transfers derived from the border shared by the 
two countries and thus had nothing to do with the issue of refugees from 
the 1956 events. The ICRC’s actions in 1959 were limited to conveying 
requests for information to the Hungarian Red Cross and verifying their 
accuracy.
The High Commissioner for Refugees asserted that certain repa­
triated refugees had been arrested and prosecuted. The ICRC decided to 
seek confirmation of this information from the Hungarian Red Cross. 
During his mission to Hungary in June 1959, delegate Fischer learned 
that repatriated refugees who were escaped convicts were indeed 
arrested when they returned to Hungary. Juvenile delinquents were 
placed in reformatories.
Between 1960 and 1962 the ICRC handled several cases of family 
reunification, but no general measures could be applied. Instead, it solved 
individual problems on a case-by-case basis in response to requests from 
the High Commissioner for Refugees or the people involved.
In short, the ICRC never managed to achieve a general agreement 
governing family reunification, and its role as an intermediary between 
Hungary and the countries of asylum was useful only in a few isolated 
cases. This, then, represented yet another failure for the ICRC in the 
protection sphere.
228 «‘Note de Mme Mathez à M. Maunoir du 29 septembre 1958”, AICRC, 225(65), II.4.
CONCLUSION
Of all the world organizations - including the United Nations — only 
the ICRC was authorized to intervene in Hungary following the events 
of 1956. Entrusted with the task of maintaining relations between the 
West and Hungary, it played a key diplomatic role. Naturally its mission 
was humanitarian above all, and in that sphere it achieved notable 
success, despite the restrictions placed on its activities.
It was most successful in the provision of material aid. Fifty thousand 
tonnes of relief supplies, worth close to 88 million Swiss francs, were 
distributed between October 1956 and December 1957. In the emergency 
stage (27 October-11 November 1956), the ICRC action consisted 
primarily in distributing supplies and medicines donated by countries all 
over the world. Subsequently (November 1956-June 1957), two delega­
tions were established, one in Vienna and the other in Budapest, in order 
to administer 167 food and clothing assistance programmes. During the 
last phase of its action, the ICRC operated longer-term, more socially 
oriented programmes, the main one being the construction of a 
prosthesis factory to benefit the war-disabled.
The ICRC did not prolong its aid programmes merely to assist the 
victims of the Hungarian Revolution, but also to maintain a foothold in 
Hungary so that it could attempt to carry out its traditional function of 
protection. It was precisely in this domain, however, that the ICRC’s 
action in Hungary proved particularly difficult.
During the fighting, the ICRC had called on the belligerents to 
respect the Geneva Conventions and had tried to visit detainees. It was 
able to do this in the insurgent camp, but all its efforts failed with the 
Soviet forces. After the initial emergency period, protection activities 
took on particular importance for the ICRC. It badgered the Hungarian 
authorities incessantly in its attempts to offer protection to political 
detainees, deportees, and medical personnel persecuted for having 
provided care to insurgents — but all in vain. In addition, the ICRC 
played a coordinating role in family reunification, but in this sphere, too, 
obstruction by the Hungarian government made the task impossible. As 
for its work with political detainees, it was not until 1965, 9 years after 
submitting its request, that the ICRC finally managed to visit a prison.
74 HUNGARIAN OCTOBER
Nor was it able to follow up on this action. It succeeded only in organizing 
the distribution of relief parcels in the prisons.
Clearly the ICRC’s action was essentially limited in the sphere of 
protection. Anything that did not relate to material assistance was 
problematic. Hungary — and by extension the Soviet Union - accepted 
the material relief that the ICRC could give them because they needed it; 
but they obstinately rejected most of its protection initiatives. This 
rejection reflected Moscow’s ideological insistence on Western, and, by 
the same token, ICRC, non-interference in the affairs of the Eastern bloc.
It should be recalled that since World War II relations between the 
ICRC and the Soviet Union had been difficult. At the 1952 International 
Conference of the Red Cross, the Soviets had made harsh attacks on the 
ICRC, accusing it of being in the pay of the capitalists. After the ICRC’s 
intervention in Hungary, however, the USSR appeared to be less hostile. 
At the 1957 International Conference of the Red Cross, there were no 
more accusations like those voiced in 1952. This improvement was 
limited, however; invited to the USSR by the Alliance of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies in 1958 and 1960, the President and Vice- 
President of the ICRC were allowed no contact with USSR authorities. 
It was not until the Cuban crisis in 1962 that the ICRC actually entered 
into contact with the Soviet government. The USSR gave the ICRC 
permission to monitor its ships en route to Cuba to make sure that they 
were not carrying any missiles — although no inspection actually took 
place, since the Soviet ships turned back.
After 1956, relations between the USSR and the ICRC remained 
ambiguous, apparently reflecting the ideological contradictions between 
Marxism as understood by the Soviet Communist Party and the 
humanitarian doctrine of the Red Cross, which was based on the primacy 
of the individual.229 In fact, only the ICRC’s behaviour towards the 
Soviet Union can be explained. In the context of the Cold War, the 
international community was certain that a third world war was 
imminent. Following the events of 1956, the American President Dwight 
Eisenhower wondered whether “with the deterioration of the Soviet 
Union’s hold over its satellites might not the Soviet Union resort to 
extreme measures, even to be tempted to start a world war? This 
possibility we must watch with utmost care”.230
229 Jiri Toman, “Les pays socialistes et le droit des conflits armés”, undated manuscript 
lent by the author.
"!" Miklós Mólnál', Budapest 1956. A History of the Hungariau Revolution, p. 218.
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The ICRC had been worrying about this for a long time. On the eve of 
the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 it was already drawing its conclusions 
from World War II and providing itself with better means of intervention 
in the expectation of an impending world conflict. However, it kept its 
concerns to itself, partly in order to avoid fueling the Communist claims 
that it preferred war to peace.231
Hence, throughout its action in Hungary, the ICRC understandably 
took care not to “rush anything and especially [not] to break off valuable 
contacts”232 of greater significance than its activity on Hungarian 
territory. As the delegate Melchior Bor singer remarked, in its 
Hungarian action the ICRC was trying to “maintain contact with certain 
groups that distrust everything emanating from our regions, precisely so 
that it can act effectively if the worst happens. This also works to the 
advantage of the American people, since it constitutes a sort of ‘disaster 
insurance’ for the future”.233
231 Junod, The Imperiled Red Cross and the Palestine-Eretz-Yisrael Conflict 1945-19.52,
p. 37.
"'i2 “Lettre de M. Borsinger au président du CICR du 8 juin 1957”, AICRC, 251(65), 1.2. 
For the full text of this letter, see Annex XVIII.
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Austria, 1956: Return of a relief convoy after the Hungarian uprising. 
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Hungary 1957
An ICRC convoy transporting medicines from the League to Hungary in January 1957. 
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Hungary 1956 - Aid
An ICRC convoy crosses the Austro-Hungarian border 
(from Klingenback to Sopron Vota va) on 11 November 1956. 
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Hungary 1956-57 
Budapest: Children’s relief action.
ICRC Photo Archives (Ref. HU-21/21) (Reproduced negative)
Hungary 1956-57
Budapest: Children’s relief - Rádda Bamen.
ICRC Photo Archives (Ref. HU-21/16) (Reproduced negative)
Hungary 1956-57 
Budapest: Children’s relief action.
ICRC Photo Archives (Ref. HU-21/19) (Reproduced negative)
Hungary 1956-57
Freudenau warehouse. These relief supplies were intended 
for the population of Budapest.
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Hungary 1956-57
Budapest (photo provided by Hungarian Red Cross). 
ICRC Photo Archives (Ref. HU-21/30) (Reproduced negative)
Hungary 1956-57
Vienna-Budapest airlift and mission of Messrs Bovey and Beekh - 
Visit to political prisoners and detainees.
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Hungary 1956-57
Budapest, Dec. 1956-April 1957: Distribution of standard food parcels. 
ICRC Photo Archives (Ref. HU-21/27) (Reproduced negative)
Hungary 1956-57
Signing in Geneva (4 December 1956) of the agreement between the United Nations 
and the ICRC concerning the distribution of relief supplies in Hungary.
Photo ICRC Hungary 5/2
Hungary 1956
Vienna-Buclapest airlift, 29-31 October 1956. The first relief supplies arrive in Budapest. 
Photo Hungarian Red Cross (Ref. HU-19/10)

ANNEX I
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE RED CROSS
1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICRC
The ICRC was bom of the initiative of one man, Henry Dunant, who, 
confronted by the atrocities of the Battle of Solferino and the lack of military 
medical services, improvised, with the assistance of the local population, a relief 
operation for the wounded who had been abandoned to their fate on the 
battlefield. On the strength of that experience, in 1862 Dunant wrote a book 
entitled A Memory of Solferino, in which he described not only what he had seen 
on that battlefield, but also the solutions he had conceived to provide relief to all 
wounded soldiers without discrimination. He proposed conceited international 
action on two levels. First, in peacetime, in every country, national relief 
committees234 could be established that would intervene during conflicts; second, 
States would be urged to respect a certain number of provisions protecting the 
action of these national committees. To promote these new ideas, in 1863 he 
created, together with four Genevans,235 the International Committee for Relief 
to the Wounded, which, on 20 December 1875, officially became the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.
From the outset the ICRC had a rather vast field of activities. Since it had 
founded the International Red Cross Movement, it was responsible for recognizing 
new National Red Cross Societies that wanted to join the Movement. It was also 
charged with ensuring that international humanitarian law was respected, 
specifically the First Geneva Convention of 1864, which it had originated and 
promoted. Finally, it was supposed to try to protect and assist victims of conflict on 
the battlefield, as Henry Dunant had done at Solferino in 1859.
2. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ICRC IN THE 1950s
Although the ICRC employed 3,700 people at the end of World War II, its 
staff had diminished to about 300 by 1952, and 200 in 1962. These figures included
These national relief committees were later called National Red Cross Societies, and 
the first of them, founded in 1867, was the Netherlands Red Cross. See Paul Ruegger, 
“The Juridical Aspects of the Organisation of the International Red Cross”, Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 82, Vol. 1 (1953): 492.
235 Gustave Moynier, Guillaume-Henri Dufour, Théodore Maunoir, and Louis Appia.
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both headquarters and field staff, paid employees and volunteers. The small scale 
of the staff allowed information to circulate easily between the different divisions.
The ICRC was structured like a pyramid, the highest authority of the 
organization being the Committee, numbering at most 25 members"81’ co-opted 
from among the Swiss citizenry - most of them in easy circumstances and 
university-educated. Of the 18 Committee members in 1956, only eight did not 
have doctorates.
Members of the Committee in 1956:
Max Huber Doctor of Laws, former President of the Permanent
Léopold Boissier
Court of International Justice, Honorary President
Doctor of Laws, Honorary Professor at the University 
of Geneva, former Secretary-General of the Inter­
parliamentary Union, President
Jacques Chenevière
Lucie Odier
Honorary Doctor of Literature
Former Head of the District Nursing Service, Geneva 
Branch of the Swiss Red Cross
Carl J. Burckhardt Doctor of Philosophy, former Swiss Minister to France
Martin Bodmer Honorary Doctor of Philosophy, Vice-President
Ernest Gloor Doctor of Medicine
Paul Carry
Edmond Grasset
Doctor of Laws, Professor at the University of Geneva
Doctor of Medicine, Professor at the University of 
Geneva, Director of the Geneva Institute of Public 
Health
Paul Ruegger Former Swiss Minister to Italy and the United Kingdom, 
Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Henri Guisan General, former Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army
Alfredo Vannotti Doctor of Medicine, Professor at the University of 
Lausanne
Rodolfo Olgiati
Marguerite 
von Berchem
Former Director of the Don Suisse
Former Head of Section, Central Prisoners of War 
Agency
Frédéric Siordet Lawyer, ICRC Adviser since 1943, Vice-President
2.3<) «The Statutes adopted by vote at the meeting of 10 March 1921 established 25 as the 
maximum number of people able to meet together”. Diego Fiscalini, Des élites au 
service d’une cause humanitaire: le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (history 
dissertation, University of Geneva, 1985), p. 12.
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Marcel Junod 
Ernest Nobs 
Guillaume Bordier
Doctor of Medicine, ICRC Delegate from 1935 to 1946
Former Federal Councillor
Certified Engineer EPF, MBA Harvard, Banker
Directorate:
Roger Gallopin 
Jean S. Pictet 
Edouard de Bondeli 
Claude Pilloud
Executive Director 
Director for General Affairs 
Assistant Director
Assistant Director for General Affairs
The social status and education of the Committee members were important, 
since certain governments, notably that of the USSR, considered the process of 
recruiting Committee members too selective. In addition, most of the Committee 
members also had professions completely independent of the ICRC, since the 
latter required their presence only once a month, at the plenary meeting of the 
Committee.2'"* 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8‘ During those meetings, the Committee exercised its mandated 
functions, namely to define ICRC policy and the principles that must guide it, to 
take the initiatives it saw fit in accordance with those principles, and to supervise 
the executive and administrative bodies of the organization.
In between the Committee’s plenary sessions, the Presidential Council was in 
charge of directing affairs and carrying out decisions. This Council met once a 
week and consisted of the President, the two Vice-Presidents, and three other 
Committee members. The day-to-day management of affairs and the implemen­
tation of measures undertaken at the Committee’s bidding were the responsi­
bility of a central administration divided into three divisions supervised by two 
directors. Since 1950, Roger Gallopin had been the director of both the Executive 
and Administrative Divisions.
Under his authority, David de Traz, Deputy Executive Director, managed 
the Executive Division and Edouard de Bondeli, Assistant Director, managed 
the Administrative Division. The Executive Division dealt with all issues 
involving assistance to conflict victims.22”'' The Administrative Division took care
2-11 Certain members of the Committee were also members of the Presidential Council, so
attended meetings every week. For more details on the activities of ICRC members, see
“Annexe: fiches biographiques” in Fiscalini, Des élites au service d’une cause humanitaire. 
238 This division included the following services:
1) Central Prisoners of War Agency;
2) Prisoners and Civilian Internees;
3) Delegations Abroad;
4) Relief;
5) Medical;
6) Pharmaceutical;
7) War Invalids;
8) Nursing.
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of current administrative and financial matters, and consequently consisted of 
only two services, that of administration and staff, and the accounts section.
The third division was directed by Jean Pictet, assisted by Assistant Director 
Claude Pilloud. This division took responsibility for all permanent services 
except for the conduct of operations.2'39
This was the set-up at ICRC headquarters. The ICRC organization in the 
field was divided between two kinds of delegations, those considered 
“permanent”, and those set up to deal with specific conflicts. In 1952, there were 
32 permanent delegations scattered over five continents.240 In countries where 
the ICRC had no permanent delegation - as was the case in Hungary and the 
USSR in 1952 — the ICRC maintained ties with those countries by means of 
traveling delegates who went where needed.
The second kind of delegation fluctuated in number as conflicts arose to which 
the ICRC had to respond. The number and role of the personnel employed by 
these delegations changed constantly: “The ICRC may appoint delegates for its 
outside activities. It shall determine, in each given case, the powers and duties of 
such delegates”.241 Nonetheless, their main task was to represent the ICRC and 
to implement the actions dictated by it. The delegates played an extremely 
important role, since often, for one reason or another, they were compelled to 
make decisions on their own, in the name of the ICRC: “The delegates, although 
only a cog in the machine in terms of the total organization, are the pillars of the 
ICRC”.242
Given the relative complexity of this system of organization, it is difficult to 
understand how information circulated within it. In this respect, the explanation 
provided by Melchior Bor singer, a former delegate,243 remains the most 1 2 3 4 5
2,59 This division incorporated the following services:
1) The Secretariat of the ICRC and of the Presidential Council;
2) Legal;
3) Information and Revue internationale de la Croix-RougetInternational Review 
of the Red Cross;
4) Archives and Mail;
5) Translation.
All information concerning the central administration was taken from ICRC, Report on 
General Activities (January 1 to December SI, 1950) (Geneva: ICRC, 1951), p. 8.
240 ICRC, Report on the Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (January 1 
to December 31,1952) (Geneva: ICRC, 1953), p. 10.
241 Ibid., p. 89.
242 Jacques Freymond, Gueires, Révolutions, Croix-Rouge: Réflexions sur le rôle du 
Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (Geneva: Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, 1976), p. 11.
241 Author’s interview, 1 July 1994, with Melchior Borsinger, an ICRC delegate during the 
events of 1956.
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satisfactory. At the ICRC, communication was two-way, moving from the 
“bottom” (that is, the field) towards the “top” (the Committee) and vice-versa, 
passing through all the bodies between the two. The Committee received 
information through the intermediary of the Presidential Council, in which the 
directors presented reports on the situation in the field. It then conveyed its 
decisions to the various intermediary bodies, which had the task of passing them 
on to the delegates in the field. Generally speaking, it can be said that the 
Committee was responsible for the major decisions, while the delegates took the 
initiative only to unblock a situation; they did not decide the general course of 
ICRC actions.
ANNEX II
THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
The members of the International Red Cross are clearly listed in the first 
article of the Statutes of the Movement, originally adopted at The Hague in 1928, 
revised at Toronto in 1952, and adopted in its present form by the 25th 
International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in October 1986: “The 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement [...] is composed of the 
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies recognized in accordance with 
Article 4 [...], of the International Committee of the Red Cross [...] and of the 
League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies”.244 Today, as they did in the 
1950s, these components maintain direct contact through the International 
Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, at which, as a rule, they all meet 
together every four years.
In addition to the delegations of these bodies, the International Conference is 
attended by delegations from the States party to the Geneva Conventions. These 
delegations play a key role in the Red Cross Movement through their 
participation in the International Conference, since this body is the supreme 
deliberative authority of the organization. The International Conference has the 
task of making recommendations, taking decisions, and expressing wishes 
concerning the orientation of the International Red Cross. It is supposed to 
coordinate the efforts of the different components of the Movement, and, when 
necessary, to assign specific mandates to the ICRC and the Federation. It may 
make proposals concerning humanitarian and other international conventions 
relating to the International Red Cross. Finally, it alone is competent to revise its 
Statutes and Rules of Procedure, and to resolve any disputes between the ICRC 
and the Federation.245 In the intervals between International Conferences, the 
Standing Commission coordinates the relations between the different compo­
nents of the Movement. It is also responsible for making the preparations for the 
next International Conference, cooperating with the institution scheduled to host 
the Conference.
244 ICRC/Intemational Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Handbook 
of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 13th ed. (Geneva: 
International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, 1994), p. 419.
245 Ibid., p. 426.
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Structure of the International Red Crossua
International Red Cross
Françoise Bory, Red Cross and Red Crescent. Portrait of an International Movement 
(Geneva: ICRC, 1992), p. 29.
ANNEX III
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The major part of ICRC action, today as in 1956, is based on the Geneva 
Conventions for the protection of war victims. It should be recalled, however, 
that the Geneva Conventions were not the first agreements ever made between 
different parties to a conflict; certain agreements governing the exchange and 
ransom of prisoners of war, or the surrender of fortresses, already contained 
clauses relating to the treatment of the sick and wounded and sometimes even 
provisions for the protection of the civilian population. These agreements, 
however, were drawn up for specific cases and were not universally applicable at 
all times.24'
Thus, neither the ICRC, nor even - by the same token - Henry Dunant, 
originated the “codification” of respect for persons during armed conflicts; but 
they had the genius to universalize their rules in the form of conventions that the 
States were called upon to ratify during peacetime. Accordingly, the States 
attending the 1864 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva signed the First Geneva 
Convention, making it, by their ratification or adherence, part of universal 
international law. From then on, the ICRC never ceased in its efforts to adapt 
humanitarian law to the developments of international society. Between 1864 and 
1949 it in fact drafted seven conventions that were ratified one after the other by 
most of the States.* 248
The First Convention deals with the protection of the wounded and sick in 
armies in the field, implying an obligation for each belligerent to care for enemy 
wounded. It also confers privileged status on anyone bearing the sign of the red
~4‘ Henri Coursier, Course of Five Lessons on the Geneva Conventions (Geneva: ICRC,
1963), pp. 5-6.
248 After the First Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field, there were seven more conventions:
- the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armies in the Field (1906);
- two Geneva Conventions: one covering the same material as the Conventions of 1864 
and 1906, and the other relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (1929);
- four Geneva Conventions relative to the protection of victims of war: the First and 
Third Conventions are revised versions of the Conventions of 1929; the Second is a 
revision of the Tenth Hague Convention of 1907; and the Fourth covers new material 
dealing with the protection of civilian persons in wartime. For more detail, see 
Stanslaw E. Nahlik, “A Brief Outline of International Humanitarian Law”, 
International Revieiv of the Red Cross 241 (July-August 1984): 192-193.
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cross, the red crescent, or the red lion and sun. The Second Convention provides 
protection for the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at 
sea, while the Third Convention relates to the treatment of prisoners of war, 
constituting a real code of captivity that governs the living conditions of 
prisoners. The Fourth Convention protects civilians in wartime, whether civilian 
internees or the inhabitants of occupied territories.
These four Conventions are applicable only during international aimed 
conflicts. Yet since World War II the nature of conflicts has changed: “[...] in the 
contemporary international system, the great powers have considerably 
enlarged the range of interventions and they prefer indirect and if possible 
camouflaged ones. Hence the very clear predominance of ‘non-international 
conflicts’ as compared to international conflicts”.249 250Only Article 3 common to the 
four Geneva Conventions is properly applicable to non-international conflicts, 
although it has a fairly wide scope. “As a Delegate expressed it, Article 3 is a 
‘Convention in miniature.’ Giving up the idea of an integral application of the 
Conventions as a whole, it requires the application of their principles only. But it 
defines these principles and adds certain formal obligations”.200 Given this 
article’s relevance to the events in Hungary, it is worth quoting in full:
“In the case of aimed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat 
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
2411 Jacques Freymond, Georges Willemin, and Roger Heacock, The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), p. 31.
250 Frédéric Siordet, “The Geneva Conventions and Civil War”, Revue internationale de 
la Croix-Rouge, supplement III, no. 11 (Nov. 1950): 210.
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affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict.”
Paragraph 2 merits special attention, for it concerns the ICRC. It should be 
noted first of all that the ICRC is in no way obliged to offer its services to parties 
in conflict, and, similarly, the parties may reject any proposal offered by the 
ICRC. The entire article in fact merely affirms a practice that the ICRC adopted 
long ago. In the past it had already intervened in non-international conflicts, one 
example being its intervention in Hungary in 1919, when Béla Kun instituted the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. At that time, Rodolphe Haccius, an ICRC delegate 
who happened to be in Budapest for other reasons, intervened on behalf of certain 
Hungarians and even received permission to visit some political detainees. “On 
28 April 1919, in the prison of Gyüjtöfogház, the ICRC, for the first time in 
its history, visited exclusively political detainees (48 political detainees and 
131 hostages), with the express authorization of the government of the State 
whose nationals they were”.2”1
In any case, the Statutes of the International Red Cross already authorized 
the ICRC to act in such conflicts; Article 3 merely confirmed and expanded that 
right. At the time of the events in Hungary, Article 6 of the Statutes of the 
International Red Cross described the ICRC as “a neutral institution whose 
humanitarian work is carried out particularly in time of war, civil war, or internal 
strife [...]”. And Article 4 of the Statutes of the ICRC stated: “the special role of 
the ICRC shall be: [...] (d) to take action in its capacity as a neutral institution, 
especially in case of war, civil war or internal strife [...]”. The third paragraph of 
Article 3 invited the parties to the conflict to conclude special agreements 
permitting the implementation of other provisions of the Conventions. In other 
words, the door was open to a wider application of the Conventions.251 52
Although the Geneva Conventions clearly authorize the ICRC to intervene in 
various types of conflicts, it still must face the problem of determining the nature
251 Jacques Moreillon, Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et la protection des 
détenus politiques (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, and Lausanne: Editions L’Age 
d’Homme, 1973), p. 49.
252 Michel Veuthey, “Les conflits armés de caractère non international et le droit 
humanitaire”, in Current Problems of International Law, ed. Antonio Cassese (Milan: 
Giuffrè, 1975), pp. 219-223.
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 87
of the conflict. The distinction between an international conflict and a non- 
intemational one is not self-evident. In most cases, including the events of 1956, 
the ICRC has in fact refrained from pronouncing on the nature of the conflict, in 
order to leave itself a wider margin of manoeuvre. In any case, establishing such a 
definition is not its responsibility, nor that of any of the parties.258
From a practical standpoint, however, the ICRC is nonetheless obliged to 
decide which articles form the basis of its intervention, which indirectly implies a 
definition of the conflict. If it decides to intervene under the terms of Article 3, for 
example, that means it recognizes the conflict as non-international in nature. 
David Forsythe has written:
“While it is widely accepted that the ICRC can assert its view as to the 
legal protection that should be applied, parties frequently disagree with that 
ICRC view on the basis either of an honest difference in interpreting the facts 
or of a difference in priorities. The ICRC is interested in the welfare of 
individuals; a party to the conflict may be primarily interested in securing 
control of the government, or putting down a challenge to one’s rule, among 
other things. Such priorities lead the conflicting parties to seek to reduce their 
obligations under law to a minimum in order to maintain their freedom of 
action”.254
Although the Geneva Conventions permit the ICRC to intervene in many 
kinds of conflicts, they do not spell out the strategy the ICRC must apply if it is to 
intervene most effectively. As we have seen, defining the conflict is an essential 
starting point for the development of the ICRC’s action, and therefore the ICRC 
is very attentive to the way the parties interpret the conflict, since it will have to 
work with those interpretations. Its role is not to judge their validity, but to 
provide as much protection and assistance as it can to all who need it.
25:1 Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics, p. 137. 
254 Ibid., p. 139.
ANNEX IV
THE NATIONAL RED CROSS 
AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES
The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, once founded or 
recreated, are recognized as such by the ICRC.255 The latter exercises no other 
authority over them; each National Society is an independent institution.
Unlike the ICRC, which always operates on the international level, National 
Societies as a rule work within their own countries. In peacetime, they 
collaborate with their respective governments, assisting them in the humanitar­
ian sphere (creation and administration of hospitals, training nursing staff, 
providing aid for the disadvantaged, the handicapped, and the elderly). They also 
administer emergency relief when natural disasters occur such as floods, 
earthquakes, or tidal waves. Occasionally, the Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies calls on them to go to the aid of another National Society 
in difficulty.
In wartime, National Societies also have a role to play. They are bound to 
assist all the victims of the conflict, regardless of party or nationality. 
Accordingly, they take care of prisoners, the wounded, and the civilian population 
in general. If the ICRC intervenes on them territory, they help it to carry out its 
traditional tasks of protection and assistance, introducing the ICRC representa­
tives to their governments and pleading the humanitarian cause.* 2 * * * **
250 “The role of the International Committee, in accordance with its Statutes, is in 
particular: [...] b) to recognize any newly established or reconstituted National Society, 
which fulfils the conditions for recognition set out in Article 4 [...]”. Article 5, paragraph
2, of the Statutes of the International Red Cross, in ICRC/Intemational Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Handbook of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, 13th ed. (1994), p. 422.
2oG ICRC, Cluide for National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to Activities in the
Event of Conflict (Geneva: ICRC, 1990), p. 45.
ANNEX V
THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS 
AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES
Today’s Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies began life as the 
League of Red Cross Societies in 1919, after Henry P. Davison, a member of the 
American National Society, suggested federating the National Societies of the 
victors of World War I and the neutral States in an organization similar to the 
League of Nations. The League’s first Statutes sanctioned the exclusion of the 
National Societies of the defeated countries (Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, and the USSR), and they were indeed excluded.
The main role of the League of Red Cross Societies was clearly defined in 
paragraph 3 of Article 7 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross.257 On the 
international level it also coordinated the relief actions of National Societies vis-a- 
vis their fellow Societies, and provided assistance to refugees who had fled the 
conflict zone.258
Although completely independent of each other, the League and the ICRC 
were in constant contact in order to coordinate their activities. To this end, 
League and ICRC representatives were accustomed to meet at least once a 
month.259 201 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
201 “For this purpose, the functions of the League are:
(a) to act as the permanent organ of liaison, co-ordination and study between the
National Red Cross Societies and to co-operate with them;
(b) to encourage and promote in every country the establishment and development of
an independent and duly recognized National Red Cross Society;
(c) to be the official representative of the member Societies in the international field on
any matters in connection with resolutions adopted by the Board of Governors, and
to be the guardian of their integrity and the protector of their interests;
(d) to accept the mandates entrusted to it by the International Conference of the Red
Cross”.
Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross, in ICRC/LRCS,
International Red Cross Handbook, 11th ed. (1971), p. 277. The same material, with
minor modifications, appears in Article 6, paragraph 4 of the revised Statutes. See
ICRC/International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Handbook of
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 13th ed. (1994), pp. 423-424.
258 ICRC, Getting to Know the ICRC (Geneva: ICRC, n.d.), p. 21.
2:,!l Article 8, International Red Cross Handbook, p. 278.
ANNEX VI
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEAGUE 
OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES AND THE ICRC
1. Agreement of 2 November 1956 
2. Amendments of 27 November 1956
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[letterhead - see original, p. 9J>]
Agreement between the LRCS and the ICRC 
concerning the administration 
of Red Cross gift supplies intended for Hungary
1) In consideration of the troubled conditions in Hungary at the present time, 
and in accordance with the Statutes of the International Red Cross and the 
Agreement concluded between the League and the Committee in 1952, all 
operations connected with the forwarding, allocation, and distribution in 
Hungary of gifts of National Societies are placed under the direction of the 
ICRC Delegation in Hungary, acting in cooperation with the Hungarian Red 
Cross and possibly with other qualified relief organizations.
2) As circumstances have made it necessary that a large part of the relief 
supplies from National Societies intended for Hungary should first be assembled 
in Vienna, the handling of gifts from National Societies already in Vienna or 
which may subsequently arrive in Vienna, is placed under the direction of the 
Representative of the League of Red Cross Societies, acting in cooperation with 
the Austrian Red Cross.
3) The ICRC Delegation in Hungary and the Representative of the League of 
Red Cross Societies in Vienna will exchange Liaison Officers in order to ensure 
the coordination of their respective operations.
4) In pursuance of the above, it will be for the Representative of the League of 
Red Cross Societies to coordinate gifts of National Red Cross Societies on their 
arrival in Vienna, and to arrange for their safe-keeping, warehousing and sorting, 
and for the taking of a daily inventory, by category of article.
5) It will be for the Representative of the League of Red Cross Societies to 
place at the disposal of the ICRC Delegation in Hungary whatever relief supplies 
it may request according to needs, and in conformity with a plan established in 
agreement with the Hungarian Red Cross or other qualified relief organizations. 
These relief supplies will be handed over to the Representatives of the ICRC 
either in Vienna or at a frontier post for forwarding by them and subsequent 
distribution by the Hungarian Red Cross or other qualified bodies under the 
auspices of the ICRC.
6) The transport vehicles of the National Societies, with the exception of those 
belonging to the Hungarian Red Cross, will be assembled in a car park under the 
management of the League Representative in Vienna, who will make available 
the vehicles required by the Delegation of the ICRC in Hungary for the 
forwarding of relief supplies in that country.
7) If the relief supplies assembled in Vienna or promised by the National Red 
Cross Societies are not adequate to meet the requirements of the ICRC 
Delegation in Hungary, the latter wall inform the ICRC, which will send the 
necessary appeals to the National Red Cross Societies for additional relief.
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8) It is understood that the delegates of donor National Red Cross Societies 
shall be given the opportunity, whenever circumstances permit, of personally 
observing the manner in which their gifts have been utilised on the spot.
9) It is also understood that, as soon as circumstances permit, the ICRC will 
facilitate the establishment in Hungary of any medical units which the National 
Societies may desire to send there. Their establishment on Hungarian territory 
will however have to be arranged under a plan drawn up by agreement between 
the ICRC and the Hungarian Red Cross, in order to ensure their most efficient 
use.
10) In order to ensure as perfect a balance as possible between supply and 
demand of relief for Hungary, the International Committee and the League will 
endeavour to centralise in Geneva as much information as possible on non-Red- 
Cross relief destined for Hungary.
11) The above provisions constitute the general principles on the basis of 
which the ICRC Delegation and the Representative of the League will settle 
practical details of application.
Geneva, 2 November 1956
B.de Rougé
[Signed]
Léopold Boissier
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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[letterhead, - see original, p. 97]
Geneva, 27 November 1956
Agreement between the LRCS and the ICRC 
concerning the relief action for the benefit of Hungary 
and Hungarian refugees
Following the joint decision to entrust the League with the relief work on 
behalf of refugees from Hungary in Austria, it has been agreed to make the 
following amendments to the Agreement concluded on 2 November 1956 
between the ICRC and the League:
1) The ICRC shall undertake not only the forwarding, allocation and 
distribution of relief in Hungary (as provided for in the Agreement of 
2 November), but also the handling in Vienna of gifts earmarked for the relief 
operation in Hungarian territory.
2) The League will undertake, in Austria, the handling and distribution of 
relief assigned to Hungarian refugees on Austrian soil. This work will be 
earned out with the cooperation of the Austrian Red Cross and in accordance 
with the undertakings entered into by the League.
3) The gifts in cash or in kind which have not been earmarked for a specific 
purpose will be allocated by common agreement according to needs, by the 
representatives of the ICRC and the League representative in Vienna. They 
will determine the share of this relief to be sent to Hungary and placed at the 
disposal of the ICRC, and the share to be used for refugees, for whom the 
League is responsible.
4) The ICRC and the League will consult together on the appeals to be 
addressed to National Societies in order to obtain additional relief supplies for 
the above-mentioned operations.
5) The technical measures relating to the execution of the present 
Agreement will be the subject of a special arrangement.
B. de Rougé
[Signed]
Léopold Boissier
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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Original texts of annex VI (French)
LIGUE DES SOCIÉTÉS DE LA CROIX-ROUGE 
GENÈVE
COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE
GENÈVE
Adr. télégraphique : Llcrosi 
Téléphone : 4 13 60
Adr. télégraphique : IntercroUrouge 
Téléphone : 2 05 60
Accord entre la LSCR et le CICR concernant l'administration 
des dons de la Croix-Rouse à destination de la Hongrie.
1) Vu les troubles qui régnent actuellement en 
Hongrie et conformément aux statuts de la Croix-Rouge in­
ternationale et de l'Accord passé entre la Ligue et le Co­
mité en 1952, toutes les opérations relatives à l'achemine­
ment, la répartition et la distribution en Hongrie des dons 
des Sociétés nationales sont placés sous la direction de la 
Délégation du CICR en Hongrie agissant avec le concours de 
la Croix-Rouge hongroise et éventuellement d'autres organis­
mes de secours qualifiés.
2) Les circonstances ayant exigé qu'une part 
importante des secours des Sociétés nationales à destina­
tion de la Hongrie soient préalablement assemblés à Vienne,
1'administration des dons des Sociétés nationales qui se 
trouvent déjà dans cette ville ou qui y seront ultérieu­
rement, sont placés sous la direction du représentant de
la Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge agissant avec le 
concours de la Croix-Rouge autrichienne.
3) La délégation du CICR en Hongrie et le repré­
sentant de la LSCR à Vienne échangeront des agents de liai­
son afin d'assurer la coordination de leurs opérations res­
pectives .
4) En conséquence de ce qui précède, il appar­
tiendra au représentant de la Ligue des Sociétés de la
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Croix-Rouge de coordonner l'arrivée à Vienne des dons 
des Sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge, en assurer 
la garde, l'entreposage, le tri et l'établissement d'un 
inventaire établi journellement par catégorie de mar­
chandises.
5) Il appartiendra au représentant de la ISCR 
de mettre à disposition de la délégation du CICR en Hon­
grie les secours dont celle-ci fera la demande .selon les 
besoins et selon un plan établi d'entente avec la Croix- 
Rouge hongroise ou d'autres organismes de secours quali­
fiés. Ces secours seront remis aux représentants du CICR 
soit à Vienne soit à un poste frontière pour être trans­
mis par leurs soins et distribués ultérieurement par la 
Croix-Rouge hongroise ou d'autres organismes qualifiés, 
sous les auspices du CICR.
6) Le matériel de transport des Sociétés na­
tionales à l'exception de celui appartenant à la Croix- 
Rouge hongroise, sera réuni en un parc automobile géré 
par le représentant de la LSCR à Vienne, lequel tiendra 
à la disposition de la délégation du CICR en Hongrie les 
véhicules nécessaires à 1'acheminement des secours dans 
ce pays.
7) Si les secours rassemblés à Vienne ou an­
noncés par les Sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge ne 
permettent pas de satisfaire aux demandes de la déléga­
tion du CICR en Hongrie, celle-ci en avertira le CICR qui 
adressera aux Sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge les 
appels nécessaires pour obtenir des secours complémen­
taires .
8) Il est entendu que les délégués des Sociétés
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nationales de la Croix-Rouge donatrices auront la pos­
sibilité, chaque fois que les circonstances le permet­
tront, de se rendre compte eux-mêmes des conditions dans 
lesquelles leurs dons auront été utilisés sur place.
9) Il est entendu également que, dès que les
circonstances le permettront, le CICR facilitera l'ins­
tallation en Hongrie des unités médicales que les Socié­
tés nationales désireraient envoyer dans ce pays. Leur 
installation sur territoire hongrois devra cependant se fai­
re dans le cadre d'un plan établi d'entente entre le CICR 
et la Croix-Rouge hongroise afin d'assurer la meilleure 
utilisation de ces unités.
10) En vue d'assurer un équilibre aussi harmo­
nieux que possible entre l'offre et la demande des secours 
destinés à la Hongrie, le Comité international et la Ligue 
s'efforceront de centraliser à Genève autant d'informations 
que possible sur les secours non Croix-Rouge destinés à la 
Hongrie.
11) Les dispositions qui précèdent constituent
les principes généraux sur la base desquels la délégation 
du CICR et le représentant de la LSCR fixeront les moda­
lités pratiques d'exécution.
Genève, le 2 novembre 1956.
B. de Rougé Léopold Boissier
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COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL 
CROIX-ROUGE
Geneve, le 27 novembre 1956.
Accord entre la L.S.C.R. et le C.I.C.R.
concernant l'action de secours en faveur de la Hongrie
et des réfugiés hongrois.
A la suite de la décision prise en commun 
de confier à la Ligue l'oeuvre de secours en faveur des 
réfugiés de Hongrie en Autriche, il a été convenu d'ap­
porter à l'accord conclu le 2 novembre 1956 entre le 
CICR et la Ligue les amendements suivants :
1. Le CICR assurera non seulement 1'acheminement, 
la répartition et la distribution des secours en Hongrie 
(comme prévu par 1'accord du 2 novembre), mais également 
l'administration, à Vienne, des dons affectés à l'action 
de secours en territoire hongrois.
2. La Ligue assurera en Autriche 1'administration 
et la distribution des secours affectés aux réfugiés 
hongrois se trouvant en Autriche. Ce travail se fera 
avec le concours de la Croix-Rouge autrichienne et selon 
les•engagements pris par la Ligue.
3. Les dons en nature ou en espèces sans affecta­
tion spéciale seront répartis d'un commun accord selon 
les besoins constatés, par le représentant du CICR et le 
représentant de la Ligue à Vienne. Ceux-ci détermineront 
la part de ces secours qui sera destinée à la Hongrie et 
placée à la disposition du CICR, et celle qui sera destinée 
aux réfugiés, sous la responsabilité de la Ligue.
4= Le CICR et la Ligue se consulteront sur les 
appels à adresser aux Sociétés nationales en vue d'obtenir 
des secours complémentaires pour les actions ci-dessus 
indiquées.
5» Les modalités techniques relatives à l'exécution 
du présent accord font l'objet d'un arrangement particulier.
L-i'i [•! J- fi "Il ‘ —
Léopold BoissierB„ de Rougé
ANNEX VII
ARTICLE 15 OF THE FIRST GENEVA 
CONVENTION OF 1949
At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties to the conflict 
shall, without delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the 
wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure 
their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, an armistice or a suspension of fire shall be 
arranged, or local arrangements made, to permit the removal, exchange and 
transport of the wounded left on the battlefield.
Likewise, local arrangements may be concluded between Parties to the 
conflict for the removal or exchange of wounded and sick from a besieged or 
encircled area, and for the passage of medical and religious personnel and 
equipment on their way to that area.
ANNEX VIII
TELEGRAMS FROM THE ICRC 
TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRIES OF MOSCOW 
AND BUDAPEST
JP/MLB 4 November 1956
Ministry Foreign Affairs MOSCOW
Given current events Hungary and in accordance with its traditional mission 
International Committee Red Cross asks your Government practical application 
four Geneva Conventions 1949 for protection wounded war prisoners and non- 
combatants ratified by 58 States including USSR and Hungary stop Interna­
tional Committee ready assume tasks provided for it by these Conventions and 
offers its help for any humanitarian action considered useful stop same 
communication being sent simultaneously to Government Hungary stop 
President
Intercroixrouge A593
Same message to Budapest 
Payable by ICRC
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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JP/MLB 4 November 1956
Ministry Foreign Affairs BUDAPEST
Given current events Hungary and in accordance with its traditional mission 
International Committee Red Cross asks your Government practical application 
four Geneva Conventions 1949 for protection wounded war prisoners and non- 
combatants ratified by 58 States including USSR and Hungary stop Interna­
tional Committee ready assume tasks provided for it by these Conventions and 
offers its help for any humanitarian action considered useful stop same 
communication being sent simultaneously to Government USSR stop President
Intercroixrouge A594
Payable by ICRC
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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Original texts of annex VIII (French)
JP/MLB k novembre 1956.
Ministère Affaires étrangères MOSCOU
En présence événements actuels Hongrie et conformément sa 
mission traditionnelle Comité international Croix-Rouge 
demande à votre Gouvernement mise en application pratique 
quatre Convention Genève 19*+9 pour protection blessés 
prisonniers guerre et non combattants ratifiées par 
cinquantehuit Etatd dont URSS et Hongrie stop Comité 
international prêt assumer tâches prévues pour lui par ces 
Conventions et offre son concours pour toute action humanitaire 
qui serait jugée utile stop adressons simultanément même 
communication à Gouvernement Hongrie stop Président
Intercroixrouge A593
Même message à Budapest
A la charge CICR
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copie ami
JP/M LB 4 novembre 1956
Ministère Affaires étrangères
Budapest
En présence événements actuels Hongrie et conformément sa 
mission traditionnelle Comité international à Croix-Rouge 
demande à votre Gouvernement mise en applicatiSn pratique 
quatre Conventions Genève 19^9 pour protection blessés 
prisonniers guerre et non combattants ratifiées par cinquante- 
huit Etats dont URSS et Hongrie stop Comité international 
prêt assumer tâches prévues pour lui par ces Conventions et 
offre son concours pour toute action humanitaire qui serait 
jugée utile stop adressons simultanément même gmomiHmiijMàm 
communication à Gouvernement URSS stop Président
Intercroixrouge A59*+
à la charge du CICR
ANNEX IX
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ICRC 
AND THE HUNGARIAN RED CROSS
Between the Managing Committee of the Hungarian Red Cross, represented by
Dr. Georges KILLNER, Executive Director of the Hungarian Red Cross, and
Dr. Prof. Tibor NÓNAY, member of the Managing Committee of the Hungarian 
Red Cross
and
the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva, represented by
Mr. Roger GALLOPIN, Executive Director,
the following agreement was made in Vienna on 16 November 1956:
1. The International Committee of the Red Cross assumes the control of the 
distribution in Hungary of relief supplies for the Hungarian population, which 
have been or which will be entrusted to it by national Red Cross Societies, 
either directly or through the League of Red Cross Societies.
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross will also assume the control of 
the distribution of donations made on behalf of the Hungarian population 
which have been or which will be entrusted to it by governments or private 
organizations, either directly or through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations acting in agreement with the Hungarian Government.
3. The distribution of these supplies through the neutral intermediary of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross shall be carried out in accordance 
with the fundamental principles governing its work, i.e., with strict 
impartiality and without any discrimination whatsoever other than that 
based on the urgency of the needs of the persons to be assisted.
4. Towards this end the International Committee of the Red Cross shall, in 
agreement with the Hungarian Red Cross, draw up various programmes of 
assistance which shall be carried out progressively according to the urgency of 
the needs to be met and the supplies available. As an example, it is planned to 
give assistance in the first place to the sick, the wounded, infants, expectant 
mothers, the aged and the infirm.
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5. All facilities shall be given to the International Committee of the Red Cross to 
enable it to establish a delegation in Hungary which will include the staff 
immediately required to:
(a) draw up, in agreement with the Hungarian Red Cross, the programmes of 
assistance mentioned above,
(b) ensure the protection and running of the warehouses which the 
International Committee of the Red Cross will set up in the principal 
distribution centres,
(c) transport supplies to or from these warehouses,
(d) be present during the actual distribution of supplies and to report to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva on these distribu­
tions for the information of donors.
This staff, consisting mainly of Swiss citizens, shall be placed under the orders 
of a Delegate-in-Chief, with Headquarters in Budapest, who will act in close 
liaison with the representatives designated by the Hungarian Red Cross for 
this purpose.
6. In order to allow the ICRC to carry out its strictly humanitarian action 
efficiently, the Hungarian Red Cross and the Hungarian Government shall 
ensure that in the exercise of its functions, the Delegation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in Hungary receives all aid and protection from all 
authorities, civil or military.
7. The general provisions of this agreement shall be supplemented by a practical 
working plan drawn up by agreement between the representatives of the 
Hungarian Red Cross and the Delegate-in-Chief of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in Budapest.
8. The sole object of this agreement being the distribution of relief supplies to the 
Hungarian population, it cannot be interpreted as restricting the other 
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross 
may be called upon to exercise in Hungary in conformity with the statutes of 
the International Red Cross or the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
For the International Committee For the Hungarian Red Cross:
of the Red Cross:
[signature] [signature]
Seen and approved by the Minister of the People’s Republic of Hungary in Vienna 
[signed] Frigyes Púja 
(F. Púja)
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL
DE LA
CROIX-ROUGE
Entre le Comité directeur de la Croix-Rouge hongroise, 
représenté par
M. le Dr. Georges KILLNER, directeur exécutif de la 
Croix-Rouge hongroise et
M. le Dr. Prof. Tibor NÓNAY, membre du Comité directeur 
de la Croix-Rouge hongroise
et
le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge à Genève, 
représenté par M. Roger GALLOPIN', directeur exécutif,
réunis à Vienne, le 16 novembre 1956, il a été convenu 
ce qui suit :
1. Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge assume le 
contrôle de la distribution en Hongrie des secours 
destinés à la population hongroise qui lui ont été
ou qui lui seraient confiés par les Sociétés nationales 
de la Croix-Rouge, soit directement, soit par 11 inter­
médiaire de la Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge.
2. Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge assume 
également le contrôle de la distribution des dons pour 
la population hongroise qui lui ont été ou qui lui se­
raient confiés par des gouvernements ou des organismes 
privés, soit directement, soit par 11 intermédiaire du 
Secrétaire Général des Rations Unies agissant d1 entente 
avec le gouvernement hongrois.
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3. La distribution de ces dons par 11 intermédiaire neutre 
du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge se fera selon 
les principes fondamentaux régissant son action, à savoir 
la stricte impartialité et l'absence de toute discrimina­
tion autre que celle dictée par les besoins des personnes 
à secourir.
4. Dans ce but, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge 
établira d'entente avec la Croix-Rouge hongroise diffé­
rents programmes d'assistance qui seront réalisés pro­
gressivement selon l'urgence des besoins et en fonction 
des secours disponibles. A titre d'exemple, il est pré­
vu de venir en aide en premier lieu aux malades, aux 
blessés de toute catégorie, aux enfants en bas age, aux 
femmes enceintes, aux vieillards et aux infirmes.
5. Toutes facilités seront accordées au Comité international 
de la Croix-Rouge aux fins d'installer immédiatement en 
Hongrie une délégation disposant du personnel nécessaire 
pour :
a) établir d'entente avec la Croix-Rouge hongroise les 
programmes d'assistance ■ mentionnés plus haut;
b) assurer la garde et la gestion des entrepots que 
créera le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge dans 
les principaux centres de distribution;
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c) acheminer les secours à destination des entrepôts 
ou en provenance de ceux-ci;
d) assister à la distribution proprement dite des 
secours et faire rapport au Comité international 
de la Croix-Rouge à Genève sur ces distributions à 
l'intention des donateurs.
Ce personnel, principalement de nationalité suisse, 
sera placé sous la direction d'un délégué en chef, 
siégeant à Budapest et agissant en étroite liaison avec 
les représentants que la Croix-Rouge hongroise désignera 
à cet effet.
6. Afin de permettre 1'accomplissement efficace de l'action 
strictement humanitaire du Comité international de la 
Croix-Rouge, la Croix-Rouge et le gouvernement hongrois 
veilleront à ce que la délégation du Comité international
de la Croix-Rouge en Hongrie reçoive, dans l'exercice de ses 
fonctions, aide et protection de la part de toutes les 
autorités civiles ou militaires.
7. les dispositions générales du présent accord seront 
complétées par un plan d'opérations technique établi 
d'entente entre les représentants de la Croix-Rouge 
hongroise et le chef de la délégation du Comité 
international de la Croix-Rouge à Budapest.
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8. le présent accord ayant pour seul objet la distribution 
des secours destinés à la population hongroise, il ne 
saurait être interprété comme limitant les autres activi­
tés humanitaires que le Comité international de la Croix- 
Rouge pourrait être appelé à exercer en Hongrie con­
formément aux statuts de la Croix-Rouge internationale 
ou aux dispositions des Conventions de Genève.
Pour le Comité international 
de la Croix-Rouge:
Pour la Croix-Rouge hongroise:
Vu,C -UsCAg <1
fövi
Lg
ANNEX X
THE ICRC’S RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
1. Letter from the European Office of the United Nations to the ICRC
2. Letter from the President of the ICRC 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
3. Agreement between the ICRC and the United Nations
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EUROPEAN OFFICE 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE EUROPÉEN 
DES NATIONS UNIES
Télégramme» : UNATIONS, GENEVE
Téléphone : 331000 332000 334000 Palais des Nations
GENÈVE
(à rappeler dana la réponse)
4 December 1956
Sir,
The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its Second Emergency 
Special Session, has requested the Secretary-General to take immediately the 
necessary measures to bring aid to the population of Hungary.
Considering that the International Committee of the Red Cross has been 
engaged in emergency relief activities in Hungary and has concluded an 
agreement with the Hungarian Red Cross to this effect, I wish to ask you 
if the International Committee would accept to co-operate with the United 
Nations in this humanitarian programme, under the following conditions:
le The Committee, at the request of the Secretary-General, agrees to use 
any funds as may be transferred to it by the United Nations for the exclusive 
purpose of providing immediate aid to the population of Hungary, in particular 
by furnishing medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothing. The responsibility 
assumed by the Committee in this respect will commence upon receipt of any 
such funds and will terminate after the distribution of relief supplies to 
the Hungarian population or, in the event of cessation of the programme, 
upon return to the United Nations of any unused portion of such funds or of 
supplies purchased with such funds.
2. The Committee will undertake responsibility for the distribution of such 
supplies as may be furnished by the United Nations. The Comnittee may 
indicate to the United Nations the types of relief goods regarded as most 
appropriate for the purposes of the programme.
3. In accordance with the principles of the Red Cross and in the spirit of 
the Geneva Conventions, the Committee will distribute relief under this 
programme without discrimination and on the basis of need alone.
4« While making every effort to carry out this programme as rapidly as 
possible, the Committee will retain sole responsibility for the schedule 
of distribution of relief supplies. In the event of difficulties or 
obstacles arising in the execution of the programme, the Committee will, 
if necessary, report to the United Nations but it will be solely responsible 
for taking appropriate measures.
5. The Committee will supply all organizational, supervisory and technical 
personnel, services and equipment required for the operation of the programme.
Mr. Leopold Boissier,
President,
International Committee of the Red Cross,
GENEVA
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6. The United Nations will defray such administrative and operational costs 
of the Committee attributable to the performance of the United Nations relief 
programme as may be agreed between the United Nations and the Committee.
7. The Committee will be the sole agency to carry out the relief programme 
on behalf of the United Nations with the contributions made pursuant to 
resolution 399 adopted by the General Assembly at the Second Emergency 
Special Session on 9 November 1956. This shall not be construed to limit 
the right of other United Nations agencies to carry out assistance programmes 
in accordance with their terms of reference and in agreement with the 
Hungarian authorities.
8. The United Nations recognizes the Committee as an independent and 
autonomous organization which undertakes to perform the services envisaged 
in this agreement. The performance of such services will not in any way 
place the Committee in a subordinate position towards the United Nations, 
and the Committee will not be required to carry out any other task than 
those set forth in this agreement.
9. The Committee will suhnit to the Secretary-General monthly operational 
reports and financial reports of costs incurred in the performance of its 
responsibilities under this agreement.
10. The United Nations and the Committee will act in close collaboration in 
regard to the planning and the implementation of the programme. In particular, 
the Committee will extend full co-operation to any representative who may be 
sent to Hungary by the Secretary-General in connexion with the programme.
11. Nothing contained in this agreement will affect any of the other 
activities which the Committee already is carrying out or may carry out in 
Hungary in the performance of its traditional role.
12. This Agreement may be terminated by either party on one week's notice 
subject, if possible, to prior consultation. The termination of this 
Agreement will not affect the responsibilities of either party under the 
Agreement with respect to the conpletion of the distribution of supplies 
still outstanding at the date of termination.
I should greatly appreciate receiving your confirmation that the 
International Committee of the Red Cross accepts the proposals contained 
in this letter. Following such confirmation, the Secretary-General will 
inform the Hungarian Government of this agreement.
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration,
for and on behalf of the Secretary-General
George^ . uuucj
Deputy Director, European Office of 
the United Nations
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Geneva, 4 December 1956
His Excellency 
Mr. Dag Hammarskjoeld 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
United Nations Organization 
New York
Dear Mr. Secretary-General,
The International Committee has received your letter of 4 December 1956 
concerning the United Nations relief action on behalf of the population of 
Hungary and the assistance that our organization could provide in this situation.
I am pleased to inform you that the International Committee, already engaged 
in convoying to Hungary and distributing there the relief provided by the National 
Red Cross Societies, agrees to take responsibility for the relief supplied by the 
United Nations as well, under the terms mentioned in your letter, to wit:
1. The Committee, at the request of the Secretary-General, agrees to use any 
funds as may be transferred to it by the United Nations for the exclusive 
purpose of providing immediate aid to the population of Hungary, in 
particular by furnishing medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothing. The 
responsibility assumed by the Committee in this respect will commence upon 
receipt of any such funds and will terminate after the distribution of relief 
supplies to the Hungarian population or, in the event of cessation of the 
programme, upon return to the United Nations of any unused portion of such 
funds or of supplies purchased with such funds.
2. The Committee will undertake responsibility for the distribution of such 
supplies as may be furnished by the United Nations. The Committee may 
indicate to the United Nations the types of relief goods regarded as most 
appropriate for the purposes of the programme.
3. In accordance with the principles of the Red Cross and in the spirit of the 
Geneva Conventions, the Committee will distribute relief under this 
programme without discrimination and on the basis of need alone.
4. While making every effort to carry out this programme as rapidly as 
possible, the Committee will retain sole responsibility for the schedule 
(French “cadence”) of distribution of relief supplies. In the event of difficulties 
or obstacles arising in the execution of the programme, the Committee will, if 
necessary, report to the United Nations but it will be solely responsible for 
taking appropriate measures.
5. The Committee will supply all organizational, supervisory and technical 
personnel, services and equipment required for the operation of the 
programme.
6. The United Nations will defray such administrative and operational costs 
of the Committee attributable to the performance of the United Nations relief
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programme as may be agreed between the United Nations and the 
Committee.
7. The Committee will be the sole agency to cany out the relief programme 
on behalf of the United Nations with the contributions made pursuant to 
resolution 399 adopted by the General Assembly at the Second Emergency 
Special Session on 9 November 1956. This shall not be construed to limit the 
right of other United Nations agencies to carry out assistance programmes in 
accordance with their terms of reference and in agreement with the 
Hungarian authorities.
8. The United Nations recognises the Committee as an independent and 
autonomous organization which undertakes to perform the services 
envisaged in this agreement. The performance of such services will not in 
any way place the Committee in a subordinate position towards the United 
Nations, and the Committee will not be required to carry out any other task 
than those set forth in this agreement.
9. The Committee will submit to the Secretary-General monthly operational 
reports and financial reports of costs incurred in the performance of its 
responsibilities under this agreement.
10. The United Nations and the Committee will act in close collaboration in 
regard to the planning and the implementation of the programme. In 
particular, the Committee will extend full co-operation to any representative 
who may be sent to Hungary by the Secretary-General in connexion with the 
programme.
11. Nothing contained in this agreement will affect any of the other activities 
which the Committee already is carrying out or may carry out in Hungary in 
the performance of its traditional role.
12. This agreement may be terminated by either party on one week’s notice 
subject, if possible, to prior consultation. The termination of this Agreement 
will not affect the responsibilities of either party under the Agreement with 
respect to the completion of the distribution of supplies still outstanding at the 
date of termination.
Much pleased by the agreement thus concluded between the United Nations 
Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross, I remain,
Yours sincerely,
Léopold BOISSIER
cc: archives 5 
The President 
Mr. Michel 
Mr. Gallopin 
WHM/AGu 
280 (65)
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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Agreement between the ICRC 
and the United Nations for Relief to Hungary
1. The Committee, at the request of the Secretary-General, agrees to use such 
funds as may be transferred to it by the United Nations for the exclusive 
purpose of providing immediate aid to the population of Hungary, in 
particular by furnishing medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothing. The 
responsibility assumed by the Committee in this respect will commence upon 
receipt of any such funds and will terminate after the distribution of relief 
supplies to the Hungarian population or, in the event of cessation of the 
programme, upon return to the United Nations of any unused portion of such 
funds or of supplies purchased with such funds.
2. The Committee will undertake responsibility for the distribution of such 
supplies as may be furnished by the United Nations. The Committee may 
indicate to the United Nations the types of relief goods regarded as most 
appropriate for the purpose of the programme.
3. In accordance with the principles of the Red Cross and in the spirit of the 
Geneva Conventions, the Committee will distribute relief under this 
programme without discrimination and on the basis of need alone.
4. While making every effort to carry out this programme as rapidly as possible, 
the Committee will retain sole responsibility for the schedule (French: 
“cadence”) of distribution of relief supplies. In the event of difficulties or 
obstacles arising in the execution of the programme, the Committee will, if 
necessary, report to the United Nations but it will be solely responsible for 
taking appropriate measures.
5. The Committee will supply all organizational, supervisory and technical 
personnel, services and equipment required for the operation of the 
programme.
6. The United Nations will defray such administrative and operational costs of 
the Committee attributable to the execution of the United Nations relief 
programme as may be agreed between the United Nations and the 
Committee.
7. The Committee will be the sole agency to cany out the relief programme on 
behalf of the United Nations with the contributions made pursuant to 
resolution 399 adopted by the General Assembly at the Second Emergency 
Special Session on November 9,1956. This shall not be construed to limit the 
right of other United Nations agencies to carry out assistance programmes in 
accordance with their terms of reference and in agreement with the 
Hungarian authorities.
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8. The United Nations recognizes the Committee as an independent and 
autonomous organization which undertakes to perform the services 
envisaged in this agreement. The performance of such services will not in 
any way place the Committee in a subordinate position towards the United 
Nations, and the Committee will not be required to carry out any other task 
than those set forth in this agreement.
9. The Committee will submit to the Secretary-General monthly operational 
reports and financial reports of costs incurred in the performance of its 
responsibilities under this agreement.
10. The United Nations and the Committee will act in close collaboration in 
regard to the planning and the implementation of the programme. In 
particular, the Committee will extend full co-operation to any representative 
who may be sent to Hungary by the Secretary-General in connexion with the 
programme.
11. Nothing contained in this agreement will affect any of the other activities 
which the Committee is already carrying out or may carry out in Hungary in 
the performance of its traditional role.
12. This agreement may be terminated by either party on one week’s notice 
subject, if possible, to prior consultation. The termination of this Agreement 
will not affect the responsibilities of either party under the Agreement with 
respect to the completion of the distribution of supplies still outstanding at 
the date of termination.
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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distribution : 
archives 5 
M. le Président 
M= Michel 
Mo Gallopin
WHM/AGu
280 (65)
Genève, le 4 décembre 1956»
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,
Le Comité international a rs^u votre lettre 
du 4 décembre 1956 relative à 11 action de secours des 
Nations Unies en laveur de la population de Hongrie et 
du concours que notre institution pourrait prêter an 
11 occurrence.
J'ai le plaisir de vous i'airo savoir que le 
Comité international, qui s'occupe déjà de convoyer en 
Hongrie et de distribuer dans ce pays les secours de 
Croix-Rouges, accepte de se charger également des se­
cours fournis par les Nations Unies et ce dans les condi­
tions prévues par votre lettre, c'est à dire :
1. The Committee, at the request of the Secratary- 
General. agrees to use any funds as may be trans­
ferred to it by the United Nations for the exclusive 
purpose of providing immediate aid to the population 
of Hungary, in particular by furnishing medical 
supplies, foodstuffs and clothing. The responsibility 
assumed by the Committee in this respect «ill comma nee 
upon receipt of any such funds and «ill terminate 
after the distribution of relief supplies to the 
Hungarian population or, in the event of cessation 
of the programme, upon return to the United Nations 
of any unused portion of such funds or of supplies 
purchased with such funds.
Son Excellence 
Monsieur Dag Hammarskjoeld 
Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies 
Organisation des Nations Unies 
New York
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2, The Committee vili undertake responsibility for 
the distribution of such supplies as may be furnished 
by the United Nations, The Committee may indicate to 
the United Nations the types of relief goods regarded 
as most appropriate for the purposes of the programme,
3„ In accordance with the principles of the Red Cross 
and in the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, the Com­
mittee will distribute relief under this programme 
without discrimination and on the basis of need alone,
4. While making every effort to carry out this programme 
as rapidly as possible, the Committee will retain sole 
responsibility for the schedule (B’rench "cadence" ) of 
distribution of relief supplies. In the event of diffi­
culties or obstacles arising in the execution of the 
programme, the Committee will, if necessary, report to 
the United Nations but it will be solely responsible 
for taking appropriate measures .
5» The Committee will supply all organizational, super­
visory and technical personnel, services and equipment 
required for the operation of the programme,
6» The United Nations will defray such administrative 
and operational costs of the Committee attributable to 
the performance of the United Nations relief programme 
as may be agreed between the United Nations and the 
Committee,
7» The Committee will be the sole agency to carry out 
the relief programme on behalf of the United Nations 
with the contributions made pursuant to resolution 399 
adopted by the General Assembly at the Second Emergency 
Special Session on 9 November 1956. This shall not be 
construed to limit the right of other United Nations 
agencies to carry out assistance programmes in accor­
dance with their terms of reference aid in agreement 
with the Hungarian authorities,
8, The United Nations recognises the Committee as an 
independent and autonomous organization which under­
takes to perform the services envisaged in this agree­
ment. The performance of such services will not in any 
way place the Committee in a subordinate position towards 
the United Nations, and the Committee will not be re­
quired to carry out any other task than those set forth 
in this agreement.
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9. The Committee will submit to the Secretary-Gene­
ral monthly operational reports and financial re­
ports of costs incurred in the performance of its 
responsibilities under this agreement.
10. The United Nations and the Committee will act 
in close collaboration in regard to the planning 
and the implementation of the programme. In parti­
cular, the Committee will extend full co-operation 
to any representative who may be sent to Hungary 
by the Secretary-General in connexion with the 
programme „
11. Nothing contained in this agreement will affect 
any of the other activities which the Committee 
already is carrying out or may carry out in Hungary 
in the performance of its traditional role.
12. This agreement may be terminated by either party 
on one week's notice subject, if possible, to prior 
consultation. The termination of this Agreement will 
not affect the responsibilities of either party 
under the Agreement with respect to the completion 
of the distribution of supplies still outstanding
at the date of termination.
Un me félicitant de l'accord ainsi inter­
venu entre l'Organisation dos Hâtions Unies et le Comité 
international de la Croix-Rouge, je vous prie d'agréer. 
Monsieur le Secrétaire- Général, 1'assurance de ma haute 
considération.
Léopold BOIGSIER
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ANNEX XIII
ICRC AID TO HUNGARY: 
SITUATION IN JUNE 1957
SUMMARY OF GIFT SUPPLIES
received for the relief action of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross on behalf of the Hungarian people, 
from November 1,1956 to June 25,1957
I. GIFTS IN KIND
1. Gift supplies received at Vienna and carried to Budapest:
Kg. Sw. Fr.
(a) Foodstuffs
Condensed and powdered milk 6,155,681 13,782,675
Tinned meat and fish 684,601 3,717,631
Tinned fruit and vegetables 115,548 316,621
Infant foods 121,745 316,537
Fats, oil and butter 1,961,124 4,082,289
Cheese 1,220,543 4,112,456
Sugar 443,486 388,463
Coffee and tea 27,866 295,292
Chocolate and cocoa-powder 152,857 735,813
Rice 646,895 582,205
Flour 7,513,563 4,508,137
Other cereals 34,505 25,313
Pulse 79,550 66,026
Pasta 59,395 65,334
Salt 10,100 5,858
Sundry foodstuffs (bread, biscuits, etc.) 224,491 317,013
Fruits 92,833 117,838
Potatoes 30,470 3,351
Food parcels 5,551,750 13,747,274
Total 25,307,003 47,186,131
(b) Textiles and leather goods:
Clothing and underwear 2,131,889 6,929,939
122 HUNGARIAN OCTOBER
Kg. Sw. Fr.
Footwear 244,812 1,224,060
Blankets 354,415 1,127,321
Sheets 36,423 91,057
Sundry bedding 21,140 52,850
Sundry textiles 10,498 76,976
Leather bags 2,393 11,965
Total 2,801,570 9,514,168
(c) Various supplies:
Toilet requisites (soap, razors) 67,441 113,670
Kitchen utensils and household goods 50,546 106,101
Bed-frames and mattresses 73,117 197,003
Window-glass 105,515 131,894
Coal 9,223,370 1,106,804
Seeds (through the F AO) 9,600,000 4,308,500
Vehicles (ambulances, cars and lorries) — 258,000
Sundry articles 212,696 94,200
Total 19,332,685 6,316,172
Total of gifts in kind (medicaments and
medical equipment not included) 47,441,258 63,016,471
* Medicaments and medical equipment 445,701 10,651,416
(these particulars are given separately as the
weight and value of the bulk consignments of
medicaments received at the beginning of the
relief action had to be estimated)
* Up to June 25,1957, the following relief supplies
were purchased and sent to Hungary by means of
the cash donations received by the ICRC:
Sugar 100,000 73,500
Chocolate 7,000 43,400
Tinned meat 60,000 119,463
Sundry textiles 20,900 244,414
Medicaments and medical equipment 29,710 397,384
Total 217,610 878,161
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2. List of donors
Kg.
(a) National Red Cross Societies:
Argentine Republic
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
German Federal Republic
Greece
Italy
Liechtenstein
Luxemburg
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
1,800
89,973
142,914
16,928
490,789
89,763
26,060
6,914,615
22,122
115,768
1,792
8,900
3,080
1,136,945
331,676
2,971
8,763
902,011
1,068,750
22,360
1,435,272
707,936
4,460
Total 13,545,729
N.B.
* Some gifts of governmental and non-governmental origin 
were sent to the ICRC through the National Red Cross 
which, in such cases, is listed as the donor of the supplies.
* All the gifts mentioned above were sent through the ICRC. 
In addition, the Polish Red Cross sent directly to the 
Hungarian Red Cross 1,200,000 kg. of gift supplies (food­
stuffs, clothing, medicaments, window-glass and cement), 
which were distributed in part according to the programmes 
drawn up by the ICRC in conjunction with the Hungarian 
Red Cross. Further, the Turkish Red Crescent sent 
15,400 kg. of fruits directly to the Hungarian Red Cross, 
which were also distributed according to a joint programme.
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(b) Governments:
German Federal Republic (including F AO seeds) 10,961,335
Greece 33,478
France 1,248,784
Israel 3,870
Luxemburg (FAO seeds) 100,000
Netherlands (FAO seeds) 2,500,000
Spain 480,000
United States 12,374,742
Total 27,702,209
N.B.
The relief supplies furnished by the Governments
were, in many cases, purchased with the product of public
collections.
(c) Sundry donors:
UNICEF 90,347
CARE 2,300,000
ICRC 36,478
Various individual donors 3,766,495
Total 6,193,320
(d) Total of gifts in kind (not including
medicaments and medical equiment) 47,441,258
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II. CASH DONATIONS
1. National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) 
Societies (these donations include all sums remitted up to 
June 25, 1957, either for purchases or for covering 
operational costs):
Sw. Fr.
Australia 255,500.33
Belgium 174,650.00
Brazil 12,987.20
Canada 447,250.00
Chile 707.90
Colombia 1,071.00
Ecuador 13,672.85
Finland 2,666.70
France 244,401.31
German Federal Republic 463,500.00
Guatemala 3,097.45
India 6,386.25
Iran 27,932.50
Italy 12,096.30
Japan 174,365.05
Lebanon 667.55
Liechtenstein 20,000.00
Luxemburg 35,129.75
Monaco 15,528.13
Netherlands 150,000.00
New Zealand 262,160.00
Pakistan 2,253.12
Sweden 194,026.00
Switzerland 1,000,000.00*
Thailand 10,710.52
Union of South Africa 646,867.65
United Kingdom 1,049,600.20
United States 527,846.15
Uruguay 64,256.25
Viet Nam 2,140.00
Total
* (Including Sw. Fr. 700,000 to cover operational expenses.)
5,821,470.16
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Sw. Fr.
2. Governments (through the United Nations):
Australia
Ceylon
United Kingdom
191,670.35
13,803.00
180,231.00
Total 385,704.35
3. Sundry gifts:
ICRC Fund for Relief Action
Donation P. Nenni - G. Giorgini
American Joint Distribution Committee
Other non-governmental organisations 
(through the United Nations)
Private donors
30.000. 00
28.000. 00 
20,000.00
43,143.10
427,562.81
Total 548,705.91
Total of cash donations 6,755,880.42
N.B.
(The above total of Sw. Fr. 6,755,880.42 does not include 
the sum of Sw. Fr. 54,000 representing the donations of 
persons residing in Switzerland, handed over to the Swiss 
Red Cross to cover the costs of its participation in the ICRC 
relief action in Hungary (purchase of relief supplies and 
operational expenses.)
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III. FINAL SUMMARY
List of the gifts in kind (not including medicaments and medical equipment) 
and cash donations contributed by the various countries:
Country Gifts in kind
Cash
donations Total
Sw. Fr. Sw. Fr. Sw. Fr.
Argentine Republic 4,509 — 4,509
Australia - 447,171 447,171
Austria 192,049 — 192,049
Belgium 307,592 174,650 482,242
Brazil - 12,987 12,987
Canada 69,280 447,250 516,530
Ceylon - 13,803 13,803
Chile - 708 708
Colombia — 1,071 1,071
Denmark 1,148,767 — 1,148,767
Ecuador - 13,673 13,673
Finland 534,359 2,667 537,026
France 971,751 244,401 1,215,152
German Federal Republic 12,320,629 463,500 12,784,129
Greece 60,608 — 60,608
Guatemala - 3,097 3,097
India - 6,386 6,386
Iran - 27,932 27,932
Israel 5,225 — 5,225
Italy 565,171 40,096 605,267
Japan - 174,365 174,365
Lebanon — 668 668
Liechtenstein 5,850 20,000 25,850
Luxemburg 27,281 35,130 62,411
Mexico 10,164 — 10,164
Monaco — 15,528 15,528
Netherlands 2,799,246 150,000 2,949,246
New Zealand — 262,160 262,160
Norway 1,054,642 - 1,054,642
Pakistan - 2,253 2,253
Portugal 10,489 - 10,489
Spain 492,022 - 492,022
Sweden 2,447,205 194,026 2,641,231
Switzerland 3,805,963 1,000,000 4,805,963
Thailand 20,249 10,711 30,960
Union of South Africa - 646,868 646,868
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Country Gifts in kind
Cash
donations Total
Sw. Fr. Sw. Fr. Sw. Fr.
United Kingdom 4,286,671 1,229,831 5,516,502
United States 26,463,289 547,846 27,011,135
Uruguay 8,066 64,256 72,322
Viet Nam - 2,140 2,140
F AO (seeds from the German
Federal Republic, Luxemburg
and the Netherlands) 4,308,500 - 4,308,500
UNICEF 195,915 - 195,915
ICRC — 30,000 30,000
Various donors 900,979 470,706 1,371,685
Total (not including medicaments
and medical equipment) 63,016,471 6,755,880 69,772,351
N.B.
* The total value of gifts in kind and cash donations received up to June 25, 
1957 (including medicaments and medical equipment) amounts to 
Sw. Fr. 80,423,767 (i.e. 69,772,351 plus 10,651,415 Swiss francs).
* The total weight of gift supplies received up to June 25, 1957, amounted to 
48,104,569 kg. i.e.
Gifts in kind (not including medicaments 
and medical equipment)
Medicaments and medical equipment 
Supplies purchased with cash donations
47,441,258 kg. 
445,701 kg. 
217,610 kg.
Total 48,104,569 kg.
Source: ICRC, Report on the Relief Action in Hungary, October 1956-June 
1957 (Geneva: ICRC, 1957), pp. 45-50.
ANNEX XIV
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE BUDAPEST DELEGATION 
CONCERNING PERSONS DETAINED IN HUNGARY 
FOLLOWING THE DISTURBANCES
PV [minutes] Presidential Council 
of 15 Nov. 1956
Annex No. 2
SP 103
Instructions Concerning Persons Detained 
in Hungary Following the Disturbances
For Gallopin following conversation with Siordet and decision Presidential 
Council we suggest initial instructions for you to give Budapest delegation 
besides relief action and that should be implemented gradually as opportunities 
arise stop firstly obtain information on persons detained because of events stop 
on their status and treatment stop who are detaining authorities stop on any 
deportations secondly request authorization for ICRC to show interest in these 
persons through visits and if necessary by delivering relief supplies citing 
precedents Greece Morocco Algeria Cyprus thirdly request regular trials under 
Article Three and if possible try to obtain non-conviction or clemency for simple 
participation in struggle with no other charges, emphasizing general confusion 
fourthly under circumstances we do not consider appropriate to adopt overly 
legalistic position but advise taking as minimum basis Article Three especially 
paragraph before last, as well as general principles and spirit Geneva 
Conventions.
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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Ch'iginal text of annex XIV (French)
PV Conseil de Présidence 
du 15.11.1956
Annexe Ho 2
SP 103
Instructions concernant les personnes détenues
en Hongrie à la suite des événements
Pour Gallopin suite conversation avec Siordet et décision Conseil 
Présidence suggérons premières instructions que donneriez à délé­
gation Budapest en dehors action secours et qui seraient mises à 
exécution progressivement selon possibilités stop primo obtenir 
informations sur personnes détenues en raison événements stop 
sur leur statut et leur traitement stop quelles sont autorités 
détentrices stop sur déportations éventuelles secundo deman­
der autorisation pour CICR s'intéresser à ces personnes par vi­
sites et si nécessaire par remises secours invoquant précédents 
Grèce Maroc Algérie Chypre tertio demander jugement régulier 
selon article trois et si possible tenter obtenir non condamna­
tion ou clémence pour simple participation à la lutte non accom­
pagnée par autres accusations en faisant valoir confusion géné­
rale quarto vu circonstances ne jugeons pas opportun adopter 
position juridique trop stricte mais conseillons prendre pour 
base minimum article trois dont soulignons avant-dernier alinéa, 
ainsi que principes généraux et esprit Conventions de Genève.
ANNEX XV
DOSSIER NOTE CONCERNING THE LEGAL ASPECT 
OF THE CONFLICT IN HUNGARY
JW/RRB 10 December 1956
NOTE
Attached hereto you will find a clear copy of the internal note that I had 
drafted following our conversation on the legal aspect of the Hungarian conflict, 
which served notably as the basis for the instructions conveyed to Mr. Bovey 
through the agency of Mr. Gallopin.
It is interesting to find that the idea expressed in the last paragraph of page 3 
(possible prisoner of war status for deportees) echoes the suggestions recently 
made by Mr. Beckh in his note of 6 December 1956.
R.J. Wilhelm
cc: Messieurs Siordet, Pictet, and Maunoir 
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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12 November 1956 
10 December 1956
Dossier Note
In re: Fate of participants in the fighting in Hungary who fell into the hands of 
the adversary
Along with all the various kinds of assistance that the ICRC can provide for 
the Hungarian civilian population and civilian and military wounded, the fate of 
persons who participated in the fighting in Hungary and fell into the power of the 
adversary must now become a focus of concern for the ICRC and its delegation in 
Budapest.
1) Having examined the issue with the assistance of Mr. Siordet, the 
administration of the General Affairs Division can, first of all, make the following 
comments regarding the legal basis on which the ICRC and its delegates might 
found their measures on behalf of these persons.
Undeniably, in certain respects the events in Hungary present the 
characteristics of an international conflict between two Parties — the USSR 
and Hungary — bound by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This was the 
justification for the ICRC’s request to the Governments of these two countries 
(telegram of 4 November) concerning the practical application of these 
Conventions — a request to which, incidentally, these two Governments have 
not so far responded.
In numerous other aspects, however — among which the interpretation of the 
events given by the Governments involved cannot be completely disregarded — 
the hostilities in Hungary called instead for the application of Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, an article that is valid for non-international conflicts. 
Moreover, in the appeal it broadcast to Hungary by radio on 31 October 1956, the 
ICRC referred merely to certain fundamental principles of the Geneva 
Conventions, principles that in the main corresponded to those laid down in the 
aforementioned Article 3 (although the appeal did not mention the article).
In light of all this and the necessity of basing the Committee’s action on the 
principles giving it the greatest chance of effectiveness, the Division of General 
Affairs considers that the measures to be undertaken with respect to participants 
in the fighting who have fallen into the hands of the adversary in Hungary must 
be based above all on Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It is understood, 
however, that the guarantees provided by that article must be considered as a 
minimum in the case of Hungary.
We must underline, moreover, that this acknowledgment of Article 3 as the 
most appropriate legal basis for action must in no way be considered to constitute 
an exact legal definition of the conflict in Hungary; such a definition is not 
currently necessary for humanitarian action.
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2) This being the case, the view of the General Affairs Division is that the 
practical activity by the ICRC and its delegation in Budapest on behalf of 
participants in the fighting in Hungary who have fallen into the hands of the 
adversary should focus on the following points:
1. The delegation in Budapest should strive to find out if persons of any 
nationality are detained or interned in Hungary as a result of the recent events, 
particularly for participating in the fighting, and, if so, what authorities are 
holding them.
2. If there are such persons, the delegation should find out their status and 
what is to become of them. It should request that, in accordance with Article 3, 
these persons be treated humanely and given medical care if required, that 
notification of their internment be sent to their families, and that they be allowed 
to correspond with the latter, if necessary by “civilian messages”.
3. Where possible, the delegation should request that persons be spared 
harassment, prosecution, or punishment by law for the mere fact of taking sides, 
particularly taking up arms on behalf of one camp or the other. In support of such 
a request, it might emphasize in particular that there is all the more reason to 
excuse these persons since they fought partly against troops of foreign 
nationality and took up arms in response to a call from authorities whom they 
might have considered to be their legitimate Authorities.
Whatever the case, the delegation could ask that if these persons are 
prosecuted they not be convicted except upon judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples (Article 3, para. d).
4. Where possible, the delegation should ask to be allowed to visit persons 
interned in Hungary for having participated in the hostilities, in order to give 
them relief supplies.
5. The ICRC delegation should also try to ascertain the accuracy of the 
reports that persons who participated in the hostilities have been deported to 
Russia or other Eastern countries.
If the reports are time, such a transfer of persons abroad would reinforce the 
international aspect of the conflict and the ICRC would be justified in intervening 
on behalf of these persons, and considering them as prisoners of war or civilian 
deportees.
[signed] 
R.J. Wilhelm
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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JW/RRB Le 10 décembre 1956
NOIE
Vous trouverez ci-joint, mise au net, la 
note interne que J'avais établie en son temps, à la suite 
de notre entretien sur l'aspect juridique du conflit de 
Hongrie, qui a servi notamment de base aux instructions 
communiquées à M. Eovey, par l'entremise de M. Gallopin.
Il est intéressant de relever que l'idée ex­
primée dans le dernier alinéa de la page 3 (statut éven­
tuel de prisonniers de guerres pour les déportés) rejoint 
les suggestions faites récemment par M. Eeckh dans sa note 
du 6 décembre 1956.
RJ. WILHELM
DISTRIBUTION i MK. Siordet - Pictet et Maunoir.
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12 novembre 1956 
10 décembre 1956
NOTE DE DOSSIER
Concerne : Sort des personnes qui ont pris part aux combats 
en Hongrie et qui sont tombées aux mains de l'ad­
versaire.
A côté des secours de toute nature que le CICR peut 
apporter à la population civile hongroise ainsi qu'aux blessés 
civils et militaires, le sort des personnes ayant pris part aux 
combats en Hongrie et étant tombées au pouvoir de l'adversaire 
doit, dès maintenant, faire l'objet de l'attention et des préoc­
cupations du CICR et de sa délégation a Budapest.
1) Après avoir examiné la question avec le concours 
de M. Siordet, la Direction de la Division des Affaires générales 
peut tout d'abord préciser ce qui suit quant à la base juridique 
sur laquelle peuvent se fonder les démarches du CICR et de ses 
délégués en faveur de ces personnes.
Il est incontestable que, sous certains aspects, les 
événements de Hongrie présentent le caractère d'un conflit d'ordre 
international entre deux Parties - l'URSS et la Hongrie - liées 
par les Conventions de Genève de 1949. A ce titre se justifiait 
la demande que le CICR a adressée aux Gouvernements de ces deux 
pays (télégramme du 4 novembre) en vue de l'application pratique 
de ces Conventions - demande à laquelle ces deux Gouvernements 
n'ont d'ailleurs pas répondu jusqu'ici.
Toutefois, par de nombreux autres aspects - au nombre 
desquels 1'interprétation des événements donnée par les Couverne- 
*) intéressés ments*ne peut être totalement négligée - les hostilités survenues 
en Hongrie ont appelé plutôt l'application de l'article 3 des Con­
ventions de Genève, article valable pour les conflits de caractère 
non international. Aussi, dans son appel radiodiffusé à destination 
de la Hongrie du 31 octobre 1956, le CICR s'est-il borné à rappeler 
quelques principes fondamentaux des Conventions de Genève, princi­
pes qui correspondaient dans 1'ensemble à ceux que prévoit l'artlà 
cle 3 précité (bien que l'appel ne fît pas mention de ce dernier).
En raison de ce qui précède et eu égard également à la 
nécessité de fonder l'action du Comité sur des bases lui donnant 
les plus grandes chances d'efficacité, la Direction des Affaires 
générales estime que les démarches à entreprendre en vue des per­
sonnes ayant combattu et étant tombées aux mains de l'adversaire
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2.
en Hongrie, doivent se fonder avant tout sur l'article 3 des 
Conventions de Genève. Il est entendu, cependant, que les ga­
ranties prévues par cet article doivent être considérées com­
me un minimum dans le cas de la Hongrie.
Ri outre, soulignons que le fait de regarder l'ar­
ticle 3 comme la base juridique la plus appropriée en vue des 
démarches à entreprendre ne doit nullement être considéré com­
me la qualification juridique exacte du conflit .survenu en Hongrie, 
la recherche de cette qualification n'étant actuellement pas né­
cessaire pour l'action humanitaire.
2) Ceci étant posé, de l'avis de la Direction des 
Affaires générales, l'activité pratique du CICR et de sa déléga­
tion à Budapest en faveur des personnes ayant combattu en Hon­
grie et étant tombées aux mains de 1'adversaire devrait porter 
notamment sur les points suivants :
1. - La délégation à Budapest devrait s'efforcer 
de savoir si des personnes, de quelque nationalité que ce soit, 
sont détenues ou internées en Hongrie, par suite des récents 
événements et notamment pour avoir pris part aux combats, et au 
pouvoir de quelles Autorités elles se trouvent.
2. - S'il y a lieu, la délégation devrait s'infor­
mer du statut et du sort réservés à ces personnes. Elle devrait 
demander que ces personnes, conformément à l'article ,3> soient 
traitées avec humanité, qu'elles soient soignées si besoin est, 
que leur internement soit notifié à leur famille et qu'elles puis­
sent correspondre avec celle-ci, au besoin par "message civil".
3. - Selon les possibilités, la délégation devrait 
demander que les personnes ayant pris parti, en particulier,
par les armes, pour l'un ou l'autre camp, ne soient ni inquiétées 
ni poursuivies ou punies judiciairement de ce seul fait. Elle 
pourrait faire valoir notamment, à l'appui d'une telle demande, 
qu'il y a d'autant plus de raisons d'excuser ces personnes^ qu'el­
les ont lutté en partie contre des troupes de nationalité étrangère 
et qu'elles ont pris les armes à la suite d'un appel d'autorités 
qu'elles ont pu considérer comme leurs Autorités légitimes.
La délégation pourrait demander, en tout état de cau­
se, que si ces personnes sont poursuivies, elles ne soient pas 
condamnées sans un jugement préalable rendu par un tribunal ré­
gulièrement constitué assorti des garanties judiciaires reconnues 
comme indispensables par les peuples civilisés (article 3j lett. d)
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*+.- Selon les possibilités, la délégation de­
vrait demander de pouvoir visiter les personnes détenues in­
ternées en Hongrie pour avoir pris part aux hostilités en vue 
de leur apporter des secours.
5. - La délégation du CICR devrait également s'ef­
forcer de savoir si les nouvelles selon lesquelles des personnes 
ayant pris part aux hostilités auraient été déportées en Russie 
ou dans d'autres pays de l'Est sont exactes.
Si tel était le cas, un tel transfert à l'étranger 
renforcerait l'aspect international du conflit et le CICR se­
rait justifié à intervenir en faveur de ces personnes, à les 
considérer comme des prisonniers de guerre ou comme des civils 
déportés.
il/:IL L,
ANNEX XVI
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ICRC 
AND HUNGARY ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION
1. Instructions for M. A. Guillermet.
2. Draft Agreement between the Hungarian Government 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
on Family Reunification betiveen Hungary and Other Countries.
3. Draft Declaration to Be Signed by the Competent Authorities 
of Host Countries that Have Taken in Hungarian Refugees.
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234(00-65) 25 April 1957
TM/BT
Instructions for Mr. A. Guillermet
In re: Reunification of families dispersed between Hungary and other 
countries.
1. Mr. Guillermet is going to Hungary as a special delegate of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in order to request from the Hungarian 
Government the necessary facilities to reunite families dispersed between 
Hungary and other countries.
To that end, Mr. Guillermet will submit the draft agreement attached hereto to 
the Hungarian Government.
2. Mr. Guillermet is authorized to sign the aforementioned agreement as long as 
any amendments to it requested by the Hungarian Government do not in any 
way affect the fundamental principles on which it is based.
Mr. Guillermet will especially consider as fundamental principles the entire first 
article. In particular, if the Hungarian authorities reject the principle of family 
reunification or reciprocity in the application of this principle, Mr. Guillermet will 
inform the Hungarian Government that the ICRC, not having been afforded the 
necessary facilities, is compelled to refuse to lend its assistance to such an action, 
and to inform those who have applied to it accordingly.
3. If amendments are requested on essential points, or points that the ICRC 
delegate considers incompatible with fundamental principles, Mr. Guillermet 
will merely make a formal note of the matter and refer it to the ICRC. If he 
sees fit, he may ask the Hungarian Government to draft a written counter­
proposal, which he vail submit to the ICRC.
4. If an agreement can be concluded exclusively for the purpose of reunifying 
families involving minors in the first age category, or the first and second age 
categories, Mr. Guillermet is authorized to sign it without first referring it to 
the ICRC.
5. Mr. Guillermet will inform the Hungarian Government that as soon as the 
agreement has been signed, the ICRC will apply itself to obtaining equivalent 
guarantees from the other governments involved.
6. When his negotiations with the Hungarian Government have been completed, 
Mr. Guillermet will go to Vienna to report to the ICRC. He will not tell the 
Austrian authorities or other governments about the attached draft 
agreement until he has submitted it to the Hungarian Government.
Geneva, 25 April 1957
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
Léopold Boissier 
President
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DRAFT AGREEMENT 
between the Hungarian Government 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
on Family Reunification between Hungary and Other Countries
Many Hungarian families were dispersed following the events of October 
1956, and it appears that family members, some in Hungary and others abroad, 
are not able to join their relatives through their own efforts.
Given this situation, the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic, the 
Governments of several host countries, and the United Nations High Commis­
sioner for Refugees have requested the intervention of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.
In response to these appeals, the International Committee has agreed to lend 
its good offices in order to find a solution to this problem, in accordance with the 
humanitarian principles that guide its action.
Consequently, the Government of the People’s Republic of Hungary and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross agree as follows:
1) The principle of reuniting families dispersed as a result of the events of 
October 1956 will constitute the basis for the humanitarian action that the 
present agreement is intended to facilitate.
This principle wall apply both to Hungarian nationals currently abroad who 
wish to join their families in Hungary or whose families have requested their 
return, and to Hungarian nationals currently in Hungary who wish to join 
their families abroad, or whose families have so requested.
Such reunions wall take place on an individual and voluntary basis.
As a rule, they will take place in the home or place of residence designated by 
the head of the family.
In consideration of the principle of family reunification, the authorities wall issue 
the exit visas for persons to be reunited with their relatives according to a more 
rapid procedure, distinct from that usually applied for emigration purposes.
2) The family réunifications described above wall be undertaken simultaneously 
for Hungarian nationals currently abroad who wash to join then- families in 
Hungary, or whose families have requested their return, and for Hungarian 
nationals currently in Hungary wrho wash to rejoin their families abroad, or 
w7hose families have requested it.
In both cases, wrhere minors are concerned the following age categories will be 
taken into consideration:
1st age category: minors who are under 6 years old on 1 May 1957;
2nd age category: minors w'ho have attained the age of 6-14 years by 1 May 1957; 
3rd age category: minors who have attained the age of 14-18 years by 1 May 
1957.
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Reunification operations will be undertaken successively for each of the three 
age categories defined above, beginning with the first one.
3) The International Committee of the Red Cross will invite both parents, or, 
failing parents, the person or persons exercising parental authority, to state in 
writing their decision concerning the return to or departure from Hungary of 
the minor in question, whatever the latter’s age category. This statement will 
constitute the necessary basis for an examination of the child’s individual case. 
The statements received will subsequently be passed on either to the 
Hungarian Government, in the case of minors currently in Hungary who wish 
to join their families abroad or whose families wish it, or to the host country, in 
the case of minors currently abroad wrho wish to join their families or whose 
families have requested their return.
An analogous procedure will be applied to spouses separated as a result of the 
events of October 1956 who wish to be reunited.
4) Minors in the first age category will be reunited with their families as soon as 
both parents, or, failing parents, the person or persons exercising parental 
authority, have stated their wishes.
Minors in the second age category may be consulted by the ICRC and the 
authorities of the countiy where they are staying concerning their wish to 
return to or leave Hungary.
Minors in the third age category will be consulted in all cases.
5) The family réunifications operations described above will be supervised and 
monitored by the International Committee of the Red Cross and its 
representatives in Hungary.
The Hungarian authorities will accord every facility to the representatives 
designated by the International Committee of the Red Cross to accomplish 
this mission. The representatives of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, who will be of Swiss nationality, will receive in particular the necessary 
entry and exit visas.
In addition, its representatives will be empowered at all times to establish 
direct contact with the petitioning head of the family, with the minors or adults 
whose departure from or return to Hungary is requested, and with the 
persons lodging them.
The National Red Cross Societies may be called upon for assistance in the 
actual accomplishment of family reunification, notably in the provision of 
qualified people to accompany minors.
6) All family-reunification expenses incurred on Hungarian territory shall be 
borne by the Hungarian authorities.
The International Committee of the Red Cross will apply to host countries and 
the relevant governmental and non-governmental organizations to cover 
family-reunification expenses incurred outside of Hungary.
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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Draft
Declaration to Be Signed by the Competent Authorities 
of the Host Countries that Have Taken in 
Hungarian Refugees
X.......................has read the agreement signed between the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Government of the Hungarian People’s 
Republic concerning the reunification of Hungarian families dispersed as a result
of the events of October 1956. X............... subscribes, for his part, to the basic
provisions of that agreement.
Consequently, X.............................undertakes to facilitate the execution of
that agreement under the same terms.
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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234(00-65)
TM/BT
Instructions
pour
Monsieur A, Guillemet
Concerne î Regroupements de familles entre la 
Hongrie et l'étranger»
1, M. Guillemet se rend en qualité de délégué spécial du 
Comité international de la Croix-Rouge en Hongrie en vue 
de demander au Gouvernement hongrois les facilités né­
cessaires à la réalisation des regroupements de famille 
entre la Hongrie et l'étranger»
A cet effet, M. Guillemet soumettra au Gouvernement 
hongrois le projet d'accord ci-joint»
2» M. Guillemet est habilité à signer l’accord sus-mentionné 
dans la mesure où les modifications qui lui seraient 
éventuellement demandées par le ,Gouvernement hongrois 
n'affecteraient en rien les principes fondamentaux sur 
lesquels il repose»
M. Guillemet considérera-notamment comme principes fon­
damentaux l'ensemble de l'art, 1er, En particulier, si 
les autorités hongroises rejettent le principe des regrou­
pements de famille ou la réciprocité dans l'application de 
ce principe, M. Guillemet fera savoir au Gouvernement 
hongrois que le CICR n'obtenant pas les facilités néces* 
saires, est contraint de renoncer à prêter son concours à 
une telle action et d'en informer ceux qui se sont adressés 
à lui.
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3» Au cas où des modifications seraient demandées sur des 
points essentiels ou que le délégué du CICR considérerait 
comme Incompatibles avec des principes fondamentaux,
M. Guillermet se bornera à en prendre acte pour en référer 
au CICR# S'il le Juge à propos, il demandera au Gouver­
nement hongrois de formuler une contre-proposition par 
écrit qu'il soumettra au CICR,
4, Si un accord peut être conclu exclusivement en vue du 
regroupement de familles intéressant les mineurs de la 
première-classe d'âge, ou de la première et de la deuxième 
classe d'Sge, M. Guillermet est autorisé à la signer sans 
en référer au préalable au CICR»'
5. M* Guillermet fera savoir au Gouvernement hongrois que 
sitôt l'accord conclu, le CICR s'emploiera à obtenir des 
garanties équivalentes de la part des autres Gouvernements 
Intéressés.
6» Lorsque ses négociations avec le Gouvernement hongrois
seront terminées, K. Guillermet se rendra à Vienne pour en 
rendre compte au 6ICR, Il s'abstiendra de donner connais­
sance du projet-d'accord ci-joint aux autorités - autri­
chiennes ou à d'autres gouvernements avant de l'avoir 
soumis au Gouvernement hongrois»
Genève, le 2? avril 1957
Léopold BOISSIER 
Président
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PROJET D'ACCORD
entre le Gouvernement hongrois et Comité International 
de la Croix-Rouge sur 
les regroupements de familles entre 
la Hongrie et l'étranger
De nombreuses familles hongroises se sont trouvées 
dispersées à la suite des événements d'octobre 1956 et leurs 
membres, qui sont les uns en Hongrie et les autres à 
l'étranger, ne paraissent pas en mesure de se réunir par 
leurs propres moyens»
En présence de cette situation, le Gouvernement de la 
République populaire de Hongrie, les Gouvernements de 
plusieurs pays d'accueil et le Haut-Commissaire des Nations 
Unies pour les réfugiés ont demandé l'intervention du 
Comité international de la Crcix-Rouge»
Répondant à ces sollicitations, le Comité international 
a accepté de prêter ses bons offices en vue de rechercher 
une solution à ce problème, conformément aux principes 
humanitaires qui guident son action*
En conséquence, le Gouvernement de la République populaire 
de Hongrie et le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge 
conviennent de ce qui suit I
1) Le principe du regroupement des familles dispersées à la 
suite des évènements d'octobre 1956 constituera la base 
de l'action humanitaire que le présent accord aura pour 
but de faciliter,,
146 HUNGARIAN OCTOBER
- 2
Ce principe s'appliquera aux ressortissants 
hongrois actuellement à l'étranger demandant à rejoindre 
leur famille en Hongrie ou dont le retour est demandé par 
cette famille, comme aux ressortissants hongrois actuel­
lement en Hongrie demandant à rejoindre leur famille à 
1'étranger ou dont la sortie est demandée par cette famille*
La réunion aura un caractère individuel et volontaire*
En règle générale, elle 3'accomplira au lieu de 
séjour ou de résidence que désignera le chef de famille «
Compte tenu du principe du regroupement des familles, 
les visas de sortie en faveur des personnes à réunir avec 
leurs proches parents seront accordés par les autorités 
intéressées selon une procédure accélérée et distincte 
de celle appliquée généralement en matière d'émigration*
2) Les regroupements de familles prévus ci-dessus seront entre­
pris simultanément pour les ressortissants hongrois actuel­
lement à l'étranger demandant à rejoindre leur famille en 
Hongrie ou dont le retour est demandé par cette famille 
comme pour les ressortissants hongrois actuellement en 
Hongrie demandant à rejoindre leur famille à l'étranger 
ou dont la sortie est demandée par cette famille.
Dans les deux cas, et en ce qui concerne les mineurs, 
les classes d'âge suivantes seront prises en considération.
1ère classe d'âge, mineurs Jusqu'à 6 ans révolus au 1.5.1957 
2ème " " " de 6 à 14 anx " " " "
3ème " " » de 14 à 18 ans " " " "
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Les opérations de regroupements seront entreprises 
successivement pour chacune des trois classes d'âge défi­
nies ci-dessus, en connençant par la première»
3) Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge invitera les 
deux parents ou, à défaut, celui ou ceux qui exercent 
la puissance paternelle, à se déterminer au moyen d'une 
déclaration écrite, sur le retour en Hongrie ou la sortie 
de Hongrie, du mineur intéressé, quelle que soit la 
classe d'âge à laquelle il appartient. Une telle décla­
ration constituera la base nécessaire à l'étude du cas 
particulier de chaque enfant.
Les déclarations reçues seront transmises pour la 
suite à donner, soit au Gouvernement hongrois dans le 
cas des mineurs actuellement en Hongrie et demandant à 
rejoindre leur famille a l'étranger ou dont la sortie 
est demandée par cette famille, soit au?: pairs d'accueil 
dans le cas des mineurs actuellement à l'étranger et 
demandant à rejoindre leur famille ou dont le retour est 
demandé par cette famille*
Une procé-’ure analogue sera appliquée aux conjoints 
séparés à la suite des évènements d'octobre 1956 et 
désireux d'être réunis.
è-) Les mineurs de la première classe d'âge seront réunis 
avec leur famille sitôt que les deux parents, ou à leur 
défaut, celui ou ceux qui exercent la puissance paternelle, 
se seront déterminés.
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Les mineurs de la deuxième classe d'âge pourront 
être consultés par le CICR et les autorités du pays où 
ils se trouvent, sur leur désir de retourner en Hongrie 
ou leur d-sir de sortir de Hongrie.
Les mineurs de la troisième classe d'âge seront 
dans tous les cas consultés,
5) Les opérations de regroupement de familles décrites ci- 
dessus seront placées sous la surveillance et le contrôle 
du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et de ses 
représentants en Hongrie»
Les autorités hongroises accorderont toutes faci­
lités aux représentants que désignera le Comité inter­
national de la Croix-Rouge pour l'accomplissement de 
cette mission. Les représentants du Comité international 
de la Croix-Rouge, qui seront de nationalité suisse, 
recevront en particulier les visas d'entrée et de sortie 
nécessaires»
D'autre part, ses représentants seront en tout 
temps habilités à prendre directement contact avec le 
chef de famille demandeur, avec les mineurs ou les adultes 
dont la sortie de Hongrie ou le retour en Hongrie est 
demandé, comme avec les personnes qui les hébergent»
Il pourra faire appel au concours des Sociétés 
nationales de la Croix-Rouge pour la réalisation maté» 
rielle des regroupements de familles, notamment pour 
11 accompagnement des mineurs par des personnes qualifiées.
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6) Tour- les frais de regroupement de familles encourus 
sur territoire hongrois seront couverts par les auto­
rités hongroises.
Pour la couverture des frais de regroupement de 
familles encourus hors de Hongrie, le Comité interna­
tional de la Croix-Rouge interviendra auprès des pays 
d'accueil et des organisations gouvernementales et non- 
gouvernementales intéressées.
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23 avril 1957
Projet
d'une déclaration à signer par les autorités responsables 
des pays d'accueil ayant accueilli des réfugiés hongrois»
X............. .. a pris connaissance
de l'accord passé entre le Comité international de la 
Croix-Rouge et le Gouvernement de la République populaire 
hongroise au sujet du regroupement des familles hongroises 
dispersées à la suite des évènements d'Octobre 1956. X ... 
souscrit, en ce qui le concerne, aux dispositions de 
principe contenues dans cet accord»
En conséquence, X ............................... ..
s'engage à faciliter l'exécution de cet accord dans des 
conditions identiques.
ANNEX XVII
MISSION REPORT BY DELEGATE BECKH
Report by M.H.G. Beckh on Mission to Vienna 
and Budapest, 11-21 October 1966
From the 11th to the 13th of October, I held meetings, described below, in 
Vienna. On 14 October, I went to Budapest, this date having been decided upon in 
Geneva during meetings between the League and Mr. Rostás, the Secretary- 
General of the Hungarian Red Cross. In Budapest, accordingly, I exchanged 
views with representatives of the Hungarian Red Cross and of the Hungarian 
Lawyers’ Association.
VIENNA
Austrians Missing in the USSR
The three-way meeting between Presidents von Lauda and Miterev and a 
representative of the ICRC could not be organized during the League meetings. 
Originally the plan had been for Mr. von Lauda to request an interview with Mr. 
Miterev, at which he would propose the participation of the ICRC. However, Mr. 
von Lauda was obliged to return suddenly to Vienna because his wife had to 
undergo an operation. Mr. Sevcik, for his part, has not had the opportunity to 
speak of the matter to the President of the Alliance.
Accordingly, Mr. Sevcik intends to write to the Alliance and lay before it the 
problem of Austrians who have disappeared in the USSR. At the time of my visit, 
he was hesitating between two possibilities: to write to the Alliance now and 
afterwards request the support of Mr. Jonas, President of the Austrian Republic, 
who was expecting a visit from Mr. Potgorny, President of the Soviet Union; or to 
leave it to Mr. Jonas to take up the issue with his guest in the name of the Austrian 
government.
Minister Krippl-Redlich, head of the Legal Division of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, rather regretted the contretemps in Geneva, since, he said, it would have 
been better if Mr. Jonas could have recommended to his Soviet colleague a Red 
Cross action that was already in progress. The Minister thought that this would 
have been preferable since a request by the Austrian Embassy in Moscow had 
already been refused (see HGB report, no. 1792, 27.10.66, page 2).
Family Reunification
My trip to Vienna gave me the opportunity to discuss a few cases of family 
reunification and to give instructions.
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BUDAPEST 
Political Detainees
Mr. Rostás, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Red Cross, received me 
immediately, in the presence of Mrs. Koltai. Since returning from Geneva, he had 
once again contacted the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the 
administration of penitentiary facilities, but the attitude there was very negative.
The Hungarian authorities in fact seem to think they have done everything 
necessary to meet the humanitarian requirements of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions: authorization granted to the Hungarian Red Cross to visit, in 1961, 
two places of detention and to send relief parcels, and, finally, the authorization 
granted to Mr. Maunoir to visit the Thökol Penitentiary Centre on 12 October 
1965.
It would, of course, be desirable to extend aid to political detainees all over the 
world; but why concentrate on Hungary, when everyone knows that the situation 
of political detainees in Spain is terrible? If the Hungarian Red Cross could tell 
the competent authorities that the ICRC also visits political detainees in Spain, 
our delegates would have a greater chance of obtaining new visiting permits.
I did not endorse Mr. Rostas’s unfavourable attitude, an attitude all the more 
surprising because he had intimated other views to me in Geneva. Accordingly, I 
tried to get the Red Cross and the authorities to reconsider their decision during 
two other talks with the leaders of the National Red Cross Society, as well as with 
Mr. Benedek, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Lawyers’ Association.
My general argument and the responses I received were as follows:
The Hungarian Red Cross seems rather surprised that Mr. Maunoir’s prison 
visit in October 1965 has not been mentioned in our publications [Revue, general 
report, etc.).
I explained that Mr. Maunoir’s visit could not be characterized as a visit to 
prisoners in the sense of Article 3. First of all, he had not been able to speak with 
prisoners who had taken part in the events of the autumn of 1956, but only with 
two other political detainees of a different category, and he had been allowed to do 
that only with prison administrators present.
Mr. Rostás expressed the opinion that this was perfectly reasonable, since the 
Third Geneva Convention does not stipulate private meetings with prisoners — 
an opinion that I refuted by citing Article 126 of the Third Geneva Convention. 
Mr. Rostás acquiesced. In addition, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Red 
Cross maintained that it did not matter which category of detainees Mr. Maunoir 
managed to speak with, since all the prisoners were subject to the same 
conditions; according to him, a spy who had collaborated with the enemy would be 
a political prisoner like any other.
With respect to political prisoners in Spain, I emphasized that the ICRC had 
made indefatigable efforts to gain access to detainees. However, whereas in 
Hungary the issue was the application of Article 3 of the Conventions, the
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situation in Spain was different. As far as we know, none of the political prisoners 
currently in detention there had been arrested for participating in the civil war. If 
the Hungarian government did not agree to the application of Article 3, the 
ICRC’s chances of achieving any success in Spain would dwindle still further. Mr. 
Rostás and Mrs. Koltai seemed to understand this argument. Moreover, I pointed 
out again that when a delegate spoke with a political detainee, he was supposed to 
discuss only the material conditions of detention.
At the conclusion of our conversation, I submitted a list containing the names 
of 35 political detainees, particularly those who had taken part in the events of the 
autumn of 1956, and I specified that I wanted to speak to a dozen of them. As for 
the other detainees on the list, the ICRC would be grateful to the Hungarian Red 
Cross and authorities for any recent information on their state of health, as well as 
their chances of a prompt release. I gave them to understand that if the 
Hungarian authorities agreed to authorize an ICRC delegate to speak privately 
with those dozen prisoners, it would probably be possible to mention the mission 
in our publications. The text might take the following form: While the authorities 
had, in 1965, allowed one of the ICRC delegates to look at the various facilities of a 
place of detention, the same authorities have in the meantime granted another 
delegate the opportunity to speak with a dozen political detainees of his choice, 
freely and without witnesses.
After speaking to the penitentiary authorities again, Mr. Rostás and Mrs. 
Koltai finally informed me that the administration would in principle be 
favourably disposed to this request. Although the visit could not be made during 
10th anniversary of the counter-revolution, I could probably make it during my 
next mission to Hungary. Since I am expected in Bulgaria in the first week of 
December, also to visit a place of detention, the date of this stop in Budapest was 
tentatively set for mid-December.
For his part, Mr. Benedek, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Lawyers’ 
Association, unofficially promised me to support our plan if possible. In addition, 
he advised me to go to the Ministi-y of Justice myself and talk with the Minister’s 
deputy. Upon reflection, however, I decided not to do this, in order to avoid 
antagonizing the Hungarian Red Cross, which seemed to me to be doing 
everything it could to support us.
Moreover, I referred to a letter from Amnesty International, dated 
26 September, on the subject of political detainees in Hungary. This organization 
had sent us a photocopy of a letter from the Hungarian Lawyers’ Association in 
which the Association advised Amnesty to contact the ICRC because the latter 
had been informed, by a letter from the Hungarian Red Cross dated 23 August 
1966, of the fate of a certain number of political prisoners.
Before responding to Amnesty, I decided to discuss the matter with both the 
Hungarian Red Cross and the Hungarian Lawyers’ Association. These two 
organizations stated that we could cite the information contained in the letter 
from the Hungarian Red Cross, but that we must advise the London organization 
to ensure that this information was not revealed in the press.
154 HUNGARIAN OCTOBER
The Lawyers’ Association obligingly obtained a translation of the Hungarian 
penal code for me. This code is rather draconian with respect to penalties for all 
acts or omissions considered hostile to “the public and social order of the 
Hungarian People’s Republic”.
* *
*
Mr. Fuchss, Ambassador of Switzerland, very kindly assisted me as much as 
he could by providing me with useful information.
From another source, I was told that the Minister of Justice, Mr. Ferenc 
Nezval, is a very restrained, suspicious person, which explains why the ICRC, 
despite Mr. Maunoir’s indefatigable efforts, has not yet obtained authorization to 
visit political prisoners in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
[signed] 
H.-G. BECKH
3.XI.1966
HGB/gj
(Traits, from the French: M.G.)
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Original text of annex XVII (French)
RAPPORT PE MISSION DE M. H.G.BECKH
à Vienne et Budapest du 11 au 21 octobre 1966
Du 11 au 13 octobre, j'ai eu à Vienne des entretiens 
que je relate ci-dessous.
le 14 octobre, je me suis rendu à Budapest, date qui a 
été fixée à Genève lors des réunions de la ligue avec M. Rostás, 
secrétaire général de la Croix-Rouge hongroise. J'ai donc eu, à 
Budapest, des échanges de vues avec des représentants de la 
Croix-Rouge hongroise et de l'association des juristes hongrois.
VIEME
Autrichiens disparus en JtaJii iuhe
1'entretien tripartite entre les présidents von lauda 
et Miterev ainsi qu'un représentant du CICR n'a pas pu être 
organisé lors des réunions de la ligue. En effet, il avait été 
prévu que M. von lauda demande un entretien à M. Miterev où il 
aurait proposé la participation du CICR. Or M. von lauda a dû 
rentrer précipitamment à Vienne, sa femme ayant dû subir une 
opération. M. Geveik, de son côté, n'a pas eu 1'occasion d'en 
parler au président de 1'Alliance.
M. Heveik a donc 1'intention d'écrire à 1'"Alliance" 
pour lui soumettre le problème des Autrichiens disparus en URBS 
lors de ma visite, il hésitait entre deux possibilités : soit 
écrire maintenant à l'Alliance et demander par la suite l'appui 
de M. Jonas, président de la République autrichienne, qui doit 
recevoir prochainement la visite de M. Potgorny, président de 
la l'Union soviétique, ou laisser à M. Jonas le soin d'entamer 
ce problème au nom du gouvernement autrichien auprès de son 
hôte.
Le Ministre Krippl-Redlich, chef de la Division juri­
dique du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, a regretté quelque 
peu le contretemps qui s'est produit à Genève, car, selon lui, 
il aurait été préférable que M. Jonas puisse recommander à son 
collègue soviétique une action de la Croix-Rouge déjà commencée. 
Selon le ministre, cette manière de faire lui aurait semblé plus 
opportune vu le refus qui avait déjà été opposé à une demande 
de 1'Ambassade d'Autriche à Moscou (voir rapport HGB, enr. 1792 
du 27.10.1966, page 2).
1833
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Regroupement de familles
Mon passage à Vienne a permis de discuter de quelques 
cas de regroupement de familles et de donner des directives.
BUDAPEST
Détenus politiques
M. Rostás, secrétaire général de la Croix-Rouge hon­
groise, m'a reçu aussitôt, en présence de Mme Koltai. Depuis 
son retour de Genève il avait repris contact avec le Ministère 
de la Justice qui assume 11 administration des établissements 
pénitentiaires, qui a eu une attitude très négative.
En effet, les autorités hongroises seraient d'avis 
d'avoir fait tout le nécessaire pour répondre aux exigences 
humanitaires contenues dans l'art. 3 des Conventions de Genève : 
autorisation accordée à la Croix-Rouge hongroise de visiter, en 
1961, 2 lieux de détention et d'envoyer démolis de secours et, 
finalement, 1'autorisation accordée à M. Maunoir de visiter, 
le 12 octobre 1965, le Centre pénitentiaire de Thökol.
Il serait bien, sans doute, d'étendre dans tout le 
monde 11 assistance aux détenus politiques ; mais pourquoi se 
concentrer sur la Hongrie, alors que tout le monde sait que la 
situation des détenus politiques en Espagne est terrible. Si la 
Croix-Rouge hongroise pouvait dire aux autorités compétentes que 
le CICR visite également les détenus politiques en Espagne, nos 
délégués auraient plus de chance d'obtenir de nouvelles autori­
sations de visites.
Je n'ai pas acquiescé à cette prise de position défa­
vorable de M. Rostás, qui était d'autant plus étonnante qu'il 
m'avait fait entrevoir d'autres perspectives, à Genève. J'ai 
donc tenté de faire revenir la Croix-Rouge et les autorités sur 
leur décision au cours de deux autres entretiens avec les diri­
geants de la Croix-Rouge nationale, ainsi qu'avec M. Benedek, 
secrétaire général de 1'Association des juristes hongrois.
J'ai à peu près fait valoir 1'argumentation suivante, 
et voici les réponses qui me furent données :
la Croix-Rouge hongroise semble s'étonner quelque peu 
de ce que la visite de prison faite par M. Maunoir en octobre 
1965 n'ait pas été mentionnée dans nos publications (Revue, 
rapport général, etc.)
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J'ai expliqué que cette visite n1 avait pas le carac­
tère prévu pour une visite à des prisonniers tombant sous le 
coup de l'art. 3• Tout d'abord, M. Maunoir n'a pas pu s'entre­
tenir avec des prisonniers qui avaient pris part aux événements 
de l'automne 1956 mais seulement avec 2 autres détenus politiques 
d'une autre catégorie, et il n'a pu le faire qu'en présence des 
dirigeants de la prison.
M. Rostás a émis 1'opinion que ceci aurait été tout à 
fait naturel étant donné que la 3ème Convention de Genève ne 
prévoit pas des entretiens en privé avec les prisonniers, opinion 
à laquelle j'ai pu opposer 1'article 126 de la 3ème Convention 
de Genève. M. Rostás acquiesça. D'autre part, le secrétaire géné­
ral de la Croix-Rouge hongroise était d'avis que la câtégorie 
de détenus avec lesquels M. Maunoir avait pu parler n'avait pas 
d'importance, car les prisonniers avaient tous le même régime ; 
selon lui, un espion ayant collaboré avec l'ennemi serait un 
prisonnier politique comme un autre.
Quant aux prisonniers politiques en Espagne, j'ai 
souligné que le CICR avait déployé des efforts inlassables pour 
avoir accès auprès des détenus. Toutefois, alors qu'en Hongrie 
il s'agirait en fait de 1'application de 1'article 3 des Conven­
tions, la situation se présente différemment en Espagne. Pour 
autant que nous le sachions, aucun 4le» des prisonniers politiques 
actuellement détenus n'a été arrêté du fait de sa participation 
à la guerre civile. 3i le gouvernement hongrois n'accordait pas 
1 'application de cet article, les chances pour le CICR d;'aboutir 
en Espagne diminueraient encore. M. Rostás et Mme Holtai donnèrent 
1'impression de comprendre cet argument . En outre, j'ai répété 
que lorsquèun délégué a un entretien avec un détenu politique, 
il est sensé s'occuper uniquement des conditions matérielles de 
la détention.
A l'issue de notre conversation, j'ai soumis une liste 
de 35 noms de détenus politiques^ particulièrement ceux qui 
avaient pris part aux événements de l'automne 1956, et j'ai pré­
cisé que je désirais parler à une douzaine d'entre-eux-r Pour 
les autres détenus mentionnés dans la liste, le CICR serait re­
connaissant à la Croix-Rouge et aux autorités hongroises de 
bien vouloir lui fornir des informations récentes sur leur état 
de santé ainsi que sur les possibilités éventuelles de leur pro­
chaine libération. J'ai fait entrevoir qu'au cas où les autorités 
hongroises seraient d'accord d'autoriser un délégué du CICR de 
parler, seul à seul, avec cette douzaine de prisonniers, ceci nous 
donnerait probablement la possibilité de faire mention d'une telle 
mission dans nos publications. Le texte pourrait avoir la teneur 
suivante : Alors que les autorités avaient donné la possibilité 
à un des délégués du CICR, en 1965, de prendre connaissance des 
diverses installations d'un lieu de détention, ces mêmes autorités
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ont entretemps accordé à un autre délégué la possibilité de 
s'entretenir avec une douzaine de détenus politiques de son choix, 
librement et sans témoin.
Après avoir parlé à nouveau avec l'administration péni­
tentiaire, M. Rostás et Mme Koltai m'ont finalement déclaré que 
cette administration serait en principe favorable à cette demande. 
Toutefois, cette visite ne pourrait pas se faire au moment du 
lOème anniversaire de la contre-révolution. En revanche, je 
pourrais, en toute probabilité, réaliser ce projet de visite 
lors d'une prochaine mission en Hongrie. Etant donné que je suis 
attendu dans la première semaine du mois de décembre, en Bulgarie, 
également pour me rendre dans un lieu de détention, la date de 
cette halte à Budapest a été provisoirement fixée pour la mi- 
décembre.
De son côté H. Benedek, secrétaire général de l'asso­
ciation des juristes hongrois, m'a officieusement promis d'appuyer 
si possible notre projet. Il m'a du reste conseillé de me rendre 
moi-même au Ministère de la Justice et de parler avec l'adjoint 
du Ministre. Après réflexion, j'ai quand même renoncé à me rendre 
à ce Ministère pour ne pas indisposer la Croix-Rouge hongroise, 
qui m'a semblé faire tout son possible pour nous appuyer.
Je me suis du reste référé à une lettre d'"Amnesty 
international" du 26 septembre, au sujet de détenus politiques 
en Hongrie. Cette organisation nous adressait la photocopie d'une 
lettre de 1'"Association des juristes hongrois" d'où il ressor­
tait que cette dernière conseillait à "Amnesty" de s'adresser 
au CICR, étant donné que celui-ci avait été informé, par une lettre 
de la Croix-Rouge hongroise datée du 23-8.1966, du sort d'un 
certain nombre de prisonniers politiques.
J'ai préféré avoir, avant de répondre à "Amnesty", 
un échange de vues tant avec la Croix-Rouge hongroise qu'avec 
l'Association des juristes hongrois. Ces deux organisations 
ont déclaré qjue nous pourrions faire état des renseignements 
contenus dans/lettre de la Croix-Rouge hongroise mais que nous 
devions recommander à l'organisation de Londres de veiller à 
ce que ces renseignements ne soient pas divulgués dans la presse.
L'association des juristes a bien voulu me. procurer 
une traduction du code pénal hongrois. Ce code esVdraconien en 
ce qui concerne les sanctions contre tous agissements ou toutes 
omissions,lesquels sont considérés comme hostiles à "l'ordre 
étatique et social de la République populaire hongroise."
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M. Fuchss, Ambassadeur de Suisse, m'a très aima­
blement aidé dans le cadre de ses possibilités en me fournis­
sant d'utiles renseignements.
Par une autre source, il m'a été dit que le Ministre 
de la Justice, M. Ferenc Nezval, est une personnalité très 
fermée et méfiante, ce qui explique pourquoi le CICR, malgré les 
efforts inlassables de M. Maunoir, n'a pas encore obtenu l'auto­
risation de visiter les prisonniers politiques, conformément à 
1'article 3 des Conventions de Genève.
H.-G. BECKH
ANNEX XVIII
LETTER FROM DELEGATE BORSINGER 
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ICRC
PERSONAL Vienna, 8 June 1957
MBB/EBr.
Professor Léopold Boissier
President of the International Committee of the Red Cross
7, Avenue de la Paix
ICRC
Geneva
Dear Mr. President,
I am most eager to thank you for your very kind personal letter (no. 322) of 
3 June, which I value highly. I am waiting now not only to express my gratitude, 
but also to give you some additional information on the subject of our relations 
with the authorities and diplomatic representatives here.
What I particularly appreciated was your confirmation that the ICRC does 
not wish to rush anything or, especially, to break off valuable contacts that are of 
greater importance than our activity in Hungarian territory. This is in fact the 
line that we endorse each time differences seem to be imminent, whether with 
certain donors or with the Austrian government in the sphere of family 
reunification. Particularly since December, I have been trying to make the 
Americans understand that if in operations of perhaps secondary importance 
— such as that in Hungary — the ICRC may occasionally appear to hesitate or to 
progress extremely slowly and carefully, this is because it must always 
remember that its main task is not necessarily to provide material relief, but, 
on the contrary, to be constantly in a position to fill the role accorded to it by the 
Geneva Conventions, now in force almost universally. Any concessions the 
Committee may make in the course of some secondary action are made advisedly 
and are intended to maintain contact with certain groups that distrust everything 
emanating from our regions, precisely so that it can act effectively if the worst 
happens. This also works to the advantage of the American people, since it 
constitutes a sort of “disaster insurance” for the future. It seems to me that the 
Americans are beginning to understand this, and I have not really felt any very 
great resistance on the part of the United States Embassy here to the
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continuation of our operations as planned until 30 June, despite the changes that 
have taken place within the Hungarian Red Cross.
The foregoing obviously applies, though admittedly in a lesser degree, to our 
relations here with the League and the Embassies of Great Britain and France. 
An interesting observation in this respect is that the minor European powers 
seem much closer to us, with a better grasp of our modus operandi, and support 
our action in Hungary almost unreservedly. I am thinking in particular of the 
Scandinavian States, as well as the Benelux countries, Switzerland, and West 
Germany. As regards family reunification, the Austrians are clearly rather 
disappointed by the failure of our talks with the Hungarian government on this 
subject, but their disappointment is fortunately tempered by outright hostility 
towards the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which 
saves us from being the black sheep of this operation!
I must tell you that the last time Mr. de Rougé passed through, he invited 
Minister Helmer to dinner, last Tuesday, and was kind enough to extend the 
invitation to me. Other people you know were present as well: the section head, 
Hantschk, who is Permanent Secretary of State for internal affairs; the 
ministerial advisor Lieher; Mr. Schaeffer, General Delegate of the League; Mr. 
Page of the American Red Cross; Messrs Elliot and Brings, the respective 
Assistant Directors of the offices of the High Commissioner and the ICEM here; 
General Hickmann and Mr. Sevcik, respectively Secretary-General and 
Assistant Secretary of the Austrian Red Cross; and Count Goess, Vice-President 
of that society, Mr. de Lauda being absent.
At the end of the dinner, Mr. Helmer delivered a beautiful speech to mark the 
occasion of Mr. Schaeffer’s departure and to thank Mr. de Rougé for the League’s 
assistance to the Hungarian refugees in Austria. However, this heartfelt speech, 
which lasted half an hour, dwelled for 20 minutes on the ICRC’s action in 
Hungary. This, I know, was no accident on Minister Helmer’s part; he looked at 
me too often, using this means to send a message to the ICRC.
What was visibly preoccupying this remarkable man was what would happen 
to the five professors, particularly later when we will have left Hungary. He 
fears, in fact, that their days of relative freedom are now numbered. He 
apparently wants the ICRC to aid and protect them, or even get them out of 
Hungary. He even added: “The key used to lock the office you have been asked to 
leave is often — behind the iron curtain - the same that locks your cell”.
I explained to Minister Helmer that this is a problem that also worries the 
ICRC, and that I had been asked, a few months ago, to convey a note from Geneva 
to our delegation in Budapest concerning precisely that question, and not merely 
with respect to the five members of that society’s presidency, but all other 
members who might in future find themselves in a delicate position. I delivered 
that note to Mr. Kuli, but do not know what our delegation has done since then. I 
will seize the next opportunity to recall the matter to our delegation. I also 
thought I sensed in Minister Helmer’s speech that feeling that I have already
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reported - that the Committee’s attitude towards the People’s Democracies is 
perhaps not firm enough.
Here you have, Mr. President, the scraps of information I wanted to give you. 
I would not wish, however, to end this letter on an overly negative note. It goes 
without saying that alongside the reservations or criticisms, sometimes veiled, 
concerning certain aspects of our activities, there is also much praise and 
admiration for our relief work in Hungary and for the way that this action has 
been carried out from Geneva as well as by Mr. Rutishauser here. For example, I 
am convinced that the perhaps rather unfortunate impression made on the 
Americans by our failure in North Korea has now, to a large extent, been erased, 
and that they have more confidence in the ICRC than they did four or five years 
ago.
I remain, Mr. President, your devoted servant, 
[signed]
Melchior Borsinger
(Trans, from the French: M.G.)
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Original text of annex XVIII (French)
COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL
CROIX-ROUGE
PERSOItKEL
Vienne, le 8 juin 1957 
MHB/EBt.
Monsieur le Président,
Je tiens tout particulièrement à vous remercier de votre 
très aimable lettre personnelle no. 322 du 3 juin, qui m’a été, 
et qui m'est très précieuse. Si je vous écris, ce n'est pas 
seulement pour exprimer ma reconnaissance, mais aussi pour vous 
donner quelques éléments d'information complémentaires au sujet 
de nos rélatiens avec les autorités et représentations diplomatiques 
ici.
Ce qui m'a été particulièrement précieux, était votre con­
firmation que le CICR ne désire pas brusquer quoique ce soit et 
surtout rompre des contacts précieux, dont la signification dépasse 
celle de notre activité sur le territoire hongrois. C'est en effet 
une ligne que nous nous permettons de défendre ici chaque fois que 
des divergences semblent être sur le point de se produire, soit avec 
certains donateurs, soit avec le gouvernement autrichien dans le do­
maine de la réunion de familles. Auprès des américains, notamment 
depuis le mois de décembre,je m'efforce de faire comprendre que, si 
dans les actions prèsque secondaires - comme celle de Hongrie - le 
CICR peut, quelquefois, paraître hésitant ou progresser avec une 
extrême lenteur et prudence, c'est qu'il doit toujours garder en
Monsieur le Professeur Léopold Boissier 
Président du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge 
7, Avenue de la Paix
C. I. C. R.
Genève
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mémoire que sa tâche principale n'est pas nécessairement d'apporter 
des secours matériels mais au contraire de toujours être à même de 
remplir le rôle qui lui est dévolu par les Conventions de Genève, 
maintenant prèsqu'universellement en vigeur. Si le Comité fait certaines 
concessions au cours d'une action secondaire quelconque, il les fait 
sciemment et afin de garder le contact avec certaines milieux qui se 
méfient de tout ce qui vient de nos régions, afin précisément de pouvoir 
agir efficaement au cas ou le pire viendrait à se produire, agissant 
ainsi également à l'avantage du peuple américain, car il s'agit d'une 
sorte "d'assurance catastrophe" envers l'avenir. Il me semble que * nos 
interlocuteurs commencent à comprendre cela et je n'ai, à la vérité, 
pas senti une très forte résistance de côté de l'Ambassade des Etats 
Unies ici pour la poursuite de nos operations comme prévu jusqu'au 30 
juin, malgré les changements intervenus au sein de la Croix-Rouge hong­
roise.
Ce qui précède s'applique évidemment, mais dans une moindre mesure, 
il est vrai, à nos rélations ici avec la Ligue et les Ambassades de Grand- 
Bretagne et de France. Une constatation intéressante dans ce domaine est 
que les petites puissances européens semblent beaucoup plus proche de nous, 
saisissant mieux notre façon de procéder et soutiennent notre action en 
Hongrie quasiment sans réserves. Je pense surtout aux Etats Scandinaves 
ainsi qu'aux pays du Benelux, la Suisse et l'Allemagne occidentale. En ce 
qui concerne la réunion de familles, il est évident qu'il y a une légère 
déception de côté autrichien à la suite de l'échec de nos conversations 
avec le gouvernement hongrois dans ce domain, heureusement mâtiné par 
une franche hostilité envers le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour 
les réfugiés et toutes leurs oeuvres, ce qui nous value de ne pas être 
les brebis noires de cette operation!
Il faut que je vous informe qu'à l'occasion du dernier passage de M. 
de Rougé, celui-ci a offert un dîner au Ministre Helmer, mardi dernier au­
quel il a eu la grande aimabilité de me convier et auquel assistaient 
également divers personalités que vous connaissez; soit le chef de section 
Hontschk, secrétaire d'état permanent de l'intérieur, le conseiller 
ministériel Lieher, M. Schaeffer, délégué général de la Ligue, Mr. Page
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Croix-Rouge américaine, MM. Elliot et Frings, respectivement directeurs- 
adjoints des bureaux du Haut Commissaire et du CIME ici, ainsi que le 
Général Hickmann et M. Se veik, secrétaire-général et secrétaire adjoint 
de la Croix-Rouge autrichienne, Le Comte Goess, vice-président de cette 
société - M. de Lauda étant absent.
A l'issue du dîner, M. Helmer a fait un très beau discours pour le 
départ de M. Schaeffer et pour remercier M. de Rougé pour l'aide de la 
Ligue envers les réfugiés hongrois en Autriche. Toutefois ce discours, 
qui a duré une demie heure et venait du coeur, traitait pendant 20 minutes 
1'action du CICR en Hongrie. Il s'agissait pas, je le sais, d'une confusion 
de l'ésprit du Ministre Helmer qui m'a trop souvent regardé et adressait 
ainsi un message au CICR.
Ce qui préoccupe visiblement cet homme remarquable est le sort des 
5 professeurs dès maintenant, mais surtout plus tard lorsque nous aurons 
quitté la Hongrie. Il craint, en effet, que leurs jours de liberté re­
latifs soient maintenant comptés. Il aura souhaité que le CICR puisse leur 
assurer aide et protection, voir même les sortir de Hongrie. Il a même 
ajouté: " La clef qui sert à boucler le bureau qu'on a été prier de 
quitter est souvent - derrier le rideau de fer - la même qui verrouile votre 
cellule."
J'ai expliqué au Ministre Helmer qu'il s'agit ici d'un problème qui 
préoccupe également le CICR et que j'avais été prié, il y a quelques mois, 
de remettre une note de Genève à notre délégation de Budapest concernant 
précisément cette question et qu'il s'agissait la non seulement des cinq 
membres de la Présidence de cette société, mais de tous les autres membres 
qui pourraient à 1 'avenir se trouver dans une situation délicate. J'ai re­
mis cette pièce à M. Kuli, mais j'ignore ce que notre délégation a fait 
depuis lors. Je saisirai la prochaine occasion pour rappeler la chose à 
cette délégation. J'ai cru sentir, aussi, dans le discours du Ministre 
Helmer ce sentiment au sujet duquel j'ai déjà fait rapport: soit que 
1'attitude du Comité envers les démocraties populaires n'est peut-être pas 
assez ferme. ./•
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Voici, Monsieur le Président, les quelques éléments d'information 
que je tenais à vous donner. Je ne voudrais pas, cependant, terminer 
cette lettre sur une note trop negative. Il va sans dire qu'à côté 
des réserves ou critiques, quelquefois voilés, quant à certains aspects 
de nos activités, il y a également beaucoup d'éloges et d'admiration 
pour notre oeuvre de secours en Hongrie ainsi que pour la façon dont 
cette action a été exécuté aussi bien de Genève que par M. Rutishauser 
ici. Je suis, par exemple, convainçu que l'impression, peut-être un 
peu fâcheuse qu'à laissé dans l'ésprit des américains, notre échec Corée 
du Nord est maintenant, dans une large mesure, effacée et qu'ils ont 
plus de confidence dans le CICR qu'il y a quatre ou cinq ans.
Croyez-moi, Monsieur le Président, avec ma déférence votre très 
sincèrement dévoué,
Melchior Borsinger
tissn
ANNEX XIX
MAP OF RELIEF DISTRIBUTION CENTRES 
VISITED BY THE DELEGATES
Source: “L’action du CICR en Hongrie”, Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge 
39 (May 1957): 269.
ANNEX XX
CHRONOLOGY OF THE ICRC OPERATION 
IN HUNGARY, 1956-1957
1956
23 October Beginning of unrest in Budapest.
27 " Appeal by the League to the National Red Cross Societies — 
departure of Mr. Beckh with the first relief shipment.
28 " Appeal by the ICRC - departure of Mr. Bovey on board a 
Swissair DC-3.
29 " First air link established with Budapest.
31 " The sixth flight is refused permission to land - ICRC appeal 
to respect the principles of the Geneva Conventions.
1 November First road convoy (of the Austrian Red Cross, led by Mr. de 
Preux) reaches Budapest.
2 " First agreement between the League and the ICRC.
3 11 Mr. Bovey and Mr. de Preux remain in Budapest.
4 " ICRC appeal for a truce.
11 11 Another road convoy crosses the Austro-Hungarian border 
with Dr. Willener.
14 11 Mr. Gallopin meets Mr. Bovey and the leaders of the 
Hungarian Red Cross in Vienna. The first shipment by boat 
arrives in Budapest.
17 " Agreement with the Hungarian Red Cross concerning the 
forwarding of relief supplies. Establishment of a technical 
delegation in Budapest.
27 " Second agreement between the League and the ICRC.
29 " ICRC appeal to National Red Cross Societies to register 
refugees and the establishment of a Hungarian card-index 
at the ICRC Central Agency.
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4 December Agreement with the United Nations.
7 " First letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
stating the needs perceived in Hungary.
10 " Beginning of refugee registration operations in Vienna.
18 " First report by Mr. Rutishauser.
19 " Agreement with the Hungarian Red Cross and the Fűszert 
concerning the sale of flour and the opening of a blocked 
account.
20-21 " Visit to Geneva by representatives of the Hungarian Red 
Cross.
28 " Memorandum to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations on general relief.
1957
4 January Seynes-Wahlen mission to Budapest
17 " Report by the Secreta-i'y-General of the United Nations on 
the UN-FAO mission.
25 " Provisional Rutishauser-Wahlen agreement for the trans­
port of F AO seeds throughout Hungary.
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